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TABLE 1
Main Economic Indicators in Middle East and North African Countries, 2003
GDP
GDP purchasing
per power parity
GDP capita per capita Exchange Population Labor force
Country (US$ millions) (US$) (US$) rate (thousands) (thousands)
Algeria 65,993 2,073 6,248 77.4 31,833 11,336
Bahrain 9,606 13,934 16,900 0.38 689 329
Djibouti 625 1,373 2,144 177.7 455 116
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 70,000 1,036 3,950 5.85 67,559 20,359
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 136,830 2,061 7,145 8,194 66,392 18,700
Iraq 13,500 547 1,500 2,000 24,700 6,100
Jordan 9,860 1,858 4,320 0.71 5,308 1,628
Lebanon 19,000 4,224 5,073 1,508 4,498 1,646
Libya 23,600 4,245 6,300 1.29 5,559 1,604
Morocco 44,491 1,477 4,012 9.57 30,113 12,413
Tunisia 24,282 2,454 7,083 1.29 9,895 4,050
West Bank and Gaza 3,455 1,026 727 4.54 3,367 600
Yemen, Republic of 10,831 565 889 183.5 19,173 6,120
Sources: All data, except as indicated, are from the World Bank World Development Indicators database (2003f, 2004f). Bahrain gross domestic
product (GDP) and population data are from the Bahrain Monetary Agency. Djibouti population and labor data are from the recent population
survey (National Statistical Office). GDP estimates for the Arab Republic of Egypt are based on National Statistical Office data; for Iraq and Libya,
IMF data was used. GDP purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita for Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, and the West Bank and Gaza refer to U.S. government
estimates (the West Bank and Gaza for 2002). Labor force data for the Islamic Republic of Iran are based on official historic labor force partici-
pation rates; for Iraq, the most recent data were used and provided by the government.
Note: Labor force data on the West Bank and Gaza assumes 450,000 employed and a 25 percent unemployment rate.
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Preface
This is the first comprehensive assessment of pension systems in the
Middle East and North Africa. While other regions—Central and Eastern
Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America, in particular—have been
actively introducing reforms to their pension systems, Middle East and
North African countries have lagged behind. This is explained, in part,
by the common belief that, because demographics remain favorable—
the countries are young and the labor force is expanding rapidly—
financial problems are still far in the future and therefore pension reform
does not have to be a priority within the broad policy agenda.
The authors show, however, that pension systems in the Middle East
and North Africa are facing important structural problems. Their
current design imposes unnecessary distortions on the economy and,
contrary to general perceptions, can be a source of adverse distributional
transfers. Basically, pension funds today favor middle- and high-income
workers at the expense of low-income workers. Indeed, the systems cover
a relatively modest share of the labor force (33 percent), mostly workers
in the public sector and the formal private sector. Moreover, in the
majority of systems, the returns that individuals receive on their savings
depend on career and wage histories and on enrollment and on retire-
ment strategies. Hence, although redistribution takes place—some indi-
viduals receive higher returns than others—it is nontransparent and can
be regressive.
But financial problems are starting to develop as well. Even if favor-
able demographic conditions persisted, pension systems in the Middle
East and North Africa would run into trouble eventually. The reason is
simple: the benefit promises are not in line with the contribution rates
and the retirement ages. The fact is, however, that as in other regions, the
populations in Middle East and North African countries will grow older
and aggravate the financial problem. Today, most schemes have accumu-
lated large implicit pension debts, ranging between 30 and more than
100 percent of GDP. This debt is related to the promises made to current
retirees and contributors and is often larger than the explicit government xiii
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debt. Unfortunately, this implicit pension debt is seldom taken into ac-
count when setting macroeconomic and monetary policies, thus biasing
policy choices and affecting the credibility of the fiscal framework. In the
absence of rapid interventions, this debt will continue to grow, threaten-
ing the welfare of future generations. Indeed, governments will have to
default on this debt by abruptly reducing benefits for future generations,
increasing revenues (imposing higher taxes on future generations), or
reducing expenditures on other items (such as education and health).
Thus waiting to intervene can be costly and unfair.
The authors put forward a comprehensive framework to guide dis-
cussion about pension reform. They emphasize the need to differentiate
between two types of policy choices: (a) those related to the objectives
and the mandate of the pension system and (b) those related to the
mechanisms to implement this mandate. Regarding the mandate, coun-
tries need to make explicit choices about the level of benefits that the
pension system will provide, in particular, which share of preretirement
income should be replaced by the public system and which share should
be the responsibility of individuals. Various factors that influence these
choices are discussed. Ultimately, these reflect social and cultural pref-
erences but, at the same time, face economic and biological constraints.
Pension benefits that need to be financed by a 50 percent contribution
rate or by working 60 years or more are not affordable. When it comes
to the design of the system, the authors emphasize that there are many
options that could be considered. There is no universal model that
should be adopted by all countries: on the contrary, the structure of the
pension system needs to respond to local conditions. What is important
is that basic principles of design are respected in all cases, so that
whichever system is chosen is able to work properly and deliver on its
promises.
My hope is that this book will raise awareness about the need to
rapidly address the problems facing pension systems in the region in
order to minimize negative fiscal, macroeconomic, and welfare impacts.
Readers—policy makers, academics, and all of those interested in pen-
sion reform—will find an objective analysis of the current situation and
useful principles for designing and implementing a sustainable, efficient,
and equitable pension system.
CHRISTIAAN J. POORTMAN
VICE PRESIDENT
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION
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Executive Summary
Most countries of the Middle East and North Africa set up their current
national pension schemes in the 1970s, and no major changes or reforms
have been introduced since then. This report shows why pension reform
is needed and why it is urgent. It sets out the options and the arguments
for different ways forward. 
The report highlights six general problems with pension systems in
the region: the pension promise is large and unaffordable; schemes are
financially unsustainable; badly designed rules introduce unnecessary
distortions in labor supply and savings decisions; the schemes are
fragmented and administration is weak and costly; coverage rates are
modest, with important gaps among the self-employed and in rural
areas; and governance structures are not designed to ensure that the
funds are managed in the best interests of plan members. 
This is a stark prognosis, but there is some room for optimism.
Middle East and North African countries do have time to act before the
financial problems bite, but the window for action will not last long. It
is, indeed, “time for change.”
The Prognosis 
Pension promises in Middle East and North Africa are large and unaffordable.
Pension systems in the Middle East and North Africa target, on average,
a pension for full-career workers of nearly 80 percent of earnings before
retirement. This is much higher than the pension promise in 24 high-
income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, in 10 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
and 9 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, where pension
replacement rates average 57 percent.
Middle East and North African countries rarely impose a cap on the
level of earnings eligible for pensions (or these ceilings are very high).
For higher-income workers, earning double the average, the target
replacement rate averages more than 75 percent in the Middle East and xxi
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North Africa region, compared with less than 50 percent in 43 countries
in other regions. 
The size and scope of the pension mandate mean that few people will
want to provide for retirement outside the mandatory pension system, in-
cluding middle and high earners. This means that retirement savings are not
diversified, making them more risky for individuals than they need be and
hampering the development of capital markets through long-term savings
institutions. Finally, high mandates are simply unlikely to be affordable.
Pension systems are financially unsustainable as a result not of future aging
of the population but of poor system design. Because pension schemes in the
Middle East and North African countries are “young,” they are still
running cash flow surpluses, meaning that contribution revenues exceed
benefit expenditures. But this happy position cannot and will not last for
long. The financial projections in this report show that the future flow
of pensions already promised (that is, the implicit pension debt) adds up
to, on average, 80–90 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This is
often larger than conventional government debt. Even where there are
pension reserves, these probably will be depleted in 10 years or so. 
The financial problem is basically explained by the fact that promised
benefits are not in line with retirement rules and contribution rates.
Adjusting these parameters—for instance, by increasing the contribu-
tion rate—could improve financial sustainability, but the necessary
adjustments are unlikely to be feasible. 
As an illustration, to pay for pensions of the size that is promised with-
out changing the retirement rules, the pension contribution rate will need
to rise to 30 percent or more, just to cover old-age pensions: adding in
survivors’ and disability benefits, the contribution rate will need to be
higher still. A rise in contribution rates of this degree will have substan-
tial effects on labor costs and so on competitiveness. Even without demo-
graphic change, pension systems will soon encounter financial problems.
Pension schemes have badly designed rules that damage incentives and
arbitrarily redistribute income between members. Basing pension entitle-
ments on final salary, rather than the average of pay over the lifetime, is
unfair and open to abuse. The history of earnings recorded by the
pension scheme can be manipulated so that the final salary, which
determines the pension, is high, while pay in earlier years, on which
contributions are levied, is lower. Moreover, individuals whose earnings
rise rapidly over their career, who tend to be relatively well paid, receive
relatively more from the pension system than those whose earnings rise
slowly (that is, they receive larger benefits relative to their contributions).
Pension schemes in the Middle East and North Africa also favor and
thus encourage early retirement. While the normal age for pension
eligibility is typically 60, people often can draw the pension at age 50 or
earlier. Early retirees see no adjustments of their benefits or pay a penalty
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that does not reflect the cost of paying the pension for a longer period.
Again, this implies that workers retiring earlier get a better return on
their contributions than those who retire at the normal age or earlier.
Because the implicit returns on the contributions that members pay
depend on their wage history and strategies regarding enrollment and
retirement, the redistribution that takes place within the pension system
is not transparent. Basically, middle- and high-income individuals can
receive better treatment than low-income individuals. 
Administration of pensions is fragmented, often with two or more schemes
for different groups of workers. This is unnecessarily costly and limits the
mobility of the labor force across sectors. There are economies of scale in
managing pension plans, so running multiple programs means that
administrative costs are higher than they need be. An integrated
approach, with a single program for all workers, is more efficient. 
It is often impossible to transfer pension rights between different
pension schemes, or the procedures are cumbersome at best. This makes
labor markets rigid because the movement of the labor force between
sectors is less fluid. Both public and private sectors could benefit from a
flow of workers between employers. 
Finally, benefit formulas and eligibility conditions vary considerably
among the schemes. Fragmentation then becomes another source of
inequalities, as the mandatory pension system treats workers in different
sectors differently. 
Much of the workforce remains uncovered by a formal pension scheme,
reflecting the structure of labor markets. Around a third of the workforce in
Middle East and North African countries is covered by the pension system.
Coverage rates are higher in predominantly public sector economies, such
asLibya,or incountrieswith specialprograms foragriculturalworkers and
the self-employed, such as the Arab Republic of Egypt and Tunisia.
While better incentives for individuals to contribute and for systems to
improve their administrative capacity to track contributions could expand
coverage and reduce evasion at the margin, the main driver will be the
capacity of the economy to generate jobs in the formal sector. Prospects
today are not encouraging, and a considerable part of the labor force will
continue to lack access to appropriate income security during old age.
Governance and administration of pension schemes are weak. In particular,
pension reserves are not managed in the best interests of their members.
Tripartite boards, with representatives of government, employers, and
trade unions, are common. Nominated members often lack the expertise
necessary to manage large and complex financial institutions, and
responsibilities are blurred.
The result is that, where there are pension reserves, investment policies
are risky, governed more by political influence than by the interests of pen-
sion scheme members. Most reserves are in the form of government debt,
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in part reflecting the state of development of capital markets. However,
the debt is rarely formal or marketable. Holdings in private sector enter-
prises are often in companies managed directly by the pension fund. Their
value is difficult to determine, the relative performance of the companies
is difficult to assess, and the companies’ solvency is often questionable.
In addition, administrative capacity is generally weak, amplifying the
problems. Although no survey of administrative capacity has been
conducted across countries, the quality of management raises issues
regarding the administration of collection and record keeping, identifi-
cation of plan members, payment of benefits, information technology
infrastructure, and administrative costs. In particular, information tech-
nology systems are either outmoded or nonexistent. This makes it
impossible for workers to check the accuracy of records and to know the
pension entitlement that they have earned. 
Finally, pensions involve a long-term commitment: today’s policies have
implications for years and decades to come. Middle East and North African
countries are making pension promises that will be difficult or impossi-
ble to keep. With serious financial problems impending, the time for a
change in pensions is now. 
The Way Forward 
Countries considering pension reform ought to differentiate policy
discussions at two levels: (a) general principles and objectives for the
pension system and (b) mechanisms for implementation. 
Regarding the objectives, pension systems around the world concen-
trate on guaranteeing a basic level of income at retirement (adequacy
function) and/or ensuring a minimum level of replacement of before-
retirement income (insurance function). Middle East and North African
countries will need to make explicit choices about the objectives of the
pension system. Thus societies will need to determine the level of pen-
sion entitlements that the system will guarantee at various levels of
income. These choices reflect social preferences and cultural factors
(such as family structure and the capacity of individuals to save on their
own for retirement). In all cases, choices need to be affordable. Replace-
ment rates that require a 30 percent contribution rate are neither
affordable nor sustainable. In general, there is little rationale for the pen-
sion system to be the only source of retirement income, particularly
among middle- and high-income workers.
Regarding implementation, countries have a large pool of pension
systems from which to choose. These systems can be classified along
three dimensions: how they are financed (pay-as-you-go, fully funded,
government budget, or some combination), how pensions are calculated
and risks distributed (earnings-related schemes, defined-contribution
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schemes, or some combination), and how the system is managed (for
example, private or public management, centralized or decentralized
management). There is no unique model that should be implemented.
Choices need to respond to local economic, political, and social condi-
tions. These choices, however, need to be based on sound economic
analysis. In all cases, basic norms for the proper operation of the system
should be respected. In the Middle East and North Africa, the following
principles should guide the reform:
• The pension system should provide benefits that are adequate and
affordable to all workers.
• The pension system should be financially self-sustainable, thus guar-
anteeing that pension promises can be kept.
• If redistribution takes place, it should be transparent and progressive
(that is, from high- to low-income workers).
• The pension system should not distort incentives, and this requires a
closer link between contributions and benefits.
In most Middle East and North African countries, current defined-
benefit schemes are likely to remain an important part of the mandatory
pension system. An integrated reform strategy will then involve inter-
ventions in the following areas:
• Improving financial sustainability, incentives, and equity of current
earnings-related schemes. This will imply realigning promised benefits
with contribution rates and retirement rules and establishing a closer
link between the earnings on which contributions are paid and the
earnings on which pension entitlements are calculated.
• Mitigate the impacts of the reforms on women and review policies that dis-
criminate against them. The necessary changes in benefit formulas and
eligibility conditions are likely to affect more women than men. Thus
it is necessary that adjustments for them will be more gradual. In ad-
dition, women should have the same rights when it comes to trans-
fering pensions to their survivors. Special interventions will also be
required to better protect the rights of divorced women and those
married to men with multiple wives. Finally, it is important to iden-
tify and cost mechanisms to maintain a minimum level of contribu-
tions to the pension fund during the child-bearing years.
• Identifying mechanisms to finance the current implicit pension debt in a trans-
parent manner while making future liabilities explicit. Pension reform will
ensure that the pension rights accrued by new contributions will be
sustainable. The reform, however, will not eliminate the current im-
plicit pension debt—that is, the flow of pension promises to current
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retirees and current contributors. It is important to make this implicit
debt explicit (that is, in the form of formal government debt) and to
design transparent financing mechanisms. In addition, to improve the
credibility of the fiscal framework, it is desirable that new implicit
pension liabilities be backed by explicit government debt.
• Improving governance and administration. Reforms include improving
the mechanisms to select the governing body, accountability, and
investment policies to ensure that pension schemes are run in the best
interests of members. In addition, work is needed on improving
institutional capacity and administration, which will include invest-
ments in information technology systems. Finally, it is important to
review the institutional organization of the pension system to ensure
a gradual integration of the various schemes. In the meantime,
“bridges” are needed to facilitate mobility across schemes. 
• Expanding coverage. Efforts are needed to explore ways of extending
the formal pension system to vulnerable groups. However, this policy
should follow reforms that put the pension system on a financially
sustainable footing. 
• Diversifying the retirement-income provision. Countries with a core of
sound banks and insurance companies and a clear agenda to support
financial sector development (for example, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Morocco) should consider higher levels of funding in the mandatory
scheme. It is also desirable to promote the development of voluntary
private pensions, which implies having in place the appropriate
regulatory and supervisory framework.
The report is organized in six chapters. Chapter 1 discusses motiva-
tions and objectives and details the main findings and messages of each
of the chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the initial conditions for pension
reform, including demographics, macroeconomic prospects, and the
level of development of the financial sectors. Chapter 3 takes stock of the
public pension system in the region and identifies the main problems
that necessitate attention. Chapter 4 introduces a general framework for
pension reform. It describes a set of minimum conditions that any
reform program will have to meet: the specific content of these pro-
grams clearly will have to reflect local economic, social, and political
conditions. Given the relevance for most countries in the region, chap-
ter 5 treats separately the issue of how to improve the management of
public pension funds to serve the interests of plan members. Finally,
chapter 6 provides a brief overview of where Middle East and North
African countries stand in the reform process and discusses future
prospects.
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BOX 1
Glossary of Key Technical Terms
Accrual rate. The share of the preretirement income (income measure) that the worker
receives on retirement for each year of contribution.
Full-career worker. An individual who joins the system at age 20 and contributes until
the normal retirement age or until the maximum replacement rate is reached.
Implicit rate of return. Technically, the rate of return that equates the present value of
contributions to the present value of future pension payments. Since individuals pay
contributions (an operation similar to depositing savings in a bank account) and, on
retirement, receive pensions (an operation similar to withdrawing savings from a bank
account), it is possible to compute the implicit rate of return on the contributions. 
Income measure. The income used as the basis for computing the pension—for in-
stance, the average of the last 10 years of salaries. Technically, the pension is equal to the
income measure times the accrual rate times the number of years of contributions.
Pension wealth. The value at the time of retirement of discounted future pension
payments.
Replacement rate. The pension divided by the last wage.
Vesting period. The number of years during which individuals have contributed and
accumulated pension rights. 
Indexation of pensions. The process by which the value of pensions is adjusted over
time—for instance, as a function of inflation.
Revalorization of wages. The process by which the wages included in the calculation of
the pension are adjusted—for instance, by inflation.
Overview
CHAPTER 1
More than 60 countries have introduced reforms to their mandatory pen-
sion systems in the space of 20 years (Schwarz and Demirgüç-Kunt 1999).
The strategies have varied widely, but a common motivation has been the
need to deal with the financial problems, and fiscal implications, of gen-
erous earnings-related schemes mostly financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
In doing so, reforms have often served other objectives, such as reducing
adverse distributional transfers across and within generations, mitigating
distortions in labor markets and savings decisions, and, in some cases,
contributing to financial sector development and economic growth.
As has happened elsewhere in the world, pension systems in the coun-
tries of the Middle East and North Africa today are at a crossroads.1 They
all have earnings-related pension schemes, in essence financed on a pay-
as-you-go basis, which in their current form go back to the late 1960s and
early 1970s. These schemes cover, on average, 30 percent of the labor
force. Despite these relatively modest coverage levels and the fact that
only 5–10 percent of the elderly receive a pension, expenditures as a share
of gross domestic product (GDP) are already in the 1–3 percent range,
which in most cases is above expectations, given international patterns
and current demographic structures. Most funds are accumulating large
and unsustainable unfunded pension liabilities, and problems regarding
equity, efficiency, governance, and administration are pervasive.
This report takes stock of current mandatory pension systems in the
region, assesses the magnitude and nature of the main problems, and
outlines the common components of an integrated reform strategy. As
discussed in chapter 2, the region is highly heterogeneous. There is large
variation across countries in size, level of income, productive structure,
and political organization: from the Arab Republic of Egypt, with more
than 60 million inhabitants, to Djibouti, with only 450,000 inhabitants;
from the Republic of Yemen, with income per capita of $450, to oil-rich
countries in the gulf, where per capita income surpasses $10,000; from
oil-poor countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco, where
1
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incentives to embrace market reforms are relatively strong, to oil-rich
countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and Libya, which continue
to be dominated by the public sector; from monarchies such as Saudi
Arabia to nascent democracies such as Algeria and Lebanon. The idea of
seeking a common strategy for pension reform could seem futile, yet the
pension systems across the region share important features in design and
face similar structural problems. Thus it is possible to formulate a set of
minimum conditions that any reform program will have to meet; the
specific content of these programs clearly will have to reflect local
economic, social, and political conditions.
A preliminary assessment of pension systems in the region was
undertaken five years ago (Boersch-Supan, Palacios, and Tumbarello
1999). With the limited data available at the time, the report identified
several of the problems facing Middle East and North African coun-
tries and encouraged governments to initiate reforms while demo-
graphic conditions were favorable. Since then, the World Bank has
been providing technical assistance in the area of pension reform to
several countries in the region, new and more detailed information has
become available, and various country studies have been prepared.2
This report is thus able to deepen and expand the analysis as well as the
policy recommendations. 
The report is organized in six chapters. This first chapter provides a
brief overview of the materials presented in the book. Chapter 2
discusses the initial conditions for pension reform, including demo-
graphics, macroeconomic prospects, and level of development of the
financial sector. Chapter 3 takes stock of the public pension systems in
the region and identifies the main problems that require attention.
Chapter 4 introduces a general framework for pension reform and
describes a set of minimum conditions that any reform program will
have to meet. Given the relevance for most countries in the region,
chapter 5 treats separately the issue of how to improve the management
of public pension funds to serve the interests of plan members. Finally,
chapter 6 provides a brief overview of where countries in the region
stand in the reform process and discusses prospects for the future. The
following sections present a detailed summary of the main findings and
messages of each of the principal chapters.
Chapter 2: Initial Conditions for Pension Reform
The chapter looks at the demographic characteristics of countries in
the Middle East and North Africa, macroeconomic prospects for
growth and job creation, as well as the structure of the financial sector.
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Developments in these three areas are important not only because they
affect the functioning of the pension system but also because they can
constrain the choice of reform.
Demographics Remain Favorable But Should 
Not Be a Cause for Complacency 
Although there are important differences in demographic structure, all
countries in the region share a relatively young population. A rapid
increase in old-age dependency ratios will take place only after 15 to
20 years. Within the next decade, the average population growth rate for
the region will remain at around 1.9 percent a year, declining to 1.5 per-
cent for the period 2015–25. The expansion of the working-age popula-
tion is expected to be accompanied by a continuous increase in female
participation rates. This will produce dramatic effects on the size of the
labor force, which is expected to grow 3.3 percent a year between 2002
and 2010, declining to 1.8 percent around the second half of the 2020s. 
These apparently favorable demographics should not be a cause for
complacency. First, it is not clear that the future expansion of the labor
force will be accompanied by an expansion of employment in the formal
sector and, therefore, an expansion of the covered population. Second,
even if this were to occur, chapter 3 shows that, in the majority of cases,
the implicit rates of return paid on contributions by the pension systems
are too high to be sustainable. This being the case, expansion of the
covered population will worsen the financial situation of the funds.
Hence, independent of the aging process, pension systems will eventu-
ally run into trouble. The future aging of the population will simply
make things worse.
Slow Growth and High Unemployment Remain 
Important Challenges 
The majority of countries have made important progress toward achiev-
ing macroeconomic stabilization, which improves the operational condi-
tions of pension funds. With only a few exceptions (the Islamic Republic
of Iran and the West Bank and Gaza), inflation rates are generally below
5 percent a year. This creates a better environment for investors, includ-
ing pension funds, but does not preclude the need for mechanisms
that protect the income of retirees against price fluctuations. External
balances have also improved, although capital controls persist and pen-
sion funds are restricted from investing abroad. Fiscal policies are the
Achilles’ heel. Among the countries surveyed, the fiscal outlook appears
persistently delicate. Fiscal balances continue to be negative (between
4 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
5 and 12 percent of GDP), and public debt remains high (between 50 and
200 percent of GDP). This reinforces the need to control the accumu-
lation of implicit pension debt in pay-as-you-go systems and to find
appropriate and transparent financing mechanisms.
The main challenge remains to stimulate economic growth and job
creation in the private formal sector. Not doing so implies that an im-
portant part of the labor force will remain outside the pension system
and might not be accumulating sufficient savings to finance an adequate
standard of living during old age. Moreover, better living standards for
the elderly can result only from sustained economic growth. Unfortu-
nately, the most recent forecasts put the average yearly growth rate of
income per capita for the next decade in the 1–2 percent range for the
region. Today, the region’s unemployment rate is among the highest in
the world, conservatively estimated at 15.9 percent.3 The informal
sector is also large and expanding (constituting between 42 and 55 per-
cent of nonagricultural employment). Without growth rates of at least
5–6 percent a year, unemployment rates will remain high in most coun-
tries. It is important to emphasize that pension reform could have a role
in facilitating economic growth and job creation if it (a) reduces distor-
tions in labor markets, for instance, by not basing the financial sustain-
ability of the pension system on increases in the contribution rate;
(b) contributes to increased national savings; and (c) contributes to the
development of the financial sector. 
Financial Sectors Remain Underdeveloped But Offer New
Opportunities for Pension Systems in Some Countries 
The role of the public sector in providing pensions and the proper level of
funding for the pension system depend, in part, on the level of develop-
ment of the financial sector. As financial sectors develop, private (that is,
voluntary) arrangements can be expected to assume a more prominent
role in the overall pension system. The level of development of the
financial sector also affects both the opportunities for investment
(for earnings-related and defined-contribution schemes) and the choices
regarding the level of funding. Important questions concern the existence
of a core of sound banks and insurance companies, the level of
development of debt markets, and the level of development of stock
exchanges.
Banking Sector
The banking sector is quite heterogeneous across countries, with assets
ranging from less than 20 percent of GDP (the Republic of Yemen) to
more than 300 percent (Lebanon). In all cases, credit to the private
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sector represents less than 50 percent of total assets. Only Jordan,
Morocco, and Tunisia have a core of commercial banks that seem to be
relatively resilient to both interest rate and exchange rate shocks,
although moderately exposed to deteriorating credit quality in the port-
folio. These banks have the potential to channel pension fund savings to
medium- and long-term investments. Elsewhere in the region, banking
systems are more vulnerable to exchange rate shocks or deteriorating
portfolio quality, have significant exposure to a single borrower (for
example, government bonds in Lebanon), or are too weak to intermedi-
ate new funds effectively.
Insurance Sector
The insurance sector has expanded in the region, but assets remain
below 5 percent of GDP; in most cases, the contribution to financial
intermediation is small. No country has well-developed annuity markets,
and the majority of assets relate to property and casualty insurance and
therefore are invested in short-term, liquid instruments. The life insur-
ance sector is better developed and regulated in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, and Tunisia, with premiums ranging between 9 percent
(Tunisia) and 30 percent (Egypt) of the total. In these countries, insur-
ance companies could provide voluntary private pensions and compete
for the management of public pension funds. In the other countries
surveyed—Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, the West Bank and Gaza, and the
Republic of Yemen—the insurance sector is weak or nonexistent and
lacks expertise in the management of financial funds. In the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the government has privatized the sector, and the reg-
ulator is committed to passing the necessary regulations and supporting
the industry. Reputational risks, however, are hindering its expansion.
Debt Markets
Government debt in the form of bonds and treasury bills is a key compo-
nent of debt markets, yet these represent a modest part of the total govern-
ment debt in the region. Domestic debt tends to be short term—between
one and five years—and benchmark yield curves have failed to develop
(this is due, in part, to the fragmented issuance of public debt). In most
countries commercial banks heavily dominate the purchase of domestic
debt issues. A movement toward funded pensions or the shift of current
reserves in the pension systems to more transparent asset classes would
imply increasing the share of government debt held by domestic investors,
lengthening maturities, and holding open and regular debt auctions.
Corporate bonds are the smallest component of the capital markets,
with maturities between two and five years. Issuance is usually done
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through private placement rather than through auction. Only Tunisia
has noticeable levels of corporate bonds, at 15 percent of stock market
capitalization in 2002, although the majority is tied to financial
institutions.
Equity Markets
Stock exchanges exist in all countries reviewed in this report with the
exception of Djibouti, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic
of Yemen. However, with the probable exception of Jordan, financing
through the stock exchange is marginal, and the number of listed compa-
nies is very small. Egypt has the highest number of listed companies
(1,000), but only 40 percent are traded.
Chapter 3: Taking Stock of Pension Systems 
in the Middle East and North Africa
Chapter 3 is the heart of the report. It summarizes the findings of a review
of more than 30 pension schemes across 13 countries. The chapter pres-
ents the main features of pension systems in the region and the key chal-
lenges along five dimensions: (a) institutional organization and coverage;
(b) the size and shape of the schemes; (c) incentive problems; (d) equity,
including gender equity, problems; and (e) financial sustainability.
Pension Systems Are Fragmented and Coverage Is Modest 
None of the countries surveyed has a national pension scheme that cov-
ers all categories of workers. Even Jordan, which has recently integrated
the schemes for private sector workers, civil servants, and the military,
excludes the self-employed and workers in the agricultural sector. Egypt,
Morocco, and Tunisia have the largest number of schemes: six, five,
and four, respectively. This fragmentation is an important policy issue
because it constrains the mobility of the labor force within and across
sectors, increases administrative costs, and generates an unequal treat-
ment of different categories of workers.
There is a large variation in coverage rates among the countries
included in the analysis (between 10 and 70 percent of the labor force)
explained mainly by the structure of the labor market (for example, public
or private sector) and institutional arrangements that cover different cat-
egories of workers. In Libya, for instance, coverage rates are high (above
70 percent of labor force) because a large majority of the labor force is
employed in the public sector or state-owned enterprises. In Morocco,
in contrast, a large agricultural sector keeps coverage rates depressed
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(around 20 percent of the labor force). Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia achieve
higher-than-average coverage rates through special schemes.
In general, the prospects for expanded coverage rates are limited, and
governments need to think creatively about mechanisms to protect the
old-age income of vulnerable population groups. Better incentives to
enroll or better administrative capacity to track contributions could
improve coverage at the margin, but the impacts are likely to be limited.
Without an expansion of the formal sector of the economy, coverage
rates are unlikely to increase substantially. In this context, noncontribu-
tory pensions (also called social pensions) could be used to guarantee a
basic level of retirement income to vulnerable groups. 
Pension Schemes Have Large Mandates 
The chapter presents an assessment of targeted replacement rates across
pension systems in the region. The replacement rate is defined as the
pension divided by the last salary. It indicates the share of total gross
income that is replaced or preserved at retirement. On average, the
mandates of pension systems in terms of income replacement are
more onerous in the Middle East and North Africa than in other
regions. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and the Republic of Yemen
have the highest replacement rates in the world for the average full-
career worker (above 100 percent).4 The average gross replacement rate
for the region is 75.7 percent. This is much higher than the pension
promise in 24 high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries, in 10 countries in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, and nine countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, where pension replacement rates average 57 percent.
Net replacement rates, which include the effect of taxes, are even
higher. Hence, in Egypt, while the gross pension represents 80 percent
of the gross wage, the net pension represents more than 100 percent. In
essence, the average worker has more disposable income after retirement
than while working!
Schemes for civil servants target, in general, higher levels of income
replacement than schemes for private sector workers.
The targets for the basic pension also tend to be among the most gen-
erous in the world. Moreover, Middle East and North African countries
rarely place ceilings on the covered wage or ceilings are high. As a result,
replacement rates that are flat across levels of income. Basically, the
pension system guarantees the same level of income replacement to a
low- as to a high-income individual.
The problem with having large mandates is that few people will
want to save for retirement outside the mandatory pension system,
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including middle and high earners. This means that retirement savings
are not diversified, making them more risky for individuals than they
need be and hampering the development of capital markets through
long-term savings institutions. Finally, high mandates are simply un-
likely to be affordable, since, to be financed, they will require contribu-
tion rates that the economies cannot sustain.
Benefit Formulas and Eligibility Conditions Damage Incentives 
The mechanisms used to compute and award pensions affect the
behavior of individuals, including retirement, labor supply, and savings
decisions. Chapter 3 assesses incentive problems by reviewing implicit
rates of return on contributions. Indeed, since individuals make contri-
butions during their active life (an operation similar to depositing
savings in a bank) and receive pensions when they retire (an operation
similar to withdrawing savings from a bank), it is possible to compute the
implicit interest rate (or rate of return) on the contributions (savings).
The results show that, across countries and schemes, current benefit
formulas and eligibility conditions provide incentives for retirement over
work. This is reflected in implicit rates of return that are higher for
individuals retiring early than for individuals retiring late. The reason for
this pattern is the lack of actuarially fair reductions in pensions for early
retirement and actuarially fair compensations for delayed retirement.
Ceilings on replacement rates, or pensions, can also lower the rate of
return for individuals retiring late and thus discourage additional years
of contribution. Indeed, once the ceiling is reached, additional contribu-
tions do not bring additional benefits. These ceilings are pervasive in the
region, since most countries use them to reduce costs.
The systems also provide incentives to manipulate salaries stra-
tegically, since only the last few salaries count toward the pension. With
the exception of the RCAR (Régime Collectif d’Assurance et de
Retraite) in Morocco, none of the schemes uses a full-career average of
salaries to compute the pension. In general, the schemes use the last
salary or an average of three to five years. The problem is that workers
have an incentive to declare lower wages early in their career and higher
wages late in their career.
All of the pension schemes in the region reward individuals who evade
or game the system. This is again explained, in part, by the fact that only
a few wages count toward the pension. Ceilings on replacement rates also
contribute by reducing the implicit rate of return paid to workers who
have long contribution periods (to avoid the ceiling, individuals might
choose to delay enrollment). In general, a weak link between contribu-
tions and benefits reduces the incentives to enroll and contribute.
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Redistribution within Pension Systems Is Nontransparent
and Can Be Regressive 
When it comes to redistribution, a primary source of inequality within
generations is also related to the fact that only a few wages count toward
the pension. Manual workers have relatively flat earnings across their
career. Managerial and especially professional workers tend to see their
pay rise more rapidly over their lifetime. Basing pension values on final
salary favors workers with steeply rising earnings. In Algeria, for
instance, a 25-year-old man whose salary grows at 2 percent a year will
receive a rate of return one percentage point lower than a colleague
whose salary grows at 4 percent a year. 
In all pension schemes, there are implicit transfers from young to old
workers, regardless of the level of income, because implicit rates of
return on contributions are allowed to vary by the age of enrollment in
the system. In Tunisia, for instance, a 20-year-old male retiring at age 60
will receive a 4.5 percent real rate of return, while a 30- and a 40-year-
old male will receive a 7 and 9 percent real rate of return, respectively.
Regarding gender equality, pension laws across the region have
attempted to provide women with more flexible retirement decisions
and more secure survivor benefits, driven by the assumption that men
are the principal breadwinners. Standard eligibility ages and vesting pe-
riods for pensions are either equal for men and women or favorable to
women. Early-retirement rules tend to be more generous for women
than for men. Thus, in general, women receive higher implicit rates of
return on their contributions and a higher pension wealth.5
This special treatment, however, also makes women more vulnerable
to pension reform. Indeed, if the goal is to have a pension law that treats
women and men equally, then adjustments will tend to affect women
more than men. Thus policy makers need to devise mechanisms that
mitigate the impact of pension reforms on women. Some alternatives are
discussed in chapter 4.
Pension Systems Are Financially Unsustainable 
The sustainable implicit rate of return that a pay-as-you-go system can af-
ford to pay on contributions is a function of the growth rate of the covered
wage bill. Over the long run, a good proxy for this sustainable implicit rate
of return is the growth rate of the economy (3–4 percent a year). In the large
majority of cases, pension systems are paying rates of return well above
these levels. These high implicit rates of return reflect a misalignment of
the accrual rate, the retirement age, survival probability at retirement, and
contribution rate. Basically, current replacement rates are too high given
the retirement age, contribution rate, and life expectancy at retirement.
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As a result, all pension funds have accumulated large implicit pension
debts. Under conservative assumptions, normalized estimates of
accrued-to-date pension liabilities range between 6 percent of GDP
(RCAR in Morocco) and more than 170 percent (Social Security
Corporation—SSC—in Jordan). The average implicit debt in the region
is close to 80 percent of GDP, often linked to a small segment of the
labor force. These liabilities refer to the present value of pension prom-
ises to current retirees and the pension rights accrued to date by current
contributors. Large implicit pension debts threaten macroeconomic
stability and the credibility of the fiscal framework. They also represent
a potentially large intergenerational transfer. Indeed, in the absence of
any intervention, future generations will have to finance the implicit
pension debt in the form of lower pension benefits, higher taxation, or
reductions in the budget for other items (for example, education and
health).
Chapter 4: A Framework for Reform
Chapter 4 argues that it is important to differentiate between two types
of questions when discussing pension reform: (a) questions regarding the
objectives of the pension system and its mandate for income replace-
ment and (b) questions regarding mechanisms with which to implement
this mandate. The chapter starts by discussing factors that could guide
choices regarding income replacement targets as well as international
experiences in terms of system design. The subsections that follow cover
six topics: the basic norms for the design of earnings-related schemes,
such as the current systems in the region, the potential benefits and costs
of higher levels of funding in the pension systems, the types of policies
that could be considered to expand coverage, and the important issues
related to institutional organization, regulation, and administration.
Choosing and Implementing the Mandate 
of the Pension System 
The primary objective of a public pension system is to ensure that older
people have a decent standard of living in retirement. However, there are
different interpretations of this primary objective. The first is that
the pension system should need to ensure only a basic standard of living.
The main rationale for the existence of the pension system in this case is
the need to reduce poverty (measured in relative terms), and the focus is
on the “adequacy” of the pension benefit, which can be defined relative to
economywide average earnings. The second interpretation is that the
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pension system should ensure a reasonable standard of living in retire-
ment relative to the position before retirement. Under this interpreta-
tion, the pension system plays an insurance function in the context of
imperfect financial markets and myopic individuals. The focus in this case
is on the replacement rate: the value of the pension relative to individual
earnings.
Across countries, there are various degrees of emphasis on these
objectives. Countries such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, and the
United Kingdom focus on adequacy. Pension systems in Finland, Italy,
and Luxembourg emphasize the insurance function. In between, coun-
tries such as France, Germany, and the United States balance the objec-
tives of adequacy and insurance. These countries guarantee both a basic
pension and a replacement rate ranging between 25 and 50 percent of
the last salary. In general, replacement rates fall with the level of income
due to the existence of ceilings on the covered wage. Hence, the
adequacy and insurance functions focus on low-income workers. 
There are no formal rules to define the proper level of the basic pen-
sion or the average replacement rate. Choices need to take into account,
first, cultural factors, such as family structures or the willingness of indi-
viduals to save for old age, and, second, economic factors, such as the gen-
eral standard of living of the population, estimates about minimum
consumption needs (for example, the poverty line), the existence of
other formal and informal social assistance programs, and, of course, the
costs. The targets for basic pensions and replacement rates need to be
affordable.
Once the pattern of income replacement has been chosen, a large
typology of pension schemes can be designed to achieve these targets.
These pension schemes can be classified along three dimensions: (a) how
the system is financed, (b) how the risks are distributed, and (c) how the
system is managed. Around the globe, choices have been dictated by local
economic, social, political, and cultural conditions. The chapter summa-
rizes broad international trends. Choices, however, need to be based on
sound economic analysis. In all cases, basic norms for the proper opera-
tion of the system should be respected.
Minimum Standards for an Earnings-Related Pension System 
In most countries in the region, defined-benefit schemes will continue to
be at the core of the public pension system. It is therefore important to
review current benefit formulas and eligibility conditions with a view
to promoting financial sustainability, efficiency, and equity. (See box 1
for a glossary of key technical terms.) In a nutshell, this implies having a
sustainable system that pays an implicit rate of return on contributions,
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avoiding unnecessary variations in the rate of return across individuals to
prevent adverse distributional transfers, and correcting distortions in
labor supply, savings, and retirement decisions. To achieve these goals,
countries need to converge gradually to the following standards:
• Measure of income used to compute the pension. Countries should gradu-
ally include all salaries in the calculation of the pension, but they
should be appropriately revalorized—that is, past wages need to be
adjusted by a given index. An index could be the growth rate of the
average covered wage. The purpose of this policy is not to reduce
the level of the pension but to improve incentives and equity.
• The accrual rate. The accrual rate of a well-designed pay-as-you-go
system is linked intrinsically to the contribution rate, the retirement
age, survival probabilities after retirement, and the rate used to
revalorize wages. The accrual rate should be chosen to reflect the
mandate of the pension system regarding income replacement for the
average full-career worker at a given retirement age. If, for instance,
the target replacement rate is set at 50 percent for an individual retir-
ing at age 60 with 40 years of contributions, then the accrual rate
should be equal to 1.25 percent. The contribution rate and the
retirement age should then be adjusted accordingly. 
• Contribution rate. Policy makers ought to be careful not to overtax
labor, and this implies that the contribution rate should not be used
as the parameter that “closes” the finances of the system. High con-
tribution rates can reduce the demand for labor, expand the informal
sector, or simply reduce individuals’ well-being by forcing them to
save well beyond their preferences. The preferred alternative is to set
a contribution rate that is affordable once all components have been
taken into account (for example, health insurance, unemployment
insurance) and to keep it constant over time. 
• Normal retirement age. Because there is a limit to how much an econ-
omy can afford to pay on contributions and because the accrual rate
reflects the mandate of the pension system regarding income
replacement—which presumably should also remain constant over
the short and medium term—the normal retirement age ought to
be the parameter that adjusts endogenously. Thus, for a given contri-
bution rate, the choice of accrual rate would determine the choice of
retirement age. The higher the accrual rate—and therefore the
higher the pension that an individual receives—the longer the indi-
vidual has to work. Clearly, there is a biological limit to how long
individuals can work, and this depends on the economic sector. This
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limit constrains the choices regarding the value of the accrual rate:
there is a maximum level that a given economy can afford to pay. 
• Early retirement. It is good policy to give some flexibility to individu-
als and allow them to retire earlier. However, in order to guarantee
the same rate of return to all individuals, independent of the age when
they retire, the accrual rate should be adjusted as a function of the
retirement age. Individuals retiring before the normal retirement age
should have a lower accrual rate, while individuals retiring after the
normal retirement age should have a higher accrual rate.
• Vesting period. A minimum vesting period is not a necessary condition
to receive the earnings-related pension as long as the accrual rate is set
properly. On the contrary, the introduction of vesting periods
becomes another source of variation in rates of return that can deter
enrollment. Individuals who join the system late in their life can be
penalized, since they are forced to contribute past the normal retire-
ment age without adjustments to their pension. A vesting period should
be enforced, however, to be eligible for a minimum pension guarantee.
• Mechanism used to index pensions. Practices vary around the world, but
prudence and the aim of preserving a constant rate of return within
and across generations suggest that the proper index should be infla-
tion. The indexation process should be automatic, not subject to
negotiation or political discretion.
The Case for Virtual Account Systems 
Countries can also consider reforms of their defined-benefit schemes
through the introduction of notional defined-contribution or virtual
account systems. In essence, the virtual account system enforces the
standards or best practices of traditional earnings-related pay-as-you-go
systems. However, the benefit formula is operationalized differently. In
the virtual account scheme, contributions are registered in individual
accounts. It is only a registration on “book” because individuals do not
have real funds accumulated in their account, contrary to defined-
contribution schemes. The contributions are indexed by the sustainable
rate of return of the system, again a function of the system’s average
wage and the covered population. When the individual retires, the pen-
sion is computed as an annuity of the sum of revalorized contributions.
This is done by dividing the total contributions by a so-called G factor,
which is simply the discounted sum of the survival probability at various
ages after retirement.
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The virtual account approach generates a more transparent link
between contributions and benefits. Countries that have implemented
virtual account systems have also invested in better procedures for
reporting to plan members regarding their accrued rights. The virtual
account system can also facilitate the political economy of reform.
Changing the paradigm can help countries to implement the best prac-
tices in design discussed previously. Indeed, some of these reforms might
be difficult to implement using the language of traditional defined-
benefit schemes.
Costs and Benefits of Higher Funding 
There are several ways to increase the level of funding of a pension sys-
tem. Chapter 4 discusses alternative approaches, but the main focus is on
switching (completely or partially) from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded
system (as was done in Chile and other countries, where basically all or
part of the targeted replacement rate is financed on a capitalization basis).
International experiences suggest five potential benefits of higher
funding: (a) higher rates of return on contributions and a better diversi-
fication of risks, implying higher pensions for the same contribution
rate; (b) potentially higher national savings; (c) the development of
security markets; (d) the reduction in financial risks confronting firms;
and (e) a more stable and efficient banking sector. Each of these is
discussed in chapter 4 in the context of countries in the region.
Costs, in contrast, are related to sourcing the funds and the risk of
capital loss. Costs can be exacerbated in places with an unstable
macroeconomic environment, a weak banking system, volatile capital
markets, or a high risk of capital losses in the funded system as a result
of weak institutional capacity to manage investments and inappropriate
governance structures and regulations.
In most countries in the region, there are three constraints to higher
levels of funding, although they are not necessarily binding. First, a frail
fiscal position makes it difficult to finance the costs of transition, as part
of new contributions can no longer be used to finance pensions. Second,
investment opportunities are limited even in countries with more
advanced financial sectors. Third, weak governance structures, weak
institutional capacity, and limited expertise in the private sector for out-
sourcing make it difficult to conduct investment policies in the best
interests of plan members.
Countries that are better placed to increase funding include Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. These countries have a core of
sound banks and are engaged in reforms in the financial sector. They
have a nascent insurance industry with know-how in the management of
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funds that could serve as the basis for the development of private
voluntary pensions. In Egypt and Jordan, particularly in the former,
current occupational plans could also serve as the basis for the take-off of
voluntary pension plans (the main constraints are still large mandates of
the public sector and the average level of income of the population). The
main risk regarding higher levels of funding in the mandatory system is
related to weak governance and institutional capacity. In all cases, it
would be important to promote the outsourcing of fund management
and even administrative procedures. Given a frail fiscal stance, the tran-
sition to higher levels of funding would need to be gradual.
Countries where the benefits of higher funding are less evident
and the risks and constraints are more severe include Algeria,
Djibouti, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, the West Bank
and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. A priority in these countries
would be to bring the defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go system up to
standards by improving administration, developing management
and information systems, and, to the extent possible, improving
investment policies. In parallel, governments would need to continue
with structural reforms for private sector development, including the
financial sector. These countries could then start by creating the con-
ditions for voluntary private pensions. The constraint in this case is
the low level of income per capita and the limited capacity to save. A
more important role for voluntary schemes also would entail review-
ing the mandate of the mandatory system, at least in the case of
middle- and high-income workers.
Administration and Regulation
Several areas are not discussed extensively in the report and yet are crit-
ical for the proper functioning of a pension system: (a) the institutional
organization, meaning the types of programs in place and the institu-
tions in charge of managing them; (b) the way in which administration
is designed and implemented; and (c) the way in which pension funds are
regulated. 
Ideally, the reform of pension systems in the Middle East and North
Africa region should aim at full integration. Countries would basically
converge to a unique pension system that covers all categories of work-
ers, although there could be differentiated contribution rates to facilitate
the voluntary enrollment of vulnerable groups. Countries such as the
Islamic Republic of Iran would also need to seek the integration of
occupational plans, which currently operate as substitutes to the main
scheme (the Social Security Organization).
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Success of any policy initiative aiming to reform the national pension
program will depend heavily on administrative capacity and planning.
Analysis of the existing systems, procedures, and institutions should be
part of any comprehensive reform. The focus should be on the division
of responsibilities of various public agencies involved in the process, the
expenses associated with administering the system, and the administra-
tive burden on employers and employees.
Another area where work is required concerns the regulation of
mandatory and voluntary pension plans. In general, neither public
pension funds nor occupational pension plans are formally regulated. 
Chapter 5: Improving the Management 
of Pension Funds 
Chapter 5 discusses policies that could be implemented to provide
incentives to manage pension funds in the best interests of plan members.
The question is highly relevant in the Middle East and North Africa.
Indeed, most of the public pension schemes have accumulated reserves.
Among the countries reviewed, these range between 4.2 percent (Djibouti)
and 52.5 percent (Bahrain) of GDP. At the regional level, the reserves of
the mandatory pension systems account for 14.4 percent of GDP. This
level is among the highest in the world, second only to South Asia.
Unfortunately, weak governance and poor or no accountability to plan
members have led to investment policies that are not designed and im-
plemented in the best interests of plan members. Chapter 5 presents best
international practices to improve the management of pension funds.
However, these impose high standards that can be difficult to implement,
in part, because of political constraints and governance problems at a
broader level. Nonetheless, some realistic interventions could be feasible
over the short and medium terms: (a) building technical capacity to de-
sign investment policies; (b) outsourcing the management of part of the
funds; and (c) most important, improving transparency, which involves
mandating full disclosure of pension fund operations.
Chapter 6: Progress to Date and Prospects 
The final chapter assesses progress on pension reform across countries
in non-gulf countries of the Middle East and North Africa and explores
socioeconomic factors that could explain the observed differences.
Three groups of countries are identified. The first includes countries
that are in the very early stages of the reform process or have not yet
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initiated discussions: Algeria, Libya, and Syria. The second involves
countries where policy discussions are more advanced but where a co-
herent strategy has yet to emerge: the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq,
Tunisia, and the Republic of Yemen. The third group refers to coun-
tries that are leading pension reform and have either (a) developed de-
tailed reform proposals or laws or (b) introduced important structural
reforms, even if these affect only part of the pension system. These
countries are Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and the
West Bank and Gaza.
A few patterns emerge from the review of regional experiences:
• In countries that are leading reform efforts, the crises of civil servants and
military pension schemes have been an important motivation for reform.
This is the case of Djibouti, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza. It
has also been a push factor in Lebanon, although the lack of a proper
pension system for private sector workers was the main driver of
reform. In Egypt, the fact that the implicit pension debt of the pen-
sion fund is matched by explicit debt with the National Investment
Bank (close to 50 percent of GDP) and that the government is already
servicing this debt also creates incentives for reform. 
• Good analyses and diagnoses have played an important role in putting coun-
tries into motion. This is definitely the case in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Jordan (in the case of the SSC), Morocco, and Tunisia. In all
these countries, discussions about pension reform within and outside
the government started with publication of reports highlighting the
problems of the various pension schemes. 
• In all countries leading pension reforms, a high-level policy maker or insti-
tution has been driving the reform process. Basically, an individual or a
group of persons understands the issues, takes the initiative to create
awareness about the need for change, proposes solutions, and gener-
ates consensus for reform within the government.
• In countries lagging behind, these three elements are not present. In Algeria
and Libya, the availability of important oil revenues might be mini-
mizing the magnitude of the financial problems facing the pension
systems and their effect on fiscal stability. 
There are also differences in the political process surrounding
pension reforms in various countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
Lebanon, and Morocco included the civil society in the policy dialogue
from the outset. To this end, multisectoral commissions were put in
place. Morocco, in addition, took a comprehensive approach to reform
that included all pension funds and relevant institutions. On the
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contrary, in Djibouti, the policy dialogue and preparation of the reform
strategy took place initially without consultations outside the govern-
ment. Plan members were not involved until late in the process. No
commission was set up to design the reform program. In Jordan, discus-
sions are taking place within the SSC, with little coordination between
the SSC and the various ministries and other relevant institutions
(for example, the Insurance Commission).
There is also considerable variation in reform strategies. Djibouti and
Jordan are developing an integrated earnings-related scheme, and
Jordan is also developing voluntary private pensions. Morocco is devel-
oping two earnings-related schemes, with one integrated defined-
contribution, fully funded scheme. Lebanon is proposing an integrated
defined-contribution scheme with a basic pension guarantee. A similar
approach is being taken in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Challenges for the future are necessarily different in the three groups
of countries. Among the countries in the early stages of reform, the focus
ought to be on preparing the necessary baseline data to conduct a proper
assessment of the financial problems facing the schemes. Without this
baseline, it is not possible to initiate discussions about the costs and ben-
efits of alternative reform packages. In the second group of countries,
the immediate goal is to move from strategic guidelines to a detailed
reform concept, which will require further analytical work and consen-
sus building. The remaining group needs to consolidate an integrated
reform strategy and move toward implementation.
In all cases, this report is intended to raise awareness about the need
for prompt interventions, thus allowing governments to take a gradual
approach toward reform and avoid drastic adjustments in the future.
The report also provides an analytical framework to guide discussions
about the options for reform as well as the implementation of new laws.
In all countries of the region, the time for change is now.
Notes
1. For the purpose of this report, the Middle East and North Africa region
refers to the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, the Arab Republic
of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the
United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Yemen. Also covered is the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Given the availability of data at the present time, however,
the analysis concentrates on non-gulf countries (except for non-Arab gulf coun-
tries and Bahrain).
2. See World Bank (2002a) for Algeria; World Bank (2003f) for Bahrain; World
Bank (2001b) for Djibouti; World Bank (2005c) for Egypt; World Bank (2003d)
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for the Islamic Republic of Iran; Robalino, Sluchynskyy, and Bogomolova
(forthcoming) for Iraq; World Bank (2003c) for Jordan; World Bank (2005a) for
Lebanon; World Bank (2005b) for Libya; World Bank (2004a) for Morocco;
World Bank (2003a) for Tunisia; World Bank (2002b) for the West Bank and
Gaza; and Mitchell (1999) for the Republic of Yemen.
3. The unemployment figure refers to non–Gulf Cooperation Council
countries.
4. A full-career individual refers to a plan member enrolling in the system at
age 20 and contributing until the normal retirement age or until the maximum
replacement rate paid by the system is attained.
5. Pension wealth is defined as the present value of future pension payments.

The Initial Conditions 
for Pension Reform
CHAPTER 2
This chapter sets the context for pension reform in the region by re-
viewing the main facts regarding demographic and macroeconomic
dynamics as well as the level of development of financial sectors. The
section on demographics focuses on trends, both within the region and
worldwide, in population growth rates, life expectancies, and depend-
ency ratios and discusses their potential effects on labor markets and
the performance of pension systems. The section on macroeconomics
assesses the recent economic performance of the region and the key
structural factors likely to influence future prospects for economic
growth and job creation and reviews indicators of macroeconomic
stability. These factors not only affect current pension systems but can
also constrain the choice of reforms. The final section presents a brief
assessment of the level of development of financial sectors in the region,
because decisions regarding the level of funding in the pension systems
and the role of the public and private sectors partially depend on it.
Demographics 
From a demographic perspective, there is often a tendency to treat the
Middle East and North Africa as a homogeneous region, with a large
youth population and high population growth rate. The fact, however, is
that, beyond the obvious differences in size, countries in the region are
quite heterogeneous in both population structure and dynamics. This
section characterizes these dynamics across countries and assesses the
impacts on labor markets and, through this channel, pension systems. 
Key Demographic Characteristics
The Middle East and North Africa region brings together a population
of approximately 300 million people or roughly 5 percent of the world
population. This figure is divided among large countries such as Algeria,
Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Morocco, with populations
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between 28 million and 60 million, and smaller countries such as
Djibouti, the West Bank and Gaza, and most of the gulf countries, with
populations of less than 4 million (see table A.1 in appendix A).
The region historically has shown exceptional population growth
rates. Between 1960 and 1990, the population growth rate averaged
3 percent, one of the highest in the world. Although population growth
rates declined in the second half of the 1980s, the average remains
higher than that of other regions of the world, with the exception of
Sub-Saharan Africa (see figure 2.1).
The Middle East and North Africa is one of the youngest regions in
the world. The average old-age dependency ratio has been and remains
one of the lowest, second only to that of Sub-Saharan Africa and far
below the world average (see figure 2.2). 
Nonetheless, comparisons among countries within the region high-
light significantly different demographic dynamics and structures. The
Middle East region has a younger population and faster rate of popu-
lation growth, while the North African region has a relatively older
population and a slower rate of growth. Djibouti, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries,1 and the Republic of Yemen exhibit signifi-
cantly higher population growth rates, with figures ranging from 6.0 per-
cent (the United Arab Emirates) to 2.1 percent (Bahrain and Djibouti),
while Lebanon and the North African countries of Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco, and Tunisia exhibit growth rates that are below the regional
average (see figure 2.3). Nevertheless, even Tunisia, which has the lowest
rate of population growth in the region, is just below the world average.
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Figure 2.1  Average Population Growth Rate, by Region, 1960–2002
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1960–2002
0
1
2
3
4
6
A
ve
ra
g
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 p
er
 y
ea
r (
p
er
ce
n
t)
8
10
5
7
9
1960–90 1991–2002
W
es
t B
an
k a
nd
 G
az
a
Jo
rd
an
Ye
m
en
, R
ep
ub
lic
 of
Om
an
Dj
ib
ou
ti
Sy
ria
Ba
hr
ain
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a
Ira
q
Eg
yp
t, A
ra
b 
Re
p. 
of
Lib
ya
Qa
ta
r
Al
ge
ria
M
or
oc
co
Le
ba
no
n
Ira
n, 
Isl
am
ic 
Re
p. 
of
Tu
ni
sia
Ku
wa
it
24 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
Regarding the structure of the population, countries exhibit differ-
ences in both their old- and young-age dependency ratios. These ratios
are important economically because they indicate the existing burden on
the working-age population required to sustain nonproductive, old, and
young dependents.
The young-age dependency ratio is quite high for Djibouti, Jordan,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic
of Yemen (see figure 2.4). In many GCC countries—namely, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—a large part of the pop-
ulation is concentrated in working-age brackets, as both the old- and
young-age dependency ratios are relatively low. North African countries
such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, as well as the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Lebanon, are characterized by slightly higher old-
age dependency ratios and significantly lower young-age dependency
ratios. Even so, the country with the oldest population structure in the
region, Lebanon, still ranks below the world average.
Differences in age structure reflect differences in where countries
stand in the demographic transition.2 Indeed, while mortality rates
exhibit only small differences, fertility rates vary considerably among
countries. For virtually all countries in the region, the first stage of the
demographic transition took place in the 1950s, when mortality rates
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Figure 2.4  Young- and Old-Age Dependency Ratios in Middle East
and North African Countries, 2000
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declined sharply and life expectancies increased gradually, triggered by
recent progress in health care. The second stage of the demographic
transition is still in progress and is characterized by a slow reduction in
fertility rates. Current fertility rates remain high according to interna-
tional comparisons.
The delayed reduction in fertility rates was the main driver of the
sustained population growth between the 1960s and the 1990s (see fig-
ure 2.5, which compares life expectancy and the fertility rate in 1985 and
2002 against the world trend). With the exception of Djibouti, life
expectancy has improved and attained higher-than-world-average levels
in most countries. However, the fertility rate, despite an overall decreas-
ing trend, has remained somewhat higher than the world average. Only
Djibouti, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia
rank at or below world-average levels. Overall, from 1985 to 2002, as the
demographic transition progressed, fertility and life expectancy rates
converged in the region.
Expected Demographic Dynamics
Survival and fertility rate forecasts imply a continuation of the demo-
graphic transition and a gradual convergence of rates in most countries.3
Within the next 25 years, survival rates are expected to improve further
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throughout the region, while total fertility rates are expected to decline.4
As a consequence, fertility rates and life expectancies will gradually be-
come more homogeneous. Only Djibouti, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the West
Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen are expected to continue
having relatively high levels of fertility.5
Projections imply a sustained but decreasing growth rate of the pop-
ulation. Within the next decade, the average population growth rate for
the region is expected to remain around 1.9 percent a year, declining to
1.5 percent for the period 2015–25. Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and the United Arab
Emirates are expected to experience higher-than-regional-average
growth rates.
The aging process will be characterized by a sustained inflow of
working-age population and in 15–20 years by a gradual outflow from
working age to old age. As figure 2.6 shows, the rate of growth of
the working-age population will exceed the rate of growth of the
dependent population in the next 10–15 years for most countries in
the region. Only after 2015 will the excess growth rate be significantly
reduced, as the dependent population (mostly the elderly) starts to grow
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Figure 2.6  Estimated Difference in the Average Growth Rate of the
Working-Age and Dependent Populations in Middle East and
North African Countries, 2000–20
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faster than the working-age population in countries such as Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Both the increase in the working-age population and the gradual
aging of the overall population are captured by increases in total and
old-age dependency ratios, although the dynamics are clearly heteroge-
neous. Old-age dependency ratios are projected to increase only slightly
between now and 2015–20 for all countries except the Republic of
Yemen, where a further decrease is expected. After 2015–20 the old-age
dependency ratio is expected to grow at a more sustained pace, and
around 2040 or later most countries could reach the level observed
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries during the 1970s. Bahrain, Lebanon, and Tunisia
would reach that level around 2030, while Kuwait, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates would reach it around 2020.6
Expected Changes in the Labor Force 
The expansion of the working-age population is expected to be accom-
panied by a continuous increase in female participation rates. This will
produce dramatic effects on the size and growth of the labor force.
Compared with international figures, the region has the lowest female
labor force participation rates, despite the fact that for the past 15 years
female participation rates have increased in every country of the region
(see table A.4 in appendix A). The increase has been relatively moderate
for Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Republic of Yemen but
large—around 10 percentage points—for all other countries. On aver-
age, male participation rates have remained close to OECD levels over
the past 25 years, with slight exceptions for certain countries. In the
future, female participation rates in the labor market are expected to
converge gradually to those of males (see figure B.3 in appendix B). 
The labor force is projected to grow by more than 4 million on aver-
age each year between now and 2030, totaling more than 50 million new
laborers between 2002 and 2015. The labor force growth rate is expected
to decline gradually from 3.3 percent between 2002 and 2010 to 1.8 per-
cent around the second half of the 2020s. Within the region, there are
significant differences among countries. Algeria, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza,
and the Republic of Yemen are likely to exhibit higher-than-average
labor force growth rates in the near future, while Bahrain, Egypt,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, and the United Arab
Emirates could experience lower-than-average growth (see figure 2.7).
Future demographic trends suggest that countries in the region have
the potential to benefit from a “demographic dividend.” Empirical
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studies show that the combination of a low total dependency ratio and a
rapidly expanding labor force is accompanied by a higher level of capital
accumulation per capita, a higher saving rate, and a higher growth rate
of output per capita (see Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003). In addition,
the rapid growth of the labor force creates conditions for increasing the
growth rate of the contributory base of pension systems, thus allowing
pay-as-you-go systems to pay potentially higher implicit rates of return
on contributions and, hence, higher replacement rates for any given
retirement age and contribution rate (see the second section of chapter 4
for a discussion of the conditions for the financial sustainability of a
pay-as-you-go pension system).
The positive effects of this “demographic dividend,” however, can
be realized only if labor markets are able to absorb the new workers.
Under current macroeconomic conditions (see the section on macro-
economics), the rapid expansion of the labor force instead could turn
into a major development challenge: in the absence of private sector in-
vestment and growth, labor markets are unlikely to be able to absorb
new entrants.
More important from the point of view of pension systems, if implicit
internal rates of return paid on contributions are above sustainable lev-
els, an expansion of coverage would worsen the financial situation of the
pension funds. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the sustainable implicit
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rate of return on contributions that an earnings-related pension system
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis can pay is a function of the growth
rate of the covered wage. Hence, for a given growth rate of the average
wage, the higher the growth rate of the covered population, the higher
the implicit rate of return on contributions that the system can afford to
pay. Within the region, a rapid expansion of the labor force could in-
crease the sustainable implicit rate of return for pay-as-you-go systems.
Unfortunately, even then, current implicit rates of return on contribu-
tions are likely to remain too high, so that new entrants to the pension
system will actually worsen their financial situation. 
A corollary is that expected financial problems are, to a large extent, in-
dependent of the future aging of the population. Even if current demo-
graphic structures remain constant, the pension systems could eventually
run into trouble if an important misalignment were to occur between the
sustainable and the observed implicit rate of return on contributions.
Under these circumstances, population aging would only aggravate the
problem. Moreover, given low coverage rates, currently favorable old-age
dependency ratios do not necessarily translate into favorable pension sys-
tem dependency ratios (see the fifth section in chapter 3).
Macroeconomics
The macroeconomy affects the performance of a pension system in var-
ious ways.7 First, the growth rate of the economy ultimately determines the
level of income that is available to distribute between the active and
inactive populations. Also, over the long run, the growth rate of the
economy is a good proxy for the sustainable implicit rate of return that
defined-benefit schemes with pay-as-you-go financing can afford to pay
on contributions and therefore the affordable level of benefits for a given
retirement age and contribution rate. 
Second, the growth rate and the composition of the employed population
influence coverage rates and the finances of pension systems. A rising
unemployment rate or an expanding informal sector implies that a large
share of the labor force remains outside the contributory pension system
and might not be accumulating the necessary savings to finance an ade-
quate level of income during old age. High unemployment rates and a
large informal sector also call for lowering, or at least not increasing,
payroll taxes, thus affecting the finances of the pension fund. 
Third, macroeconomic stability ultimately provides the enabling envi-
ronment for the proper functioning of any pension system and the
development of long-term financial instruments, including private pen-
sion savings and annuities. Inflation rates are important because they
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affect the real value of past wages and pensions and therefore the reval-
orization and indexation policies. High inflation rates can be an incen-
tive for moving toward final-pay benefit formulas, which are a source of
adverse distributional transfers and distorted incentives (see the third
section of chapter 3). High inflation rates might also deter policy makers
from committing to the automatic indexation of pensions, leaving pen-
sion funds—and retirees—vulnerable to ad hoc adjustments. Further-
more, the lack of price stability increases uncertainty and therefore the
costs of investment. The fiscal position of the government affects its
ability to support and finance the accumulation of implicit pension debt.
Finally, the external balance of a country constrains or enables the
diversification of pension funds’ investments abroad. Countries with a
fixed exchange rate and current account imbalances may have incentives
to restrict or forbid investments abroad. This section further develops
the analysis of each of these three channels in the context of Middle East
and North African countries.8
Economic Growth: Past Trends and Future Prospects
During the past decade, all economies expanded, but incomes per capita
grew modestly, in part due to decreasing total factor productivity.9 Par-
ticularly weak performers were Djibouti and the West Bank and Gaza,
where income per capita declined (see table 2.1). Only recently have
GDP growth rates exceeded population growth rates in most countries,
but economic growth rates remain below the levels required to reduce
unemployment rates.
TABLE 2.1
GDP Growth in Select Middle East and North African Countries, 1990–2003
Percent
Average, Average per capita,
Country 1990–2003 1990–2003 2002 2003
Algeria 1.9 0.1 4 6.8
Djibouti 0.5 3.2a 3 4
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 3.9 2.0 3 3
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 4.3 2.7 7 6.8
Jordan 5.0 1.0 5 3
Lebanon 5.8 4.1 2 3
Morocco 2.8 1.0 3.2 5.5
Tunisia 4.5 2.9 2 5
West Bank and Gaza 1.7 6.9b 19 2
Yemen, Republic of 4.6 1.6 4 4
Sources: Bank staff calculations; IMF 2004; World Bank 2003f, 2004f.
Notes: a. 1990–2002.
b. 1994–2002.
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Falling total factor productivity itself reflects unfriendly business en-
vironments, public sector dominance of economic activities, lack of eco-
nomic diversification, and inadequate levels of human capital. The lack
of economic diversification and the dependence on commodities have
exposed many countries to oil-price volatility. Human capital has failed
to carry out its role as an engine of growth. A recent study finds that
education, by gearing students toward public sector employment, has
failed to contribute to economic growth (Pritchett 1999). On average,
the expansion of schooling in the region has not expanded the output per
worker. 
Future growth will depend on the ability of countries to stimulate pri-
vate sector investment. To date, some progress has been achieved in
strengthening the institutional foundations of market-led economies by
adopting structural reform programs that include privatization of state-
owned enterprises, fiscal reform, trade liberalization, and deregulation.
However, the reform agenda is largely unfinished at all levels. Key trade
reforms, in particular, have not been implemented, and both tariff and
nontariff barriers remain high (World Bank 2004e). Marginal tax rates
on corporations and individuals are high across the region. The region
also records the lowest levels of privatization as well as low levels of
foreign direct investment inflows (Dasgupta, Keller, and Srinivasan
2002). The most recent IMF forecast for the region puts the annual
average growth rate of income per capita during the next decade in the
1–2 percent range.
The Unemployment Challenge
The greatest development challenge facing countries in the region is
addressing the unemployment crisis. The region’s unemployment rate
is among the highest in the world, conservatively estimated at 15.9 per-
cent; unemployment is most pronounced in Algeria, Egypt, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, and Morocco, which together account for two-thirds
of the labor force in the region (see table 2.2).10 In the Islamic Republic
of Iran, for example, the labor force grew 4 percent in 2003; despite
economic growth of more than 5 percent a year for the past three years,
the unemployment rate is currently 13.8 percent and rising. The official
unemployment rate is 9 percent in Egypt, although it is believed to be
much higher in reality. Unemployment rates for individuals under
25 years of age are about twice as high as the national averages, in par-
ticular in Algeria and Tunisia, and up to three times higher in Lebanon
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unemployment in the region is con-
centrated mainly among new entrants to the labor market and women at
the middle and upper ends of the educational distribution. Due to the
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demographics, the pressure of unemployment will continue to be excep-
tionally high for young workers at least until 2015.
The unemployment problem reflects, in part, the excessive reliance
on the public sector as a source of jobs, which crowds out the private
sector and results in a segmented labor market. Public sector employ-
ment as a share of total employment exceeds the averages for both
industrial countries and other developing regions (World Bank 2004e).
This is unambiguously the case in Algeria, Egypt, the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and Jordan. The public sector also continues to dominate in-
dustrial activities through public enterprises. The preference for gov-
ernment employment stems from implicit and explicit employment
guarantees as well as mismatched wage expectations resulting from rel-
atively generous compensation and benefits policies, including pensions.
In effect, the job security and social protection afforded by government
employment distort career incentives.
High implicit and explicit labor costs can also contribute to the prob-
lem, and this is an issue to consider when reviewing the mechanisms for
financing the pension system. Labor codes in the region continue to be
rigid, particularly with regard to hiring and dismissal procedures. In fact,
severance pay is among the most generous in the world. There is
evidence that these programs protect jobs as opposed to income by
reducing the incentives to dismiss workers (Robalino and Mataoanu
forthcoming). In doing so, they also reduce the incentives to hire workers.
TABLE 2.2
Distribution of Output and Employment in Middle East and North African Countries,
by Sector, 2003
Percent
As a share of GDP As a share of employment
Unemployment
Country rate Agriculture Services Industry Agriculture Industry Services
Algeria 28.4 11 24 65 12 30 58
Djibouti 60.0 4 82 14 — — —
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 9.0 16 50 34 30 21 49
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 13.8 11 53 37 23 31 45
Jordan 14.2 2 72 26 6 25 69
Lebanon 11.0b 12 68 20 — — —
Morocco 22.0 18 52 30 44 21 33
Tunisia 15.3 12 59 29 22 34 44
West Bank and Gaza 26.0 6 82 12 14 34 52
Yemen, Republic of 9.1 15 45 40 55 — —
Source: World Bank 2003e; for the unemployment rate in Djibouti, World Bank 2004f; for the unemployment rate in Lebanon, St. Joseph
University 2004.
Note: — = Not available.
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Current financing mechanisms for the pension system and for social
security in general also increase labor costs and can reduce the demand for
labor and encourage the movement to the informal sector.11 Indeed,
increasing contribution rates has been the preferred mechanism to
improve the finances of social security systems; contribution rates now
surpass 25 percent of wages in most countries. Weak linkages between
contributions and benefits can also encourage evasion. Today, overall
estimates of informal employment range between 42 percent of nonagri-
cultural employment in Syria and 55 percent in Egypt.12 The implication
is that a large, and probably growing, share of the labor force remains out-
side the contributory pension system and might not be accumulating the
necessary savings to cover a minimum level of income during old age.
Looking forward, the best-case scenarios suggest only gradual reduc-
tions in unemployment rates, implying that a significant part of the labor
force will remain outside the pension system. Unemployment projec-
tions based on a simple accounting framework show that, with growth
rates below 5 percent a year, unemployment rates will increase sharply
in most countries (see figure B.4 in appendix B). In Lebanon, Morocco,
and Tunisia, future dynamics will be more favorable, due mainly to
slower expansion of the labor force. The situation is more worrisome in
Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Jordan and is particularly wor-
risome in the West Bank and Gaza and the Republic of Yemen. 
Macroeconomic Stability 
Important achievements in macroeconomic stability have occurred
throughout the region. In general, countries have managed to control
inflation, narrow current account balances, and reduce both fiscal
deficits and public debt (see figure 2.8). 
Inflation in most countries has decreased sharply but remains a social
risk for vulnerable groups. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia
have stabilized inflation rates below 5 percent. Algeria and Lebanon
have succeeded in bringing inflation down from over 25 percent in the
early 1990s to the single digits observed today. In the Islamic Republic
of Iran inflation fell in excess of 30 percentage points from 1995 to 2003
(from 49 to 17 percent), although it remains stalled in double digits.
Only in the Republic of Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza have infla-
tion rates increased sharply since 2000, and they are now close to 6 and
10 percent, respectively. In general, the outlook is positive, but from a
social protection point of view, mechanisms are needed to enable
households to manage price volatility. In the case of mandatory pension
systems, the automatic indexation of pensions should be a key policy
objective.
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Regarding the external balance, while current accounts are generating
a surplus in most countries, the issue for pension systems concerns the
restrictions on capital accounts. These go in parallel with tight regulation
of trade quotas and tariffs. Paradoxically, self-imposed restrictions can
result in uncertain capital inflows. Uncertain capital inflows, in turn, pro-
vide the incentive for governments to restrict private domestic savings
within the confines of the country. Incentives are stronger given fixed or
tightly regulated exchange rates, sometimes in conjunction with the
domestic interest rate (for example, Egypt and Jordan).
Finally, despite improvements, the fiscal outlook appears persistently
delicate for the countries surveyed. This reinforces the need to control
the accumulation of implicit pension debt in pay-as-you-go systems but
may also restrict the speed of reform. Fiscal balances continue to be neg-
ative (figure 2.8). The most worrisome cases are Lebanon (–12 percent
of GDP), Egypt and Morocco (–7 percent), and Jordan (–5 percent).
The exception is Algeria, due mainly to high oil revenues. Barring a few
exceptions, the level of government debt across the region is also high,
and trends are not positive. At 103, 121, and 214 percent, respectively,
Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon have the highest level of public debt to
GDP. Moderately high levels are seen in Morocco (97 percent), Djibouti
(66 percent), the Republic of Yemen (62 percent), and Tunisia (59 per-
cent). The lowest levels are found in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
West Bank and Gaza, where the ratio of public debt to GDP is less than
or equal to 20 percent. An issue of concern is that, in all cases, the analy-
sis of the sustainability of the public debt excludes the implicit pension
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debt, which, as shown in chapter 3, can often be at least as high as the
explicit government debt. In general, high explicit government debt
should provide an additional incentive to reduce or at least stop the
accumulation of implicit pension debt.
Overview of the Financial Sector 
When discussing pension reform, countries often need to address two im-
portant questions: (a) What should be the relative roles of the public sec-
tor and individuals in financing a given level of income replacement for
retirement? (b) How should the mandate of the public pension system be
financed, meaning what should the level of funding be? The answers to
these questions depend, in part, on the level of development of the finan-
cial sector. As financial sectors develop, private (that is, voluntary)
arrangements can be expected to assume a more prominent role in the
overall pension system. The level of development of the financial sector
also has a role in determining the opportunities for investment as well as
the risks of public pension funds. When appropriate regulations are not in
place or a core of sound banks and insurance companies does not exist, in-
creasing the level of funding of the pension system might not be desirable.
The level of development of the financial sector is also immediately
relevant in the region, as several pension schemes have large reserves. In
general, the ability of the financial system, including banks, insurance
companies, capital markets, and other nonbank financial institutions, to
intermediate savings and direct them toward productive investments is
central to whether pension funds (either pay-as-you-go or funded
schemes) will be able to invest assets prudently, contribute to the overall
development of the economy, and generate long-term returns on behalf
of beneficiaries.
This section provides an overview of the financial sectors of the non-
GCC countries of the Middle East and North Africa, assessing whether
the operations of the banking, insurance, and capital markets provide a
sufficient foundation for pension fund investments. 
The Banking Sector
Large variations in the size of the banking sector occur throughout the
region, in part explained by the degree of openness of the economies to
foreign capital. Banking sector assets range between less than 25 percent
of GDP in the Republic of Yemen and more than 300 percent in
Lebanon (see figure 2.9). Countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, which
allow relatively free exchange of domestic and foreign currencies and
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allow domestic residents to hold foreign exchange accounts, have much
larger ratios of banking sector assets to GDP. Countries whose capital
accounts, currency flows, or exchange rates are more restricted—Algeria
and the Islamic Republic of Iran—have significantly smaller banking
sectors relative to the economy.
A first question of interest regarding the banking sector regards the
flow of credit. Indeed, investing pension funds in banks that are overex-
posed to government debt is not very different from lending directly to the
government. In general, the relative allocation of credit between the pub-
lic and private sector is explained by the ownership and financing needs of
the government. Countries where the private sector dominates the own-
ership of banking and where domestic debt does not crowd out the private
sector—Jordan and Tunisia—have higher rates of credit to the private sec-
tor. Egypt and Morocco have sizable state ownership of banks but are mak-
ing efforts to achieve greater private sector orientation. Lebanon’s bank-
ing sector has the highest exposure to government debt in the world,
which is explained mainly by the size of its public debt. On the other end
of the spectrum, the banking systems in several countries, including
Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Syria, remain government con-
trolled, and only a small share of domestic credit goes to the private sector.
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Figure 2.9  Banking and Credit as a Percentage of GDP in Select Middle East
and North African Countries, 2002
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Still, even among countries moving to more private ownership, there
is relatively high related-party lending, significant reliance on real estate
collateral, and short-term maturities on loans. These factors point to
financial intermediation that is not linked to long-term investment,
relying instead on reputation, existing property, and trade-related credit.
Supervisory regimes have made efforts to reduce bank lending to related
parties or to ensure that such lending is conducted on an arm’s-length
basis, but lending based primarily on the medium- or long-term
prospects of the corporate borrower is still not the norm. Banks are
reluctant to lend at medium- or long-term maturities (that is, for invest-
ment) rather than for trade or working-capital purposes largely due to a
heightened perception of risks. Very little maturity transformation takes
place, which contributes to a truncated, and flat, yield curve.13
The second question of interest to pension funds relates to the
solvency and stability of the banking sector. Countries where private
banks are a significant part of the sector have sought to improve bank-
ing stability and private sector orientation,14 while countries where the
public sector dominates the banking sector exhibit weak incentives to-
ward liberalization. Several of the banking systems have removed con-
trols on interest rates, undergone significant restructuring, and strength-
ened supervisory and regulatory regimes so that published bank financial
statements are reliable, nonperforming loans are recognized and pro-
vided for, and interest income is accrued correctly (see table 2.3). In
these countries, banks are adequately capitalized.15 In other countries,
regulations such as controls on sector lending, directed lending, or
centrally determined deposit and lending rates, which are generally
TABLE 2.3
Overview of Banking Sector and Financial Reforms and Stability in Select Middle East
and North African Countries
Assessment of and Reliance on treasury 
Interest rate Private sector provision for bills or other
Country deregulation allocation of credit nonperforming loans government assets
Algeria Low Low Low Low
Syria Low Low Unknown Low
Iran, Islamic Rep. of Low Low Low Low
Yemen, Republic of Mixed Good Mixed High
Egypt, Arab Rep. of Mixed Mixed Mixed Medium
Morocco Strong Good Mixed Medium
Tunisia Mixed Good Mixed Medium
Jordan Strong Good Mixed High
Lebanon Strong Good Unknown Excessive
Sources: Various World Bank-IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) conducted by the IMF, including: Morocco 2002b; Egypt
2002a; Algeria 2003; Tunisia 2001; Iran 2000; Jordan 2002.
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recognized not to promote efficient intermediation, have not been lifted.
The incentives to liberalize are also weak because of government own-
ership of the nonbanking real estate sector and the treatment of govern-
ment-owned banks as conduits of funds to state-owned enterprises.
In conclusion, there are a few countries in the region where the bank-
ing sector appears sufficiently sound and regulated to form a base for
both a funded pension pillar and investment of the reserves of state-run
defined-benefit schemes.16 Stress tests of banks in the region over the
past several years, analyzing the effects of credit, interest rate, and
exchange rate shocks, indicate that a core of commercial banks in Jordan,
Morocco, and Tunisia are relatively resilient to both interest rate and
exchange rate shocks but are moderately exposed to deterioration in
portfolio credit quality.17 Simultaneous shocks would likely have more
serious impacts, which highlights the need for effective macroeconomic
management. Banking systems elsewhere in the region exhibit some-
what stronger vulnerabilities to exchange rate shocks or deteriorations in
portfolio quality, have significant exposures to a single borrower (for ex-
ample, reliance on government bonds in Lebanon), or are too weak to
intermediate new funds effectively. In all cases, the challenge remains
the ability of banks to lend funds at medium and long terms for invest-
ment purposes.
The Insurance Industry
The insurance industry has experienced growth in many Middle East
and North African countries over the past few decades, but with assets
below 5 percent of GDP in most cases, the contribution to financial
intermediation is still limited.18 Annuity markets are underdeveloped
across the board. In fact, a large majority of assets within the insurance
sector are technical reserves of the property and casualty insurance
business and therefore much more likely to have to be held in liquid
instruments. Only Morocco can claim an insurance sector of any
reasonable size (see table 2.4).19 Life insurance, which has the potential
to provide insurance companies with long-term funds for investment,
represents only a small percentage of the total insurance market. Egypt
and Morocco have the largest share of life insurance premiums, at 31
and 29 percent of total premiums, respectively, followed by Lebanon. In
the other countries, life insurance premiums are below 15 percent. Fac-
tors such as ownership structure, fiscal incentives, cultural norms, and
investment opportunities limit development of the market.
The structures of the insurance and banking industries have similari-
ties: state dominance in a few countries, with correspondingly weak reg-
ulatory frameworks, and dispersed structures in others, with no clear
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dominant company and several weaker companies. In Morocco, three
private companies make up nearly 60 percent of the market, while in
Egypt three state-owned companies form 90 percent of the system. In
contrast, in Jordan and Lebanon the three largest companies constitute
only one-third of the market. Where countries have opened up their
insurance markets, supply (the licensing of insurance companies) has
exceeded demand; yet, as firms begin to face increasingly rigorous
regulations, consolidation will likely take place.
Reputational issues and lack of fiscal incentives constrain the devel-
opment of the insurance industry throughout the region. A negative
image of the insurance industry as a whole has emerged from the prob-
lematic settling of claims in the property and casualty business and the
failure of a few insurance companies. Most countries do not have fiscal
frameworks that favor long-term savings, while some impose taxes on
insurance premiums—a clear disincentive and added cost to the
industry.20
Limited long-term investment instruments also constrain develop-
ment of the sector. Small and shallow equity markets, few new
shareholding opportunities, and limited availability of corporate debt
instruments clearly limit the investment opportunities for insurance
companies. 
Regulation and supervision of insurance are weak in the region,
although progress has been made in a few countries. The past several
years have witnessed an increasing commitment to improving the legal
and regulatory framework, recognizing the potential role of insurance in
risk mitigation and financial intermediation, and mitigating the poten-
tial harm from the failure of insurance companies, both to the industry
and to the financial system as a whole, especially where cross-ownership
TABLE 2.4
The Insurance Sector in Select Middle East and North African Countries, Various 
Years, 2000–2
Percent
Insurance sector Bank sector Insurance sector Ratio of life
assets as a share assets as a share assets as a share of premiums to
Country and year of GDP of GDP banking sector assets total premiums
Algeria, 2001 2.3 36.9 6.2 —
Lebanon, 2001 2.6 295.9 1.0 24
Egypt, Arab Rep. of, 2001 3.0 111.7 2.7 31
Jordan, 2002 3.9 200.8 1.9 15
Tunisia, 2000 4.8 71.6 6.7 9
Morocco, 2000 15.7 92.4 17.0 29
Sources: World Bank-IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) conducted by the IMF.
Note: — = Not available.
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is high. Jordan, in particular, has passed a strong insurance law and good
regulations, increasing the capacity of the Insurance Commission.
Morocco has also passed a good framework law but has not completed
implementing regulations. Lebanon has drafted a new insurance law and
initiated efforts to strengthen the insurance commission. Across the
region, even where investments have been made in human resources,
implementation and enforcement capacity are reportedly weak.
Taking into account the small size of the insurance sector, the lack of
long-term savings and investment products offered by insurance compa-
nies, and the still-developing supervisory regimes, changes in the insur-
ance environment will need to continue in order for the sector to play a
role in a funded pension pillar or as a mechanism for investing the
reserves of existing pay-as-you-go schemes. This will include strength-
ening the legal and regulatory framework, strengthening corporate
governance and investment capacity, and providing fiscal incentives
(or removing disincentives) for the use of life insurance or annuity prod-
ucts as long-term savings vehicles.
Debt Instruments 
Medium- and long-term debt instruments and publicly traded equity
instruments are available in most of the countries under review; how-
ever, even where corporate debt exists, short-term debt instruments are
the norm and secondary markets are shallow. The cornerstone of debt
markets in both developed and developing financial markets is generally
government debt. In the Middle East and North Africa, domestic
government debt in the form of treasury bills and bonds is generally only
a modest portion of total government debt. External debt, often to
international financial institutions or to bilateral donor countries, tends
to be much higher due to lower costs and longer tenure (see figure 2.10).
Only in Lebanon and Morocco do domestic debt levels approach exter-
nal debt levels. Domestic debt tends to be short term—between one and
five years—and yields are not fully market based. There appears to be a
negative feedback mechanism between governments and investors with
respect to returns and maturities. Investors demand high rates for longer
maturities, presumably due to insecurity regarding domestic economic
management, inflation, and currency depreciation. Governments, in
turn, are unwilling to issue debt at the returns demanded by the market
for longer maturities, contributing to a cyclical lack of a benchmark yield
curve and investor mistrust. Finally, purchases of domestic debt issues in
most countries are already heavily dominated by commercial banks
(as well as by public pension schemes in some countries). A movement
toward private funded pensions or the shift of public funds to more
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transparent asset classes would imply increasing the share of government
debt held by domestic investors, lengthening maturities, and holding
open and regular debt auctions.
Corporate bonds are the smallest component of the capital markets.
Only Tunisia has a noticeable level of corporate bonds, at 15 percent of
stock market capitalization in 2002, although most bonds are tied to
financial institutions. Jordan’s corporate bonds represent 2 percent of
stock market capitalization and are mostly government backed or tied to
government-owned utilities. In Egypt, bonds appear to be issued
predominantly by government agencies. In all countries, relative scarcity
results in corporate bonds being bought and held to maturity rather than
being traded after initial issuance. Corporate bond maturities remain
relatively short—generally between two and five years—and issuance is
usually done through private placement rather than through auction.
This mirrors government practices with respect to treasury bonds (rela-
tively short maturities and placement at agreed rates), resulting in a
relatively flat yield curve. Indeed, growth of the corporate bond market
has likely been slowed by lack of a medium- or long-term yield curve set
through auction of government bonds, against which issuers and
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Middle East and North African Countries, 2002
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purchasers could price bonds. Finally, close relationships and often com-
mon ownership interests between corporations and banks result in a lack
of incentives for corporations to look to the public for debt financing,
especially where it will necessarily result in greater public disclosure.
Stock Markets 
With the exception of Djibouti, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, and the
Republic of Yemen, stock exchanges exist in all countries reviewed in this
report. However, with the exception of Jordan, financing through the
stock exchange plays a much smaller role than borrowing through banks
(see figure 2.11). The number of listed companies on local exchanges
remains quite low, despite government incentives. Only 3 companies
are listed in Algeria, 11 in Lebanon, approximately 50 in Tunisia and
Morocco, 161 in Jordan, and around 1,000 in Egypt.21 Listing a com-
pany, however, does not necessarily mean that shares trade or that
private investors own the shares. For example, Telecom Egypt represents
approximately 10 percent of market capitalization in Egypt but remains
entirely government owned. Of the 100 largest stocks in Egypt, 60 are
“almost untraded” and free float for the remaining 40 is less than 30 per-
cent. Cross-shareholdings among related companies also are reported to
reduce the number of shares available to outsiders. For example, a single
conglomerate controls more than 50 percent of market capitalization in
Morocco, while in the Islamic Republic of Iran two-thirds of total mar-
ket capitalization is owned by the 12 largest investors. Low turnover
ratios and low free float of shares magnify investor sentiment during
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booms and busts (see figure 2.12). Finally, financial corporations play a
large role in several exchanges and contribute to low sectoral diversifica-
tion, increasing the risks to investors seeking a balanced portfolio.22
On a more positive side, countries have absorbed the lessons of the
relative market booms and busts in the late 1990s and early 2000s: capi-
tal market laws, regulations, and supervisory authorities have been or are
being strengthened significantly. Tunisia, in particular, has strengthened
the regulatory framework with clear rules regarding insider trading,
market manipulation, takeovers, public offers, and so forth, while Egypt,
Jordan, and Morocco are in the process of updating their securities laws
and strengthening the capacity of their regulatory agencies.
Collective investment schemes have only recently come into being in
the region and are thus far active only in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.23
Where they exist, countries have worked to upgrade the professional ca-
pacity and the quality of regulations, although enforcement of regula-
tions is relatively weak due both to a lack of capacity within supervisory
agencies and to a desire not to stifle potential investment. In all countries
where collective investment schemes have been established, banks, in-
surance companies, and other financial institutions are the primary spon-
sors. Depending on the ownership structure of the local financial sector
(that is, whether sponsoring banks are part of larger conglomerates),
investments under collective investment schemes may be tied to the
underlying promoters, reducing the diversification of funds and increas-
ing the risks to investors and the system as a whole.
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Conclusions
This chapter reviews the initial conditions for pension reform in terms
of demographic structures, macroeconomic prospects, and level of de-
velopment of the financial sector. The main messages from the discus-
sion are summarized as follows.
The region has a very young population with sustained rates of
growth due to relatively high fertility rates. Because the labor force is ex-
panding rapidly and total dependency ratios are declining, countries in
the region have the potential to benefit from a demographic shift, with
positive effects on the economy as well as on pension systems. A rapid
aging of the population is likely to occur only two decades from now. 
These favorable demographic developments, however, should not give
room for complacency, as the aging of the population is not the main fac-
tor behind the financial problems facing pension systems. First, given low
coverage rates, favorable demographic structures are not reflected in pen-
sion systems where old-age dependency ratios are high. Second, given
structural problems in the labor market and weak private sector growth, it
is uncertain that rapid expansion of the labor force will be accompanied by
rapid expansion of employment in the formal sector. Finally, even if this
were the case and the growth rate of the covered population did increase,
it is unlikely to grow enough to align current implicit rates of return on
contributions with sustainable rates. Hence, even in the absence of demo-
graphic changes, pension systems will run into trouble eventually. The
future aging of the population will simply make matters worse.
The unemployment challenge facing Middle East and North African
countries also has important implications for pension reform. First, pol-
icy makers need to rethink current financing mechanisms to avoid a sus-
tained increase in payroll taxes, which can further reduce the demand for
labor. High labor costs can also reduce the competitiveness of countries,
discouraging private investment and job creation. Second, because an
important part of the labor force is expected to remain outside the pen-
sion system, countries need to think creatively about mechanisms to pro-
tect those who are not accumulating the necessary savings to provide an
adequate level of income during old age. 
Regarding the macroeconomic environment, three messages need to
be emphasized. First, already high levels of public debt reinforce the
need to control the accumulation of implicit pension debt of pay-as-you-
go systems, which can threaten the credibility of the fiscal framework.
Clearly, frail fiscal balances constrain the repayment of this debt over the
short term. Nonetheless, it is desirable for countries to make implicit
liabilities explicit and to start exploring transparent financing
mechanisms. Second, inflation rates have fallen significantly, which
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improves the prospects for long-term investors, including pension funds,
as well as for the adoption of best practices in the design of benefit for-
mulas in earnings-related schemes. Finally, improved external balances
should allow countries to consider more flexible regulations regarding
capital accounts and the investment of pension fund assets abroad. 
With respect to the ability of the financial sector to absorb and inter-
mediate pension assets, the outlook is mixed. Two groups of countries
emerge. First, countries such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have in-
complete financial markets, but the operating segments are stable and
there is commitment to further reforms. The financial sector in these
countries meets the minimum conditions for diversifying sources of
savings for retirement by increasing the level of funding of the manda-
tory pension systems through a fully funded, defined-contribution tier
and the development of privately funded voluntary pensions.
At the other end of the spectrum, countries such as Algeria, Djibouti,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Yemen have incom-
plete financial markets, with nonexistent or very small segments outside
the banking sector and weak operating segments. Introduction of
mandatory funded pensions and annuities is more controversial in these
countries, at least over the medium term. Further progress in economic
and financial sector development is necessary before complex pension
reform programs can be put in place.
In between these groups, Egypt and Lebanon face structural factors
that limit the degree to which the financial sector can play a role in
intermediating pension assets. In Egypt, the public sector still plays a
significant role in both the banking and insurance sectors; financial and
operational restructuring programs will need to be completed. In
Lebanon, the reliance of the banking sector on government debt means
that banks are not appropriate vehicles for additional placement of
pension assets—at the end of the day, funds are likely to be reinvested in
government bonds.
Finally, outside of the spectrum are countries such as Libya and Syria.
With nearly entirely state-controlled financial sectors, there is no
rationale for shifting pension assets to the banking sectors or for intro-
ducing a funded pension pillar. 
Notes
1. Countries in the Arabian Peninsula established the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in 1981 to promote cooperation. The following countries are
included in the GCC: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates.
2. A demographic transition consists of a shift from high to low mortality
and birth rates. The initial stage of the demographic transition is characterized
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by a rapid decline in mortality rates, while the final stage exhibits a slow reduc-
tion in birth rates. 
3. See appendix B for a description of the methodology used to generate
demographic projections.
4. See figure B.1 in appendix B for a description of current and projected
survival probabilities across countries. Fertility rate forecasts are associated with
rather large confidence intervals, as future fertility choices are associated
not only with current demographic variables but also with future social and
economic factors. 
5. It could be argued that fertility rates in the Middle East and North Africa
are structurally higher than in other regions because of the cultural and societal
organization. Nonetheless, many of the determinants of fertility choices, such
as health status, female education levels, female participation in the labor mar-
ket, and urbanization levels, are correlated with income. Hence, as GDP per
capita increases, it is reasonable to expect fertility rates to decline.
6. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have roughly con-
stant or mildly increasing total dependency ratios, reflecting their more
advanced stage in the demographic transition.
7. Clearly, the pension system itself influences macroeconomic dynamics.
Some of the mechanisms are discussed in chapter 5.
8. Given data constraints, the discussion focuses on non-GCC countries.
9. Several studies identify decreasing total factor productivity growth as a
primary reason for low GDP growth. The 1970s were marked by two conflict-
ing dynamics: increasing accumulation (human and physical capital per labor)
and declining growth. By the 1980s accumulation had collapsed and continued
to fall during the 1990s as both public and private investment declined (see
Bosworth, Collins, and Chen 1995; Dasgupta, Keller, and Srinivasan 2002;
Keller and Nabli 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Artadi 2002).
10. The unemployment figure refers to non-GCC countries.
11. For a review of the literature and evidence for Algeria, see Robalino and
Marouani ( forthcoming). For simulations of impacts in Morocco, see Agénor
and El Aynaoui (2003). Lax enforcement of labor and social security laws, in
part given weak administrative capacity and negative incentives for enrollment
embedded in pension laws, contribute to the problem. 
12. The informal sector encompasses small and medium enterprises, part-
time wage or seasonal workers, and various survival activities. Moreover, in
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, most informal employment occurs in broad
services, manufacturing, mining, and utilities. 
13. Despite a surplus of funds, most remain in relatively short-term time
deposits. Because of flat or nonexistent yield curves, depositors have no incen-
tive to place funds for longer periods in the domestic currency. The inability or
unwillingness of governments to issue medium- and long-term government
bonds, especially at yields demanded by the market, results in the inability of
banks and other intermediaries to price long-term deposits or lend at fixed rates
and longer maturities. Lack of competition among large potential depositors
contributes to this. In Jordan, depositors and investors report extremely high
demand for long-term, fixed-rate investments. However, they also demand
extremely high premiums to lend funds for longer than a few years—premiums
that seem out of line with past experience with inflation and currency move-
ments. Lack of a truly competitive market for funds results in the placement of
funds for shorter periods of time.
14. Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have made positive changes to monetary
policy and banking supervision, and the quality of banking operations has
improved as a result. Egypt, Lebanon, and the Republic of Yemen have also
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made positive regulatory changes, but other issues in these three countries pre-
vent banks from contributing significantly to the economy. In the Republic of
Yemen, the key issues are the weak economy and weak judicial system. In
Lebanon, excessive public debt crowds out private borrowing. In Egypt, struc-
tural issues and heavy government involvement in the sector prevent the system
from operating efficiently.
15. The Bank for International Settlements sets the minimum risk-
weighted capital adequacy ratio at 8 percent. 
16. In Jordan, for example, the banking sector already intermediates a large
percentage of the reserves of the Social Security Corporation, which manages
the mandatory public pension program.
17. Stress tests measure vulnerabilities at a particular point in time and may
not be relevant if there are changes in balance sheets.
18. Information related to the capital markets and nonbank financial inter-
mediaries is not collected in a systematic manner in the region. The information
provided here is based on miscellaneous World Bank reviews. Some information
used here comes from reports produced under the joint World Bank-Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Financial Sector Assessment Program. To the extent that
the FSAP reports have been made public by the participating countries, these
are listed in the References. Although common assessment standards are used in
reviewing regulatory frameworks, quantitative assessments of the nonbank
financial sector vary from report to report, depending on the level of develop-
ment of the system.
19. There may be some overstatement of total insurance assets in Morocco
as a result of significant cross-ownership of insurance companies and banks,
largely within a few key groups of private shareholders. 
20. For example, in Egypt property and casualty premiums are subject to a
20 percent tax, while life insurance premiums are subject to a 4 percent tax.
Even the lower rate places investment products linked to life insurance at a
distinct disadvantage to deposits at a bank.
21. In Egypt, about 85 percent of listed companies are on a secondary list-
ing for companies not meeting ownership diversification, accounting and au-
diting, or disclosure requirements of the primary list.
22. In Jordan, indexes for financial services are more than half the total mar-
ket index, and trading of financial services approximates 40 percent of total
trading on the exchange. In Lebanon, 6 of the 11 listings are banks. In Tunisia,
54 percent of market capitalization is related to banks, while financial institu-
tions as a whole make up 63 percent of market capitalization.
23. In francophone North Africa, these are known as the Sociétés
d’Investissement à Capital Variable and the Organismes de Placement Collec-
tif en Valeurs Mobilières.
Mandatory Pension Systems in
the Middle East and North Africa
CHAPTER 3
All of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa have earnings-
related pension schemes, essentially financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
In most cases, the schemes as we know them today go back to the last
quarter of the twentieth century. For this report, close to 30 pension
funds were surveyed across 13 countries. This chapter presents an
overview of the main features of those plans and the key issues they
face.1 The discussion is organized in five sections. The first section
characterizes the institutional organization of the various schemes and
discusses issues of coverage. The second reviews the mandates of the
systems with regard to pension entitlements and introduces interna-
tional comparisons. The third and fourth sections assess, respectively,
the effects of current benefit formulas and eligibility conditions on
incentives and the type of redistribution that takes place within the
systems. The final section discusses issues regarding financial sustain-
ability and the fiscal impacts of current pension systems.
Institutional Organization and Coverage
This section starts by describing the structure of the pension systems, in-
cluding the number of funds and the schemes implemented for various
categories of workers (for example, civil servants, the military, private
sector wage earners, the self-employed). It then analyzes coverage rates
and likely future dynamics.
Structure of the Pension Systems
Most pension systems in the region are fragmented, raising issues
regarding administrative costs and labor mobility. None of the countries
surveyed has a national pension scheme that covers all categories of
workers (see table 3.1). Even Jordan, which recently integrated the
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schemes for private sector workers, civil servants, and the military,
excludes the self-employed and workers in the agricultural sector. Coun-
tries like Morocco and Tunisia have the largest number of schemes and
funds. This fragmentation is an important policy issue because, in the
absence of bridges that facilitate the transfer of rights between plans, it
constrains the mobility of the labor force within and across sectors. A
different scheme for civil servants and other workers in the public sector
can also add distortions in labor supply. Indeed, when these schemes are
more generous, they crowd out labor from the private sector. In the past,
when economies were centrally planned and dominated by the public
sector, fragmentation was not an issue. As countries embrace markets as
a means to allocate productive resources across sectors and seek integra-
tion into the world economy, fragmented pension systems are likely to
TABLE 3.1
Structure of the Pension System in Middle East and North African Countries
Integrated
funds for civil Contractual 
Number servants and the workers in the Workers in state- Self-employed Number of 
Country of fundsa private sector public sector Military owned enterprises and others schemes
Algeria 2 Yesf General Generalb General Own fund 4
Bahrain 2 No Public sector Public sectorb Public sector Not covered 3
Djibouti 3 No Private sector Own fund Private sector Not covered 3
Egypt, Arab Private sector 6
Rep. of 3 No Private sector Own fund Private sector (three schemes)b
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. of 3 No Public sector Own fund Private sector Private sectorb 4
Iraq 2 No Public sector Public sectorb Public sector Not covered 3
Jordanc 2 Yes General General General Not covered 3c
Lebanon 2 No Public sector Public sectorb Public sector Not covered 3
Libya 1 Yesf General Generalb General Generalb 3
Morocco 3 No Own fund Public sectorb Own fund Not covered 4
Tunisia 2 No Public sector Public sectorb Public or private Private sector 6
(three schemes)b
West Bank 
and Gaza 2 No Not covered Not coveredd Not coveredd Not covered 2
Yemen,
Republic of 4 No Public sector Own funde Public sectore Private sector 4
Total 31 44
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes:
a. Refers to the institution managing pension plans (schemes). It excludes occupational funds in public and private companies but includes
pension funds for the military and security forces.
b. Within the fund plan, members have a special scheme.
c. Schemes for civil servants and the military are closed to new entrants.
d. New law has just been promulgated.
e. There are two separate funds: one for the military and another for the security forces.
f. Special provisions apply.
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become an important problem. Fragmentation also increases adminis-
trative costs and can be a source of inequities, as workers in some sectors
are favored relative to others.
One level of differentiation is between civil servants and private sec-
tor employees. Only Algeria, Libya to a certain extent, and Jordan of late
have an integrated system for civil servants and private sector workers.
In Algeria, one scheme, managed by the Caisse Nationale des Retraites
(CNR), applies to all wage earners. In Libya, civil servants and private
sector workers are also in the same scheme, managed by the Social
Security Fund (SSF), although there are some differences in eligibility
conditions. The last exception among the countries surveyed is Jordan,
where the civil servant scheme was closed to new entrants in 1995.2 New
civil servants now join the Social Security Corporation (SSC), which
before was the scheme for private sector workers. In all the other coun-
tries, a dual system exists. In Egypt, Law 79 of 1975 regulates a single
scheme for civil servants, employees in the private sector, and employees
in public enterprises, but special provisions apply to these three groups,
and two separate funds manage the scheme: the Government Employees
Pension Fund, in charge of civil servants, and the Public and Private
Enterprises Employees Pension Fund (PPEEPF).3 Lebanon and the
West Bank and Gaza do not provide pension coverage to workers in
the private sector. 
In part, dualism is explained by the fact that schemes for civil servants
evolved first. When coverage was expanded to private sector workers,
the civil servant schemes prevailed in most countries. Lebanon is a
special case: employees in the private sector are covered not by a pension
plan but by an end-of-service indemnity. When employees leave a
company, they receive the capital accumulated in their individual
account with past employers plus a lump sum proportional to the
number of years spent with the last employer. There is no mandate to
transform the resulting capital into an annuity. 
A second level of differentiation concerns contractual workers in the
public sector and workers in state-owned enterprises. In Morocco,
contractual workers have their own separate pension fund, the Régime
Collectif d’Allocation et Retraites (RCAR). Until recently, workers in
large public enterprises had company pension plans, but most of these
have closed, at least to new entrants, who now join the RCAR. In Bahrain,
Iraq, Lebanon, and the Republic of Yemen, contractual workers and em-
ployees in public companies enroll in the scheme for civil servants. In
Tunisia, all contractual workers join the scheme for civil servants, but
rules are less clear for workers in state-owned enterprises. Some compa-
nies join the scheme for civil servants; others join the scheme for private
sector employees. In Djibouti and Egypt, workers in public companies
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without internal regimes and contractual workers join the regime for
private sector employees. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, contractual
workers join the scheme for civil servants, but workers in state-owned
enterprises join the scheme for private sector workers. Finally, in the
West Bank and Gaza, these two categories of workers are not covered.
For the military, countries have taken one of two approaches. In
Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of
Yemen, the military have their own fund. In the other countries, they
join either the general system (for example, Algeria and Libya) or the
fund for civil servants (for example, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia). In
all cases, they enjoy special provisions. Jordan is an exception. The
scheme for the military was closed to new entrants, who now join the
SSC and are subject to the same benefit formulas and eligibility condi-
tions as other members. However, given that the retirement age is
generally lower for the military than for other workers, the budget is
expected to finance individual accounts that will top up the benefits paid
by the SSC.
Several countries also have set up special schemes for the self-
employed, part-time workers, and workers in the agricultural sector.
Algeria has a separate fund for independent workers, Caisse d’Assurance
Sociale des Non-Salariés (CASNOS), which charges a lower contribu-
tion rate but offers benefits similar to the core scheme. Egypt has a
mandatory pension plan for employers and the self-employed, a special
regime for individuals working abroad, as well as a scheme for casual
workers (all managed by the PPEEPF). The latter is basically a noncon-
tributory scheme where members pay a symbolic flat rate and receive a
flat benefit upon retirement. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the self-
employed and employees in small enterprises (fewer than 10 employees)
join the regime for private sector workers and pay a lower contribution
rate, although benefits are the same. In the Republic of Yemen, the same
holds true, although there seem to be no differences in eligibility condi-
tions or benefit formulas. In Libya, the self-employed join the general
SSF scheme but pay higher contribution rates. Tunisia has a scheme for
agricultural workers in cooperatives (Régime Salariés Associés du
Secteur Agricole), another for wage earners in the agricultural sector
employed at least 45 days per quarter by the same employer (Régime
Salariés du Secteur Agricole), and a scheme for the self-employed
(Régime des Non-Salariés, RNS). At the other extreme, Djibouti, Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and the West Bank and Gaza do not offer
coverage to the self-employed or part-time workers.
Beyond mandatory pension systems, occupational plans that often
substitute for the main schemes are common across the region. These
occupational plans contribute to the fragmentation of the labor market.
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At least 20 occupational pension plans exist in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, all defined-benefit arrangements. In Jordan there are 40 plans,
all earnings-related. In Morocco, the Caisse Interprofessionnelle
Marocaine de Retraite and the Caisse Nationale de Retraite et d’Assurance
manage several regimes (World Bank 2004a). In Egypt, there are close
to 600 occupational plans, but these complement the mandatory scheme.
In general, the occupational plans are not subject to regulations or
supervision by the government, disclosure is opaque, management stan-
dards presumably cannot be considered as “best practices,” and many are
facing financial difficulties. This is an issue of concern, first, because
several of these plans are part of state-owned enterprises and add to the
contingent liabilities of the government and, second, because plan mem-
bers face a considerable risk of not receiving promised benefits.
The remaining sections of this chapter focus on the mandatory pen-
sion schemes and, in particular, on schemes for private sector employees
and civil servants. The special schemes for various categories of workers
are not reviewed in depth, and readers are referred to the country
reports cited in chapter 1 (note 2).
Coverage
The degree to which today’s workers are covered by formal pension
systems concerns policy makers for two reasons. First, low coverage rates
imply that large segments of the population might have insufficient
income to support themselves in old age. In Middle East and North
African countries, strong family and kinship ties are an important infor-
mal way of protecting older people. However, their effectiveness in the
future is being called into question, in part, by the effects of rural-urban
and international migration. Second, the coverage of the pension system
affects its finances. For example, an expansion of coverage brings greater
revenues over the short term, and as a result many governments see the
expansion of coverage as the solution to financial problems. Unfortu-
nately, as discussed in chapter 1 (section on demographics), the opposite
could likely occur. The expansion of coverage brings higher revenues
today but also higher expenditures in the future. When pension systems
are unbalanced—benefit promises are too high relative to contributions—
bringing in new plan members worsens their financial position. Hence
policies regarding the expansion coverage need to balance social objec-
tives with financial constraints.
This subsection assesses the level of coverage of current pension
schemes and the factors likely to influence future dynamics. In all cases,
the military is excluded from the calculations, since it often is covered by
a separate fund or scheme for which little information is available.
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There are two main structural influences on the extent to which the
working population is covered by a mandatory, formal pension scheme:
(a) the institutional arrangements for pension provision, particularly the
extent to which different labor market groups are covered by the man-
date, and (b) the level of employment and its distribution among differ-
ent sectors of the economy. Other things being equal, countries that do
not provide pensions to the self-employed or seasonal workers in the
agricultural sector or where occupational plans are substituting for the
mandatory system tend to have lower coverage rates. Countries with
high unemployment rates, a large share of nonwage earners in the labor
force, or a large agricultural sector also tend to have lower coverage
rates. In contrast, countries with a large public sector (including the civil
service and state-owned enterprises) or a more industrial private sector
tend to have higher coverage rates.4
Coverage among the countries included in the analysis varies between
8 and 87 percent of the labor force. On average, the mandatory schemes
cover 34 percent of the labor force. There is, however, little information
on the characteristics of those covered (family status, earnings, and so
forth) or on the industries and occupations in which they work. Libya
has the highest level of coverage, in part, because a large majority of
the labor force is employed in the public sector or state-owned
enterprises (see figure 3.1). The other countries with coverage rates
above 40 percent (Algeria, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
Tunisia) offer special pension schemes to the self-employed or workers
Labor force coverage (percent)
Sample average
0 20 40 60 80 100
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Excludes military and security forces. Countries were selected based on the availability of data.
The figure for Egypt excludes workers covered under Law 112/1980, basically a noncontributory
scheme. Given, sometimes, important variations in labor force estimates across sources, numbers
need to be interpreted with caution.
Figure 3.1  Coverage of the Mandatory Pension System in Select
Middle East and North African Countries
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in the agricultural sector. In Egypt, the reported figure would be higher
if the scheme for casual workers were included; this is basically a quasi-
noncontributory system enrolling close to 30 percent of the labor force
(close to 6 million workers). In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the self-
employed also have access to the Social Security Organization (SSO),
the mandatory scheme for private sector workers. Given the size of the
public sector (including state-owned enterprises), the coverage of the
mandatory pension system could be higher, except that numerous
occupational plans operate as substitutes for the main scheme. A similar
phenomenon is observed in Jordan, where coverage rates are around
30 percent. Moreover, coverage is not offered to the self-employed or
seasonal workers in the agricultural sector. Lebanon and Morocco have
low coverage rates (around 20 percent) relative to their level of income.
In Morocco, one of the main reasons is that 45 percent of the employed
population are workers in the agricultural sector who are not covered.5
Indeed, in this sector seasonal jobs and multiple employers are frequent,
and access to a formal pension scheme is less likely. Djibouti, Iraq, the
West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen also have the lowest
coverage rates, and the factors explaining the outcome are similar. In
Iraq, the formal private sector is small (only 1 percent of the labor force
is enrolled.) The West Bank and Gaza does not provide coverage to
private sector workers. Djibouti has the highest unemployment rate in
the region (60 percent of the labor force), and the Republic of Yemen has
the largest share of workers in the agricultural sector (55 percent).
Coverage rates might also be affected by the incentives for individu-
als to enroll in the mandatory pension systems and for employers to
comply with the mandate. Individuals are affected by the cost of contri-
butions, by their expectations about the level of pension benefits even-
tually received (and their links to the contributions paid), as well as by
the transaction costs, such as complying with complex bureaucratic
procedures. Employers also face compliance costs that might prevent
them from covering their workers, particularly if they have only a small
number of employees.
In most countries, tensions already exist among employers, employ-
ees, and the government regarding the level of the contribution rate to
the social security system—often above 25 percent of gross wages, which
is considered high. Although most countries provide generous benefits
that could stimulate enrollment, pessimistic expectations about the
ability of the system to deliver on these promises can reduce the incen-
tives to enroll and contribute. As discussed in the section on incentives in
this chapter, choices regarding benefit formulas and eligibility conditions
can also provide incentives to evade enrollment and contributions—for
instance, when only the last few salaries count toward the pension.
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Working in the opposite direction, penalties for noncompliance and
effective enforcement of the mandate to contribute tend to increase cov-
erage. In the Middle East and North Africa, countries generally impose
penalties for noncompliance, but enforcement capacity is weak. Hence
problems regarding evasion and the insufficient declaration of wages
are pervasive (see the section on administration in chapter 4).
What are the prospects for the expansion of pension coverage in the
region? Cross-sectional studies show a correlation between the level of
income per capita in a country and the coverage rate (Palacios and
Pallarès-Miralles 2000). One explanation is that higher levels of income
can be correlated with stronger administrative capacity and better-
designed systems that improve the incentives to contribute. However,
higher levels of income will not necessarily be accompanied by structural
changes in labor markets or the institutional organization of schemes. As
previously discussed, these are important factors that can explain devia-
tions from the expected coverage rates. For instance, Algeria, Egypt, and
Tunisia, the countries with special regimes, have coverage rates above
the expected values for their level of income (adjusted for purchasing
power parity). In Morocco, the coverage rate is below expectations
(figure 3.2). 
What happens to coverage in the future will depend mainly on how
institutional arrangements evolve, how the parameters and rules of the
pension system affect incentives to enroll, and, most important, how
labor markets and industrial structures change. Over the short term, the
structural reforms that are engaged in many countries of the region (for
example, privatization, civil service reform) are likely to imply important
reallocation of resources, both capital and labor between sectors, and
could induce lower coverage rates. Over the medium and long term,
without institutional and economic change that generates jobs in the
formal sector, coverage is unlikely to expand much. This is the
“pessimistic” scenario shown in figure 3.2. This scenario assumes that
coverage among the employed population remains constant in different
sectors and that new jobs, resulting from assumptions regarding eco-
nomic growth and labor productivity, are distributed proportionally in
each of these sectors. In this case, the share of the labor force covered by
one of the mandatory systems will remain roughly constant and, in some
cases, will even decline. This is because the total number of new contrib-
utors will be growing at the same rate as or slower than the labor force.
A more optimistic scenario considers changes in the structure of the
labor market and industrial organization along with improvements in
incentives to enroll and in enforcement capacity. In figure 3.2, this
“optimistic” scenario is illustrated by assuming that current coverage
rates among new employees gradually increase to 100 percent over a
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30-year period. This results in average coverage rates of 40–50 percent
of the labor force. The truth is likely to lie somewhere in between the
pessimistic and optimistic scenarios.
Size and Shape of the Schemes
All pension systems embody a set of retirement-income objectives,
which, because of the complexity of the parameters and rules, is often
implicit. This section aims to compare these implicit objectives for
retirement income both among countries in the region and between the
Middle East and North Africa and other regions of the world. This is
done by simulating replacement rates for various pension schemes. The
replacement rate is defined as the pension divided by the last salary. It
indicates the share of total income that is replaced or preserved on
retirement. The calculations are made for full-career workers at differ-
ent income levels. Full-career here means that individuals join the sys-
tem at age 20 and contribute until the normal retirement age is reached,
or the maximum replacement rate paid by the system is attained.6
The simulations are not meant to predict the replacement rates that
systems will deliver in practice—in fact, few plan members are full-
career workers, and therefore many will deviate from the rates discussed
here. The objective of the simulations is to isolate differences in param-
eters across countries. 
The first two parts of the section explore income replacement for
private sector workers and civil servants, respectively, within the region.
The third part compares the key parameters that determine income
replacement patterns in Middle East and North African countries with a
range of pension systems in OECD, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
and in Latin America and the Caribbean. Given data constraints, this
comparison is done only in the case of schemes for private sector workers.
Income Replacement Patterns in Schemes 
for Private Sector Workers 
There is a large variation in the level of income replacement targeted by
pension systems in Middle East and North African countries. Figure 3.3
shows the gross replacement rate as a function of income expressed as a
share of the economy-wide average earnings. Income ranges from
30 percent up to three times average earnings. The highest level of in-
come replacement in the region is observed in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, where the average full-career worker receives a gross replacement
rate of 116 percent. The gross replacement rate is defined as the gross
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(that is, before taxes) pension divided by the gross salary. At the other
extreme, in Djibouti, the average full-career worker receives a gross
replacement rate close to 50 percent. Iraq and the Republic of Yemen
target average gross replacement rates of 100 percent, Bahrain and
Libya have average gross replacement rates of around 80 percent, while
Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia target average gross replacement
rates in the 60–70 percent range (see figure 3.3). 
Two important parameters influence income replacement patterns:
the minimum pension and the ceiling on the covered wage. The retire-
ment incomes of low- and often middle-income workers depend on
the value of the minimum pension rather than the parameters of the
earnings-related scheme. Moreover, at high earnings, pensions can
sometimes be affected by ceilings on pensionable earnings or maximum
pension values. Both of these policies have substantial effects on pension
values and the costs of the pension system that are not captured by look-
ing at the entitlements of average-income workers.
The effect of the minimum pension is seen at lower levels of earnings
except in the Republic of Yemen, where there is no minimum pension,
and in Morocco, where it is very small. It is useful to note the earnings at
which a full-career worker is entitled to the minimum pension. In Algeria,
Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, and Tunisia, full-career workers with earnings
below 50 percent of the average are eligible to receive the minimum
pension and therefore receive higher replacement rates than the average
full-career worker. In Libya, the minimum pension is set at 29 percent of
the economywide average earnings. With an average replacement rate of
80 percent for the full-career worker, only individuals earning less than
36 percent of average earnings are eligible. In Morocco, the minimum
Figure 3.3  Gross Replacement Rate as a Percentage of Average Earnings in Select
Middle East and North African Countries 
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pension represents only 18 percent of average earnings, and only individ-
uals with incomes below 26 percent of the average are eligible. At the
other end of the spectrum, in Bahrain the relatively low replacement rate
for workers claiming the pension at the earliest age for eligibility means
that a worker would need to earn 85 percent of the average not to receive
the minimum pension. The high minimum pension in the Islamic
Republic of Iran and in Jordan means that a worker would have to earn
more than 70 percent of average earnings not to be eligible.
The ceiling on the covered wage has the effect of gradually reducing
replacement rates for those with earnings above the ceiling. Indeed, the
higher the wage, the smaller the proportion that is used to pay contribu-
tions and calculate the pension and therefore the smaller the ratio between
this pension and the total wage. In Morocco, for instance, there is a ceiling
of close to 2.3 times the average wage. Individuals with earnings above this
ceiling receive lower gross replacement rates. In Egypt, the pension is com-
puted on the basis of two different salaries: the basic salary and the variable
salary. The first has a ceiling that is close to the average wage, while the sec-
ond represents 1.8 times the average wage. In Iraq, there is no ceiling, but
there is a maximum pension of close to two times the average wage; hence
replacement rates also fall for higher incomes.7 In the other countries, there
are no ceilings, or the ceilings that exist are quite high. For instance, in the
Islamic Republic of Iran the ceiling is close to eight times the average wage.
As a result, replacement rates are flat across most levels of income.
When taxes on pensions and wages are taken into account, replace-
ment rates increase considerably. Contrary to the gross replacement rate,
the net replacement rate refers to the ratio between the net pension (that
is, after taxes) and the net wage.8 In all cases reviewed, net replacement
rates are higher than gross replacement rates. This is because income
taxes on pensions are generally lower than income taxes on wages and
because pensioners no longer pay social security taxes. Hence, in Egypt,
while the gross pension for the average full career worker represents
80 percent of the gross wage, the net pension represents more than
100 percent of the net wage (see figure 3.4). Basically, in Egypt, the average
worker has more disposable income after retirement than while working!
Libya is an interesting case because net replacement rates increase with
the level of income. This is because pensions are not taxed, while income
taxes on wages follow a progressive schedule.
Income Replacement Patterns in Civil Servant Pension Schemes 
There is also a large range of variation regarding income replacement
patterns for civil servant schemes. The most ambitious of the schemes
is, once again, that of the Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by the
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Figure 3.5  Gross and Net Replacement Rates as a Percentage of Average Earnings in
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Figure 3.4  Net Replacement Rate as a Percentage of Average Earnings in Select Middle
East and North African Countries 
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Republic of Yemen, which offers replacement rates for full-career
workers of 100 percent or higher. Bahrain, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia
target replacement rates for full-career workers in the 75–90 percent
range. A third group includes Djibouti, Lebanon, and the West Bank and
Gaza, with targeted replacement rates for the average full-career worker
below 60 percent (see figure 3.5). In Lebanon the lower replacement rate
reflects a shorter career, since workers can retire after 20 years of
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contributions without restrictions on the age. As in the scheme for pri-
vate sector workers, net replacement rates are higher in all cases.
None of the schemes imposes a ceiling on the covered wage, and only
the Islamic Republic of Iran guarantees a minimum pension that affects
workers with earnings equal to or above 50 percent of the average. Out
of the nine specialized schemes for civil servants, five offer basic pension
guarantees: Bahrain, Djibouti, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Morocco,
and Tunisia. The value of these guarantees expressed as a share of aver-
age earnings is 12.6, 21.3, 66.0, 18.0, and 31.8 percent, respectively.
In Bahrain and Morocco only workers with earnings equal to or below
15 and 25 percent of the average, respectively, benefit from the basic
pension. Tunisia has a more generous scheme that benefits workers with
incomes equal to or below 48 percent of average earnings. 
In general, schemes for civil servants target higher levels of income re-
placement than schemes for private sector workers; income replacement
rates are flat. Only in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the gross replacement
rate for the average full-career worker lower for civil servants than for pri-
vate sector workers. In Bahrain, it is the same; in Morocco and the Re-
public of Yemen, it is 10 percent higher for civil servants; in Djibouti, it is
20 percent higher; and in Tunisia, it is 40 percent higher (see table 3.2).
An important measure of the relative generosity of a pension system
is pension wealth. Pension wealth, which is also discussed in the next
subsection, refers to the net present value of future pension benefits.
Contrary to replacement rates, this indicator takes into account differ-
ences in life expectancy and in the age at which people become entitled
to the pension. The indicator is also expressed as a proportion of
TABLE 3.2
Replacement Rate and Pension Wealth in Public and Private Pension Schemes 
in Select Middle East and North African Countries
Gross replacement rate Gross pension wealth
Ratio of Ratio of
Civil public to Civil public to
Country servants Private private servants Private private 
Bahrain 80.0 79.0 1.0 13.7 14.5 0.9
Djibouti 45.5 37.0 1.2 7.9 7.4 1.1
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 99.0 115.5 0.9 21.9 20.9 1.0
Morocco 75.0 70.0 1.1 15.1 10.3 1.5
Tunisia 90.0 64.0 1.4 16.1 18.0 0.9
Yemen, Republic of 100.0 90.0 1.1 16.7 13.4 1.2
Average 75.2 76.1 1.03 14.6 13.8 1.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Calculations are for average full-career workers. The individual is assumed to join at age 20 and retire at age 60. The discount rate of
the calculation of the pension wealth is set at 3.5 percent per year. The numbers were generated based on existing legal provisions in
each country.
Mandatory Pension Systems in the Middle East and North Africa 63
individual earnings. For instance, in the scheme for civil servants in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, pension wealth is equivalent to more than
20 times the preretirement income of the average full-career worker.
Pension wealth in the case of the schemes for civil servants is, in general,
10–50 percent higher than in the schemes for private sector workers.
The exceptions are Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Tunisia
(table 3.2 and figure 3.6).
International Comparisons of Income Replacement Targets
for National Schemes 
Just as it is useful to compare the countries of the Middle East and North
Africa with one another, so there are valuable lessons to be learned from
comparing them with countries in other regions of the world. Consis-
tent simulations of pension entitlements have now been carried out for
the 30 member countries of the OECD, 13 countries in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, and 9 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
(see Whitehouse 2004).
These countries have more diverse pension systems than the coun-
tries of Middle East and North Africa, including:
• Resource-tested schemes, where the pension benefit is targeted on lower-
income retirees. These can be pension-income tested (depending on
pension income only), income tested (depending on pension, capital,
and employment income), or means tested (depending on broad
income and assets).
Pension wealth (multiple of average earnings)
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
Yemen, Republic of
Tunisia
Morocco
Bahrain
Lebanon
West Bank and Gaza
Djibouti
0 5 10 15 20 25
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Calculations are based on country-specific mortality rates.  The discount rate is set at 3.5 percent a year.
Figure 3.6  Gross Pension Wealth as a Multiple of Average Earnings in
Schemes for Civil Servants in Select Middle East and North African Countries 
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• Basic schemes, where the pension is a flat rate amount per year of con-
tributions or residency.
• Earnings-related schemes, where the pension depends on past earnings.
Different countries have adopted different variants, including the tra-
ditional defined-benefit model (which is the standard in Middle East
and North African countries), notional accounts, or points systems. 
• Defined-contribution schemes, where the pension depends on the value of
contributionsmade, the investment returnsearned, and therateatwhich
accumulated capital is converted into a retirement-income stream.
Furthermore, there is greater variability in the institutional structure
of pension provision in these other countries. First, some OECD coun-
tries and many countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as
in Latin America and the Caribbean have mandatory provision of private
pensions. In Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America and
the Caribbean, these are mainly defined-contribution plans operated by
financial service companies. In OECD countries, there is often manda-
tory coverage by employer-based or industrywide occupational pension
plans, which can be either defined-contribution or defined-benefit
schemes. Furthermore, some OECD countries have occupational plans
based on collective agreements between employees and employers.
Since these cover 90 percent or more of the labor force, they are best
thought of as quasi-mandatory. The calculations that follow are com-
prehensive in that they include all of these different types of mandatory
and quasi-mandatory schemes. 
In general, the mandates of pension systems regarding income
replacement are more onerous in the Middle East and North Africa than
in other regions. Figure 3.7 looks at the gross replacement rate that the
average full-career worker can expect in the future under today’s pension
rules in Middle East and North African countries and a select group of
countries in other regions of the world. Most readily apparent is the vast
range of the results. The targeted replacement rate in Ireland is close to
30 percent, while the average full-career worker in the Islamic Republic
of Iran receives a replacement rate of 116 percent. Clearly, Middle East
and North African countries stand out, with 10 of the 11 countries that
have schemes for private sector workers targeting gross replacement
rates for full-career workers above the average in the sample. The highest
replacement rates in the world are observed in three countries: the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and the Republic of Yemen. Comparing
all countries for which calculations are available in the four regions, the
average replacement rate is 77.9 percent in the Middle East and North
Africa, compared with 56.4 percent in the OECD countries and in
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Eastern Europe and Central Asia and 57.2 percent in Latin America and
the Caribbean. The relative pension value at average earnings is thus
38.1 percent higher in the Middle East and North Africa than in the
OECD countries and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and 36 percent
higher than in Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure 3.7).
Targets for the basic pension guarantee in the Middle East and North
Africa also tend to be above those observed in the other regions. For the
countries considered in the sample, minimum pensions vary widely,
between 14 and 66 percent of average earnings, with an average of
30 percent. Among the schemes for private sector workers in the Middle
East and North Africa, only the Republic of Yemen does not guarantee
a minimum pension. Seven of the remaining 10 countries target a
minimum pension above or very close to 30 percent of average earnings
(see figure 3.8). Only in Djibouti, Iraq, and Morocco is the minimum
pension below or close to 20 percent of average earnings. The Islamic
Republic of Iran guarantees the highest minimum pension, representing
66 percent of the average wage or 100 percent of the minimum wage.
Only four countries in the Middle East and North Africa implement
ceilings on the covered wage. Two have very high ceilings; the other two
Percent of average earnings
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Sources: For Middle East and North African countries, authors’ calculations; for other countries,
Whitehouse 2004.
Note: The average of 61 percent was calculated based on a sample of 50 countries in 4 regions: OECD
(23 countries); Europe and Central Asia (7); Latin America and the Caribbean (9); and the Middle East and
North Africa (11).
Figure 3.7  Gross Replacement Rate as a Percentage of Average Earnings
in Select Countries around the World 
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have ceilings equal to or below the average in the sample. In this sample,
ceilings range between 1.5 times the average wage (Sweden) and 10
times the average wage (Colombia). A majority of countries have ceilings
below 3 times the average wage, but the average is closer to 3.5 times
(see figure 3.9). Out of the four pension schemes for private sector work-
ers in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria and the Islamic
Republic of Iran implement very high ceilings relative to the world
average (six and eight times the average wage, respectively). The ceiling
in Egypt is closer to the sample average, while the ceiling in Morocco
represents only half of the sample average.
The pension systems in Middle East and North African countries offer
the highest level of pension wealth. In the sample of countries analyzed,
the six countries with the highest level of pension wealth are from the
region: Algeria, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Tunisia, and
the Republic of Yemen (see figure 3.10). In these countries, pension
wealth surpasses 15 times the average wage, relative to a sample average
of 11 times the average wage. Libya and Morocco have levels of pension
wealth in line with the sample average. Only Djibouti has pension wealth
significantly lower than the sample average. Average pension wealth for
the Middle East and North African countries is 14 times average earnings,
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Note: The average of 29.4 percent was calculated based on a sample of 27 countries in 4 regions: OECD
(8 countries); Europe and Central Asia (3); Latin America and the Caribbean (6); and the Middle East and
North Africa (10).
Figure 3.8  Minimum Pension Guarantee as a Percentage of Average
Earnings in Select Countries around the World 
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Figure 3.10  Gross Pension Wealth as a Multiple of Average Earnings in
Select Countries around the World 
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Figure 3.9  Ceiling on the Covered Wage as a Multiple of Average
Earnings in Select Countries around the World 
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compared with 9 times average earnings in 30 high-income OECD coun-
tries (most not shown on the chart), 8.5 times in the 9 Latin America and
the Caribbean countries, and 8 times in the 13 Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia countries for which information is available. Thus pension
wealth for workers with average earnings is 54 percent higher in the
Middle East and North Africa than in OECD countries. The gap is
72 percent with Eastern Europe and Central Asia countries and 64 per-
cent with Latin America and the Caribbean countries.
It is also important to consider the pension entitlements of workers at
different earnings levels. These are summarized across the regions in
tables 3.3 and 3.4. The first looks at gross replacement rates for workers
with average earnings and those with low (half the average) and high
(double the average) earnings. At all levels of income, average gross
replacement rates in the Middle East and North Africa are higher than
in other regions of the world. The difference is more important among
average- and high-income individuals. As seen before, for workers with
average earnings, pension values are around 38 percent higher in the
Middle East and North Africa than in other regions. Among high-
income individuals, pension values are between 50 and 63 percent
higher. However, among low-income workers, pension values are only
TABLE 3.3
Gross Replacement Rate around the World, by Level of
Earnings and Region
Percent of individual earnings
Level of earnings and region Mean Minimum Maximum
Average earnings
Middle East and North Africa 77.9 37.5 115.5
OECD 56.4 30.6 101.9
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 56.4 38.4 87.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 57.2 36.0 102.6
Low earnings
Middle East and North Africa 81.3 42.5 132.0
OECD 74.6 47.3 115.5
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 63.7 47.3 96.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 77.7 39.1 105.3
High earnings
Middle East and North Africa 75.7 37.5 115.5
OECD 46.4 15.3 95.2
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 50.4 25.4 75.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 48.3 29.4 89.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Results based on 23 high-income countries in the OECD, 13 countries in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, 9 countries in Latin America, and 10 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Low
earnings are defined as half the average; high earnings are defined as double the average. These
simulations are based on currents laws and regulations.
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5 percent higher relative to Latin America and the Caribbean, 9 percent
higher relative to OECD countries, and 27 percent higher relative to
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
The overall pattern of replacement rates by level of earnings is there-
fore very different among regions. In OECD countries and in Latin
America and the Caribbean, replacement rates decline significantly with
income. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia and in the Middle East and
North Africa, in contrast, replacement rates tend to be much closer
across the earnings range. OECD and Latin American systems tend to
be more redistributive, giving higher replacement rates to lower-income
workers than to higher earners. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia and
in the Middle East and North Africa, the systems are more strongly
insurance based, aiming to give broadly similar replacement rates to
workers with different levels of earnings.
The earlier eligibility age for full-career workers means that pension
wealth is higher in the Middle East and North Africa than in the other
regions. For workers with average earnings, pension wealth is 55–70 per-
cent higher in the Middle East and North Africa. For workers with high
earnings, pension wealth is twice as high. For workers with low earnings,
pension wealth is only between 16 and 40 percent higher (table 3.4).
TABLE 3.4
Gross Pension Wealth around the World, by Level of Earnings
and Region
Multiple of individual earnings
Level of earnings and region Mean Minimum Maximum
Average earnings 
Middle East and North Africa 14.0 7.4 20.9
OECD 9.1 5.5 18.3
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 8.1 5.5 12.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.5 4.8 16.6
Low earnings
Middle East and North Africa 7.3 4.2 12
OECD 6.0 3.5 10.3
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 4.6 3.4 6.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.7 3.2 8.3
High earnings
Middle East and North Africa 27.3 14.8 41.8
OECD 14.8 5.4 34.1
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 14.5 6.6 24.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 14.3 8.5 28.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Results based on 23 high-income countries in the OECD, 13 countries in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, 9 countries in Latin America, and 10 countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
Calculations are based on country-specific mortality rates. The real discount rate is set at 3.5 percent a
year. These simulations are based on current laws and regulations.
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Incentives
The mechanisms used to compute and award pensions affect the behav-
ior of individuals (for example, retirement, labor supply, and savings
decisions), the type of redistribution that exists within the system, and
ultimately the system’s financial sustainability. This section assesses
incentive problems by looking at patterns in the real implicit rate of
return (IRR). Indeed, since the pension schemes receive contributions
from plan members and eventually pay benefits, it is possible to compute
the implicit return on these contributions. The goal is to compare the
rate of return received by individuals who follow different strategies, for
instance, regarding enrollment and retirement. It thus becomes possible
to identify the types of strategies that are rewarded by the scheme and
those that are penalized.
Because implicit rates of return ultimately are determined by the
choice of benefit formulas and eligibility conditions, the analysis illumi-
nates the main problems regarding these choices. In relation to benefit
formulas, key parameters discussed in this section include (a) the meas-
ure of income used to compute the pension (for example, last salary, full-
career average); (b) the accrual rate; (c) the existence of a maximum
replacement rate or pension; and (d) the level of the minimum pension.
In relation to eligibility conditions, the analysis focuses on (a) the con-
tribution rate, (b) retirement ages, and (c) vesting periods. As previously
mentioned, all the main parameters of the various pension schemes in
the region are summarized in appendix C. The methodology used to
compute IRR is presented in appendix F. The main findings follow.
Across countries and schemes, current benefit formulas and eligibil-
ity conditions provide incentives for retirement over work: the IRR is
allowed to vary widely as a function of the retirement age, with those
retiring early receiving higher rates of return. This is illustrated in
figure 3.11 for Jordan and Morocco, but the pattern is observed in the
majority of the other schemes as well.9 In Jordan, the SSC will pay a
25-year-old male who joins the system today and retires at age 55 an
implicit real rate of return on contributions of 6 percent a year. The
same individual retiring at age 65 will receive a 3.5 percent rate of return
on contributions. In Morocco, the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale
(CNSS) will pay similar rates of return to these two hypothetical
individuals.
The reason for this pattern in the majority of schemes is the lack of
“actuarially fair” reductions in pensions for early retirement and
“actuarially fair” compensations for delayed retirement.10 Most of the
schemes under review (the exception is the CASNOS in Algeria) allow
individuals to retire before the “normal” age. Among the seven
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specialized schemes for public sector workers, four (Djibouti, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Tunisia, and the Republic of Yemen) do not impose any
reductions. Among the schemes for private sector workers, the SSO in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the CNSS in Morocco and the RNS in
Tunisia do not impose reductions either. All other schemes with early-
retirement programs have reductions, but they are below actuarially fair
levels. The exception is the RCAR in Morocco, where reductions are
above actuarially fair levels. Regarding compensation for delayed retire-
ment, again only the RCAR has a formal mechanism that encourages
deferred retirement (that is, compensation is above actuarially fair levels).
Maximum replacement rates can also reduce the rates of return for
those retiring late and thus discourage additional years of contributions.
Indeed, once the maximum is reached, additional contributions do not
bring additional benefits. These maximums are pervasive in the Middle
East and North Africa, since most countries use them to reduce costs in
the presence of high accrual rates. The RCAR in Morocco is again
the only system without a maximum. In most countries and schemes, the
maximum can be reached after 30–35 years of service. The Organisme
de Protection Sociale (OPS) and the Caisse Nationale de Retraite
(CNR) in Djibouti have the highest maximum replacement rates,
reached only after 54 and 62 years of contributions, respectively.
The systems also provide incentives to strategically manipulate
salaries because only a few count toward the pension.11 With the excep-
tion of the RCAR in Morocco, none of the schemes uses a full-career
Figure 3.11  Changes in the Internal Rate of Return as a Function of Retirement Age in the
SSC in Jordan and the CNSS in Morocco 
Source: Authors‘ calculations.
Note: Refers to both males and females age 25 when joining the system, earning the average wage, married, and retiring at various ages.
Mortality tables are country and sex specific. 
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average of salaries to compute the pension. In general, the schemes use
the last salary or an average of three to five years. The OPS in Djibouti
and the Régime des Salariés Non-Agricoles (RSNA) in Tunisia use the
average of the last 10 years, the CNSS in Morocco uses the average of
the last 8 years, while the CASNOS in Algeria uses the average of the
best 10 years. Two possible explanations for why defined-benefit
schemes deviate from the full-career average are high inflation rates and
poorly developed information systems. Indeed, in the absence of appro-
priate revalorization for past salaries, high inflation rates would reduce
the value of the pension. Without well-developed information systems,
in contrast, it is impossible to track the wage history of workers. As
discussed in chapter 2, however, inflation rates have been considerably
reduced. Moreover, the movement to a full-career average does not have
to take place overnight, thus giving information systems time to catch up
gradually. In fact, in several of the countries, the necessary information
systems are already in place.
The problem is that workers have an incentive to declare low wages
early in their career and declare high wages late in their career. To
mitigate this problem, Egypt, Jordan, and the Republic of Yemen have
implemented restrictions in the calculation of the average that is used as
reference for the pension. In Jordan, for instance, if the ratio between
the last wage and the wage five years prior to retirement is higher than
1.6, the difference is subtracted from the average used to compute the
pension. In the Republic of Yemen, the average of the last two years of
salaries cannot be higher than 1.5 times the average of the last five years.
These measures, however, are only partial solutions to the problem,
since workers can still underdeclare wages that do not count toward the
pension. Moreover, the measures can penalize workers facing legitimate
wage increases at the end of their career.
All of the pension schemes reward individuals who evade or game the
system. This phenomenon is illustrated in figure 3.12 for Bahrain and
Egypt. In Bahrain, an individual who joins the system at age 25 will
receive a 6 percent real IRR if he retires at age 60; if he delays enrollment
by 10 years, his rate of return will be close to 8 percent a year. This same
person will receive an IRR of 7 percent a year if he enrolls at age 25, con-
tributes 5 years, leaves the system for 25 years, and returns to the system
at age 55. This is again explained, in part, by the fact that only a few wages
count toward the pension. Ceilings on replacement rates also contribute
by reducing the IRR paid to workers who have long contribution peri-
ods. To avoid the ceiling, individuals might choose to delay enrollment.
Finally, current systems could also discourage individual savings by
offering generous implicit rates of return on contributions. Theoretically,
other things being equal, the higher the rate of return on mandatory
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contributions, the lower the incentive to save (see Lindeman and others
2003). If individuals expect to receive high pensions when they retire,
they can be less motivated to save elsewhere. This would preclude the
diversification of savings for retirement, which is desirable to mitigate fi-
nancial risks, and the development of long-term savings schemes, which
are known to contribute to financial sector development and economic
growth (see chapter 4). By reducing individual savings, a high IRR could
also reduce the aggregate level of savings in the economy. The literature
on this issue, however, is mixed and no evidence is currently available in
the case of Middle East and North African countries.
Equity within and across Genders 
Implicit rates of return also indicate the type of redistribution that takes
place within the pension system. In a pension system with no internal
redistribution, all individuals of a given age cohort should receive the
same rate of return, regardless of their gender or wage history. When
some individuals receive higher rates of return than others, then redistri-
bution is taking place. By looking at the IRR received by various groups
of plan members, it is possible to assess the nature of the redistribution:
Are middle- or high-income individuals benefiting more from the system
than low-income individuals? Are men benefiting more than women?
Figure 3.12  Internal Rate of Return and Enrollment and Evasion Strategies in the GOSI in
Bahrain and in Egypt 
Delays enrollment 10 years 
Contributes 5 years, leaves, and comes back 5 years
prior to retirement
Normal enrollment
Source: Authors‘ calculations.
Note: Refers to males age 25 when joining the system, earning the average wage, married, and retiring at various ages. Mortality tables
are sex and country specific. 
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Equity within Genders
In all the schemes in the region, redistribution occurs, but it is not trans-
parent. One source of inequality within generations is also related to the
fact that only a few wages count toward the pension. Manual workers
have relatively flat earnings across their career. Managerial and
especially professional workers tend to see their pay rise more rapidly
over their lifetime (Whitehouse 2004). Basing pension values on final
salary favors workers with steeply rising earnings. In Algeria, for
instance, a 25-year-old man whose salary grows at 2 percent a year will
receive a rate of return one to two percentage points lower than a col-
league whose salary grows at 4 percent a year (see figure 3.13).
Minimum pensions can, to a degree, offset the adverse redistribution
by increasing the rate of return of employees at the bottom of the income
distribution. In Jordan, for example, a 25-year-old entrant with earnings
of half the average, retiring at age 50, can expect an IRR above 8 percent
a year due to the minimum pension. However, the same individual, but
with a longer vesting period, would not benefit from the minimum
pension. He could even receive a lower rate of return than a middle- or
high-income worker with a short career who benefits from the minimum
pension or who experiences a faster rise in salary (figure 3.13). 
Individual with average earnings growing at 2 percent a year 
Individual with average earnings growing at 4 percent a year
Individual with earnings of 50 percent of the average growing
at 2 percent a year 
Source: Authors‘ calculations.
Note: Refers to males age 25 when joining the system, earning the average wage, married, and retiring at various ages. Mortality tables are
sex and country specific. 
Figure 3.13  Internal Rate of Return and Wage History in the CNR in Algeria and the
SSC in Jordan
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In all pension schemes, there are implicit transfers from young to old
workers, regardless of the level of income, as the IRR is allowed to vary
by the age of enrollment in the system. In the Islamic Republic of Iran,
for instance, a 25-year-old male entrant who retires at age 60 will receive
a 4 percent real rate of return on his contributions, a 30-year-old male
entrant will receive 5.5 percent, and a 45-year-old male entrant will
receive close to 6 percent (see figure 3.14). In Tunisia, the differences are
even more striking. The 25-year-old male entrant retiring at age 60 will
receive a 5.5 percent real rate of return, while the 35- and 45-year-old
entrants will receive 7 and 9 percent, respectively. 
There are various reasons for this pattern. First, when the accrual rate
is too high relative to contributions, for a given retirement age, older
individuals with shorter vesting periods benefit from a higher IRR.12
Second, when accrual rates are not constant over the contributory
period, (meaning that they are higher for the first few years of contribu-
tions) older workers usually receive higher replacement rates for the
same vesting period and thus a higher IRR. This type of accrual rate is
used in Morocco’s CNSS and in all Tunisian pension funds. Third, the
ceilings on the replacement rates tend to penalize young workers with a
longer career. Minimum pensions can also increase the IRR of older
workers with a shorter vesting period, regardless of their level of income.
Minimum vesting periods have been introduced to mitigate these prob-
lems, but at the risk of reducing incentives for enrollment among older
workers. In Djibouti, for instance, where the vesting period is set at
Enrollment age = 35Enrollment age = 25 Enrollment age = 30 Enrollment age = 45
Source: Authors‘ calculations.
Note: Refers to males, earning the average wage, married, and retiring at various ages. Mortality tables are sex and country specific. 
Figure 3.14  Internal Rate of Return and Enrollment Age in the SSO in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and the RSNA in Tunisia
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25 years, workers who enroll in the system after age 40 can receive
negative implicit rates of return on their contributions. These vesting
periods basically imply a “moving” retirement age. Workers who enroll
in the system late in their life face considerably higher retirement ages
(see the discussion in chapter 4).
A final source of adverse redistribution, and probably the most severe,
is related to the current accumulation of unfunded pension liabilities. As
discussed in the last section of this chapter, all pension schemes in the re-
gion are accumulating large pension debts. These can be seen as “bonds”
that the government is issuing to cover the pensions of a modest share
of the labor force: a segment of relatively well-off individuals employed
in the formal sector. Future generations of workers, including those at
the bottom of the income distribution, will have to repay these bonds.
Gender Equity
The issue of gender equity in pension systems has been described as
“controversial and unsettled” (Steinhilber 2002; see also ILO 2000).
This report argues that gender inequality can be assessed by looking at
two indicators: the relative pension wealth of men and women and the
relative implicit rates of return that the pension system pays on contri-
butions. This approach then abstracts from gender inequalities that
emerge outside the pension system, in particular, in the labor market. 
An important finding is that, in most countries, pension wealth is
higher for women than for men, even when replacement rates and eligi-
bility ages are the same.13 Here pension wealth is computed at the
earliest possible retirement age, assuming that the individual enrolls at
age 20 and is an average, full-career worker. Across the countries,
average pension wealth is 22 percent higher for women than for men
(see table 3.5). This is because retirement rules tend to be more flexible
for women and because women live longer, on average, than men.
Across these countries, at age 50, for example, women can expect to live
34.1 more years, on average, and men can expect to live an additional
26.5 years, a difference of 7.6 years. This gap between male and female
life expectancy is largest in Bahrain (9.2 years) and the Republic of
Yemen (8.6 years). It is smallest in Djibouti (5.2 years).
The calculations of implicit rates of return for men and women con-
firm these results: the IRR is higher for women than for men in all of the
schemes analyzed (see table 3.5).14 Clearly, when the pension of a sur-
viving spouse is included in the calculations, the difference between the
IRR paid to women and the IRR paid to men is reduced. This is, first,
because men tend to die before their wives and, second, because women
who outlive their husbands tend to do so for a longer period than men
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who outlive their wives. Moreover, in some schemes, women can only
pass their pension to the surviving husband if he is unable to work due
to disability and if he is not receiving a pension of his own. This reduces
the proportion of women who can pass on a survivor pension. From the
point of view of the system, on average, a male plan member is more
expensive than a female plan member.
In summary, four components of benefit formulas and eligibility
conditions explain most of the relative variation in IRR between women
and men: the retirement age, the vesting period, the rules for early
retirement, and the rules regarding the survivor pension. They are
discussed below.
In all the schemes reviewed, except Morocco’s Caisse Marocaine de
Retraite (CMR) and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s SSO, the rules for
transferring survivor rights to children are the same for men and for
women. However, under the assumption that men are the principal
breadwinners, the rules for receiving a survivor pension are more flexi-
ble for women than for men. In Djibouti’s civil service scheme, for
instance, surviving husbands are not entitled to a pension. In Bahrain,
Egypt, and the Republic of Yemen, husbands can only receive the sur-
vivor pension if they are unable to work. Women also lose their survivor
pension if they work, but they can choose not to. In all cases, survivor
benefits cannot be combined with a regular old-age pension. In Jordan,
surviving husbands also have the right to their wife’s pension if they are
unable to work, but, if ineligible, their share of the pension is transferred
TABLE 3.5
Earliest Eligibility Age and Pension Wealth for Full-Career Workers, by Gender, in
Schemes for Private Sector Workers in Select Middle East and North African Countries
Difference in Implicit rates of 
Pension wealth return between women and 
Earliest eligibility age (proportion earnings) men by retirement age (%)
Country Men Women Men Women Age 45 Age 55 Age 60
Algeria 50 45 13.9 15.2 6.30 0.35 0.17
Bahrain 40 35 11.8 14.3 0.23 0.54 0.41
Djibouti 50 50 7.4 8.7 — 0.14 0.06
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 40 40 7.3 8.7 0.18 0.26 0.30
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 50 40 20.4 24.7 8.08 0.13 0.15
Jordan 45 35 12.1 15.4 0.57 0.40 0.23
Libya 62 60 13.1 15.5 — 0.25 5.76
Morocco 55 55 10.3 13.5 — — 0.29
Tunisia 50 50 18.0 22.7 0.09 0.22 0.24
Yemen, Republic of 50 45 15.5 18.7 — 0.15 0.16
Source: Authors’ calculations of replacement rates and pension wealth.
Note: Assumes that individuals enroll at age 20; — = not applicable.
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to the children. In Morocco’s CMR, the survivor benefit for children is
halved if the father is alive, but not if the mother is the survivor. In the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s SSO, children cannot receive a survivor pen-
sion from their mother if the father is alive. In the other schemes in
Algeria, Djibouti, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Morocco, and Tunisia,
the rules for survivor pensions are the same for men and for women.
Standard eligibility ages and vesting periods are either equal for men
and women or favorable to women. In the majority of schemes, the
normal retirement age is 60 for men. The exceptions are in Algeria’s
CASNOS and Tunisia’s RNS, where the normal retirement age is 65 for
men, and in Djibouti’s OPS and CNR, where it is 55. In the first two
schemes, the normal retirement age is 60 for women; in Djibouti, it is
55, the same as for men. In 7 of the 19 remaining mandatory schemes
for public and private sector workers—Algeria’s CNR, Iraq’s Social
Security and Welfare (SSW) and the scheme for civil servants, Bahrain’s
General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), the Islamic Republic
of Iran’s SSO, Jordan’s SSC, and both of the Republic of Yemen’s
pension funds—the normal retirement age is 55 for women. In the
others, it is 60. There is more variation in vesting periods, which range
between zero and 40 years. In the majority of cases, the statutory vesting
period is the same for men and for women. The three exceptions are
Algeria’s CNR, Bahrain’s GOSI, and the scheme for civil servants in the
Republic of Yemen, where women have shorter vesting periods.
Early-retirement rules tend to be more generous for women than for
men. In the CNR in Algeria, women can apply for early retirement
at age 45 with 14 years of contributions, compared with age 50 and
20 years of contributions for men. The adjustments to benefits are the
same. In the Civil Servant Retirement Organisation (CSRO) in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, women can retire with no minimum age after
20 years of contributions, while men need 30 years. In the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s SSO, women can retire at age 42 with 20 years of
service, while men need to be 50 years of age and have 30 years of con-
tributions. Jordan has the most generous retirement rules for women:
they can apply for early retirement at any age with 15 years of contribu-
tions, while men need to be at least 45 years of age and have 18 years of
contributions. Moreover, early-retirement reductions are half of those
that apply to men. In Morocco’s CMR, women can apply for early
retirement at any age with 15 years of service, while men need to con-
tribute 21 years. In Bahrain’s GOSI, women can retire at any age with
15 years and men with 20 years of contributions. In the West Bank and
Gaza, the same treatment is given to men and women.
An important gender issue is the pension treatment in cases of divorce.
All systems entitle a woman to a survivor pension only if she is married at
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the time of the husband’s death. The exception is Egypt, where divorced
women are entitled to a survivor pension if they did not initiate the
divorce. Although divorced women have rights over the pension of their
father in all schemes, they remain vulnerable to poverty during old age.
The conclusion from this analysis is that pension laws across the
region have attempted to provide women with more flexibility in their
retirement decisions and more security in their survivor benefits, driven
by the assumption that men are the principal breadwinners. However,
this special treatment also makes women more vulnerable to pension
reform. If the systems are to be balanced, pension benefits for women
need to be adjusted downward as a function of the retirement age (see
chapter 4). This might induce, women to defer retirement in exchange
for a higher pension, choosing to have less time for leisure and family
and receiving a lower IRR. At the extreme, in the case of a defined-
benefit, pay-as-you-go system, where all members receive the same
implicit rate of return on contributions, regardless of gender, at a given
retirement age, the replacement rate ought to be lower for women than
for men, simply because women live longer. Thus policy makers need to
devise mechanisms to mitigate the impact of pension reform on women.
Some alternatives are discussed in chapter 4.
Pension Costs, Financial Sustainability,
and Fiscal Implications 
Pay-as-you-go systems are, in essence, contracts issued by the govern-
ment that promise to pay pensions in the future in exchange for contri-
butions in the present. Hence, governments are receiving money today
and creating an unfunded obligation in the future, which is a financial
operation very similar to issuing regular debt.15 If the implicit interest
rate paid on this debt is too high, the pension system will run into trou-
ble eventually. 
It can be shown that the sustainable implicit rate of return on contri-
butions that a pay-as-you-go system can pay on contributions is a com-
plex function of the growth rate of the covered wage bill. Over the long
run, a good proxy for this sustainable rate is the growth rate of the eco-
nomy.16 In general, simulations for several countries in the region show
that real implicit rates of return on contributions above 3 percent a year
are unlikely to be sustainable. The essence of the financial problem
across pension systems in Middle East and North African countries is
that implicit rates of return on contributions are too high.
Therefore, all pension systems in the region are financially unsus-
tainable, even in the absence of a future aging of the population. In the
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large majority of cases, pension systems are paying real rates of return
well above 5 percent a year.17 This can be seen in figure 3.15, which
graphs the IRR for a male who enters the system at age 25, is married,
earns the average wage during his whole career, and retires at age 55 or
60 with a pension indexed to inflation. Rates of return vary from more
than 7 percent a year to zero. The most generous schemes are in Bahrain
and the Republic of Yemen. The least generous schemes are in Egypt,
given a high contribution rate (25 percent), and Djibouti, after the
recent parametric reform. However, one needs to be careful with the
comparisons since the classification depends on who is chosen as the rep-
resentative plan member (for example, men or women); as well as the
retirement age. For instance, in Jordan and Bahrain, rates of return at
age 45 can be above 8 percent (real) per year (see figures 3.12 and 3.13).
Schemes for civil servants and the military are particularly vulnerable to
financial instability. Public sector employment has declined relative to the
labor force in the past two decades. These pension schemes are also more de-
mographically mature than schemes for private sector workers, because they
have had a smaller influx of new contributors to hold down the dependency
ratio. They also are more mature in the sense that they typically predate pro-
grams for private sector workers and already have a higher proportion of
retirees. If public sector employment continues to grow less rapidly than the
workforce as a whole, the sustainable rate of return on these schemes will be
0 1 2 3 4 5
Real implicit rate of return (percent)
6 87
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Calculations are for an individual male entering the system at age 25 and retiring at age 55 or 60. At lower
retirement ages, IRR would be higher.
Figure 3.15  Real Implicit Rate of Return for a Representative Plan Member in
Select Middle East and North African Countries, by Fund
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below the rate of growth of the economy. Moreover, fiscal pressures often
have resulted in slower growth of pay in the public sector than in the econ-
omy as a whole, which again reduces the sustainable rate of return.
High and unsustainable IRRs basically reflect the misalignment of
accrual rates, retirement ages, and contribution rates. In a well-designed
and financially self-sufficient pay-as-you-go scheme, the sustainable
accrual rate is a precisely defined function of the retirement age and the
contribution rate, given the survival probabilities at retirement and
the expected sustainable IRR.18 From an equilibrium situation, increases
in life expectancy imply a lower accrual rate, a higher retirement age, or
a higher contribution rate. Similarly, given survival probabilities and the
contribution rate, the lower (higher) the retirement age, the lower
(higher) the accrual rate. None of the pension schemes in the region,
unfortunately, follows this approach in calculating accrual rates.
In the majority of countries surveyed, pension expenditures are
already above expected levels given the current demographic structure
(see figure 3.16). 19 In half of the sample, pension expenditures already
have reached or surpassed 2.5 percent of GDP, and this excludes the
military. This level of spending is close to the average expenditure of
public health systems in the region. Countries such as Djibouti and the
Republic of Yemen have relatively high expenditures, but coverage rates
are below the average. Lebanon is an exception because it does not
provide pensions to private sector workers. Expenditures on civil servant
pensions represent 0.5 percent of GDP, while expected expenditures
capture 1.2 percent of GDP.20
Pensions expenditures as a percent of GDP
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on information provided by pension funds.
Note: Expected refers to predicted levels given the share of the elderly population (see endnote 19). Excess  is the
difference between assured and predicted expenditures. For Libya and the Republic of Yemen, there are no
estimates of expected expenditures as a function of the  share of the population age 65+ years. In all cases,
pension expenditures include only old-age, disability, and survivor pensions.
Figure 3.16  Pension Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP in Mandatory
Schemes in Select Middle East and North African Countries 
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Figure 3.17  Normalized Implicit Pension Debt in Select Countries around
the World 
Most schemes are accumulating implicit pension debts that are
not sustainable (see figure 3.17). Under conservative assumptions,
normalized estimates of accrued-to-date pension liabilities range
between 6 percent of GDP (RCAR in Morocco) and more than 170 per-
cent (SSC in Jordan).21 These liabilities refer to the present value of
pension promises to current retirees and the pension rights accrued to
date by current contributors. The measure can be interpreted as the
total payments that the pension systems would need to make to plan
members if they were liquidated today. For the majority of schemes in
the Middle East and North Africa that have been analyzed, the implicit
pension debt has already surpassed 50 percent of GDP. Aggregating
across schemes for public and private sector workers, the implicit pen-
sion debt is 90 percent of GDP in the West Bank and Gaza, 96 percent
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 130 percent in Morocco, and 137 per-
cent in Djibouti. Jordan has an implicit pension debt approaching
175 percent of GDP, among the highest in the world. These numbers
represent more than two times the explicit public debt. Although no
information is currently available for Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and
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Tunisia, it is expected that the implicit pension debt has reached a similar
order of magnitude: 50–100 percent of GDP.22
Unfortunately, the value of the implicit pension debt is not included
in standard fiscal accounts. This is a problem for at least three reasons.23
The first reason, and perhaps the most important, is that this omission
severely biases the analysis of the sustainability of the public debt and
resulting policies regarding revenues and levels of spending. Basically,
governments would be ignoring an important spending item, which
compromises the credibility of fiscal and monetary policies. Indeed, with
rising implicit pension debts, governments might face incentives to raise
taxes sharply, default on public debt, or reduce the real value of this debt
through higher inflation. Second, foreign investors are increasingly
aware of these linkages, and this increases the country risk premiums,
given uncertainties regarding the true level of the public debt, its future
dynamics, and policy implications. In countries that are more integrated
with the world economy, governments have less flexibility to adapt fiscal
policy to domestic financing needs, which means that an uncontrolled
accumulation of pension debt eventually would need to be financed
through drastic cuts in benefits, which could severely disturb social
stability and harm social cohesion. Finally, studies have shown that the
implicit pension debt influences individual consumption and savings
decisions. Ignoring this debt, therefore, also biases the policy analysis of
interventions aiming to influence these decisions, such as the promotion
of voluntary, private, long-term savings.
These large implicit pension debts also represent the source of a
potentially large intergenerational transfer. Indeed, in the absence of any
intervention, the implicit pension debt will have to be financed by future
generations in the form of lower pension benefits, higher taxes, or a
smaller government budget for other items (such as education and
health).
Clearly, several schemes in the region have reserves, but these are
usually small relative to the implicit pension debt and do little to
improve financial sustainability.24 Reserves range between 4.2 percent in
Djibouti to more than 50 percent of GDP in Bahrain. At the regional
level, reserves represent 14 percent of GDP, which is among the highest
in the world. With the exception of the RCAR in Morocco, however, the
pension funds are not managed as prefunded systems. Reserves are basi-
cally treated as a source of revenue of last resort—a buffer stock that, in
a well-designed pay-as-you-go system, should be used to mitigate
unexpected demographic and macroeconomic fluctuations. Moreover,
across countries, there are important challenges to ensure that these
reserves are managed in the best interests of plan members (see
chapter 5). 
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The fact that the Middle East and North Africa remains a young
region—the labor force is expected to continue growing at an average of
3.3 percent a year during the next decade—should not be a cause for
complacency. First, it is not clear that, given the current unemployment
problem, the expansion of the labor force will be accompanied by a
similar expansion of the population employed in the formal sector of the
economy, thus bringing higher revenues to the pension funds. Second,
and more important, even if this were the case, higher revenues today
also imply higher pension expenditures in the future. Because implicit
rates of return on contributions are too high (that is, the pension systems
are “borrowing” contributions at a rate that they cannot afford), new
entrants worsen rather than improve the financial situation of the funds. 
Even without changes in the demographic structure of the popula-
tion, the pension systems sooner or later will run into trouble, and the
future aging of the population will aggravate the problem. In most coun-
tries, old-age dependency ratios in the population are expected to start
increasing around 2025. Old-age dependency ratios in the pension
systems are already increasing rapidly, particularly in the schemes for
civil servants. This will accelerate the financial crisis (see figure 3.18). 
The projected dependency rates presented in figure 3.18 were con-
ducted using PROST (Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit).
PROST is a computer-based pension model developed by the Social
Protection Unit of the World Bank. The model is designed to simulate
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the behavior of pension systems and to assess their financial sustainabil-
ity under different sets of assumptions over a long time frame. It allows
us to model different pension reform options—from “parametric”
reforms of pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit schemes to systemic reforms,
such as the introduction of fully funded, defined-contribution or
notional defined-contribution schemes. The program can be adapted to
a wide range of country circumstances and can handle simulations up to
100 years and more. PROST has been used in more than 80 countries
to provide quantitative input for pension policy discussions. Key output
from PROST was satisfactorily benchmarked against a number of coun-
tries where micro actuarial models were used.
For each age and gender cohort, PROST enforces consistency
between the projected number of people retiring in this cohort and the
cohort’s contribution history (accrued pension rights). Thus the projected
number of old-age pensioners later in the simulation period is influenced
by the number of employees in earlier years. Length of service at retire-
ment is based on actual data for each pension scheme and is assumed to
remain the same over time.25
Across the pension systems analyzed, with a few exceptions, reserves
are likely to be depleted within the next 10 to 20 years. In Bahrain, the
reserves of both the Pension Fund Commission (which covers the military
and civil servants, but only civil servants are included in the calculations)
and the GOSI are likely to disappear around 2020–5. At that point in time,
the government will need to intervene either to finance pension payments
directly or to default on part of these. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
CSRO is already in deficit. The SSO is likely to display a primary surplus
within the next 20 years, but reserves will be depleted by 2030. In Jordan,
expenditures are expected to surpass revenues around 2012–4. Reserves
could be depleted as early as 2024. In Morocco, the CMR will be in deficit
by 2008, running out of reserves around 2013. For the CNSS, the break-
even point will be in 2010, and reserves could disappear by 2021. The
RCAR, in contrast, is in a remarkably solid financial position. It has close
to a 100 percent level of capitalization and is not expected to run out of
reserves within the next 50 to 60 years. In Tunisia, the scheme for civil
servants is already in deficit, and the RSNA will see expenditures surpass
revenues in 2008. Reserves will be depleted in 2007 and 2014, respec-
tively. Djibouti is the only country where the scheme for private sector
workers is expected to remain in surplus for the next 40 years as a result of
recent parametric reforms. The scheme for civil servants, however, is
already in deficit and has no reserves.
Although 10–20 years might seem like a long time, the impacts of a
reform program take time to bear fruit. Waiting to intervene can be
costly. First, the implicit debt of the schemes will continue to grow,
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threatening the credibility of fiscal policy. Second, population aging will
aggravate financial problems in the future, requiring more severe
adjustments and possibly precluding a gradual approach to reform.
Third, delaying reforms will imply putting the bulk of the adjustment
costs on future generations. To the contrary, early interventions, when
demographic conditions are still favorable, would allow for a more grad-
ual and equitable adjustment. 
The numbers reported also reflect the fiscal challenges that countries
wanting to move to funded schemes will face. Chapter 2 shows that the
fiscal situation in most countries is still frail. With accrued-to-date pen-
sion liabilities as a share of GDP in the 50–100 percent range, higher
levels of funding can only be achieved gradually.
Conclusions
This chapter discusses issues concerning the institutional organization
of pension systems in the region, the size and shape of their mandates,
problems related to incentives, problems related to equity within and
across genders, financial sustainability, and fiscal impacts. The main
conclusions are summarized as follows.
• Pension systems in the region are quite fragmented. When transparent
and efficient rules to transfer rights across funds are not in place, the
mobility of the labor force is restricted, thus precluding an efficient
allocation of resources. Fragmentation also increases administrative
costs and is a source of inequities, as some segments of the labor force
receive preferential treatment from the public pension system.
• Coverage rates are modest, on average. Differences in coverage across
countries are explained mainly by the structure of the labor market
and institutional arrangements for different categories of workers.
There are no signs that coverage will expand substantially over the
medium term. The implication is that a significant part of the labor
force might not be accumulating the necessary savings for retirement.
• In general, pension systems in the region have onerous mandates with regard
to income replacement. Gross and net replacement rates for full-career
workers are high by international standards. While the patterns of
income replacement vary widely across countries, in the majority of
cases these are flat, reflecting the absence of ceilings on the covered
wage or the use of high ceilings. Basic pension guarantees are also
high relative to average earnings and can discourage work. The large
mandates regarding income replacement are likely to be unaffordable.
Moreover, these preclude the diversification of the sources of savings
for retirement and therefore the efficient management of risks.
Mandatory Pension Systems in the Middle East and North Africa 87
• With few exceptions, benefit formulas and eligibility conditions distort in-
centives and make the system vulnerable to adverse distributional transfers.
Individuals are encouraged to manipulate wages, evade or game the
system, and retire early. Indeed, rates of return on contributions
respond to enrollment and retirement strategies as well as wage
histories. Moreover, the systems discriminate as a function of age and
gender and penalize blue-collar workers, who tend to have flat
earnings during their career. 
• While the various pension laws have attempted to favor women by provid-
ing more flexible retirement options and facilitating access to survivor bene-
fits, some also have discriminated against women by restricting the transfer
of their pensions to dependents. In general, women are more vulnerable
than men to reform policies, such as the increase in or equalization of
the retirement age and the rationalization of benefits. 
• The majority of pension systems in the region are financially unsustainable,
reflecting high implicit rates of return on contributions. High implicit rates
of return on contributions result from a misalignment of retirement
ages, benefits, and contribution rates. Hence, even with favorable
demographics, the pension systems eventually will run into trouble.
• Pension systems are accumulating large implicit pension debts that threaten
the credibility of fiscal policy. The level of this debt often surpasses
50 percent of current GDP and can be higher than the explicit public
debt. These unfunded liabilities are the source of a major intergener-
ational transfer. 
• While several of the pension schemes, particularly those for private sector
workers, still are running surpluses and reserves are unlikely to be depleted be-
fore the next decade, delaying action can be costly. Implementing reforms
over the short term will provide more flexibility in the design of reform
options and allow for a more gradual adjustment of current systems.
Notes
1. The target populations of the various schemes, along with the parameters
defining benefit formulas and eligibility conditions, are described in appendix C.
Information on contributors, beneficiaries, revenues, and expenditures is pre-
sented in appendix F.
2. Except for special categories (for example, diplomats and parliamentarians).
3. Egypt also has a special scheme for workers in enterprises with more than
1,000 workers, but it is closed to new entrants.
4. See Colina, Lucas, and Tomasi (2002) for a rigorous empirical analysis of
the determinants of coverage rates in Argentina, and Disney (2004).
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5. This percentage is high relative to the average of median low-income
countries, which is closer to 35 percent of the employed population.
6. Two other important assumptions driving the results of the simulations
relate to the evolution of wages and pensions. All wages are assumed to grow
2 percent a year, in real terms (the model ignores inflation). Thus individual
incomes relative to the average wage are constant in the simulation period. As
far as pensions are concerned, while indexation policies are ad hoc in the major-
ity of countries, for consistency and transparency in comparisons across coun-
tries, in the simulations it is assumed that all pensions are indexed to inflation.
Thus they remain constant in real terms.
7. This refers to the current pension law in Iraq, although it ceased to be
applied after the war. See Robalino, Sluchynskyy, and Bogomolova. (2005).
8. See appendix D for a description of the tax treatment of wages and pensions.
9. Calculations of IRR for other countries and behaviors are available on
request from the authors. 
10. See chapter 4 for a discussion of actuarially fair adjustments.
11. This issue is not only relevant in schemes for private sector workers. In
schemes for civil servants, the government, which sponsors the plan, controls
wage histories and enrollment strategies, but in some cases salaries are inflated
on retirement or a final promotion is given with the intention of boosting a
defined-benefit final-salary pension.
12. See appendix E for a demonstration of this result.
13. Pension wealth is the present value of pensions received while alive
relative to the individual’s earnings. Pension wealth is a better measure of equity
than the replacement rate, which has been used in other studies (see James,
Cox-Edwards, and Wong 2003).
14. These results include the value of the survivor benefit in the calculation
of the internal rate of return accruing to the member. Other analysts have sepa-
rated out the flow of benefits going to surviving widows and widowers and
ascribed them to the relevant gender.
15. The parallel between government bonds and pay-as-you-go systems
has its limits; in the latter, plan members do not enter into the agreement vol-
untarily, so there is no market to trade their acquired rights and less certainty
regarding the stream of future benefits.
16. Over the long run, the growth rate of the wage bill is supposed to
converge to the growth rate of the economy. Basically, the share of GDP that is
allocated to the payment of wages remains constant. 
17. It has been argued that the calculation of implicit rates of return in the
schemes for the civil service (or the military) can be misleading. First, by design,
some schemes are fully financed by the central budget, which implies an infinite
implicit rate of return since there are no contributions. However, in the case of
all of the pension schemes for the civil service and the military in the region,
there is a legal definition of the contribution rates that need to be paid by the
employee and the employer, as part of the remuneration package, to make the
systems financially self-sustainable. The calculation of the implicit rate of return
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in this case can indicate the magnitude of additional resources that the budget
will be forced to transfer to finance the scheme.
18. This issue is discussed in detail in chapter 4 and appendix E.
19. At the international level, pension expenditures are correlated with the
share of the elderly population (see Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles 2000). The
equation used to compute expected expenditures is: 
PEXP = 0.4992 × S65 + 0.015558 (S65^2)
where PEXP is pension expenditures as a share of GDP; S65 is the share of the
population aged 65 or more.
20. In Lebanon, pension expenditures for the military represent 2 percent of
GDP (these are not taken into account in this discussion).
21. Data and assumptions play an important role in the calculation of the
implicit pension debt. In the context of a cross-country analysis, it is essential to
find the right balance between taking into account the idiosyncrasy of a country’s
pension system, on the one hand, and the comparability of the results, on the
other. To be consistent with the estimates of standardized international implicit
pension debt presented in Holzmann, Palacios, and Zviniene (2004), identical
assumptions are used for (a) macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, inflation,
and labor productivity growth); (b) the discount rate for calculating present
value; (c) earning profiles by age and gender; (d) future changes in coverage rates;
(e) pension indexation rules; and (f) rules for wage valorization in the benefit
formula. The main country-specific data and assumptions used in the simulations
are (a) population projections, (b) base-year average wages, (c) total number and
age or gender distribution of system participants (contributors and beneficiaries),
(d) retirement patterns (that is, distribution of new retirees by age), and (e) pen-
sion system rules (contribution rate, contribution ceilings, if any, retirement age
and early-retirement provisions, minimum vesting period, and the benefit for-
mula for calculating entry pensions). A detailed description of the assumptions
and their drawbacks can be found in Robalino and Bogomolova (forthcoming).
22. Using cross-country data, Holzmann, Palacios, and Zviniene (2004)
estimate an empirical relationship between pension expenditures expressed as
a share of GDP and the value of the implicit pension debt (termination meas-
ure), also expressed as a share of GDP. The relationship can be written as
PensionLiability = 18.984*PensionExpenditures + 42.908. When this relation-
ship is applied to Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the implicit pension debt is
105, 109, 69, and 32 percent of GDP, respectively.
23. See Holzmann, Palacios, and Zviniene (2004) for a discussion of the
importance of reporting the implicit pension debt.
24. In prefunded schemes, the sustainable rate of return becomes a weighted
average of the pay-as-you-go sustainable rate of return and the rate of return on
the investments of the funded component, where the weight is the share of the
contribution going to each component.
25. The following assumptions regarding future changes in the number of
pension system participants were used:
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Country, scheme, and 
indicator 2020 2050 Comments
Djibouti
CNR
Number of contributors as a The system is downsized 
percent of 2002 86 86 between 2002 and 2009,
Average annual growth constant number of
rate, 2002 −0.8 −0.3 contributors thereafter
Number of pensioners as a 
percent of 2002 175 185
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 3.2 1.3
OPS
Number of contributors as a Age-specific coverage rates 
percent of 2002 267 606 as a percent of employed 
assumed to be constant over 
time
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 5.6 3.8
Number of pensioners as a 
percent of 2002 274 757
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 5.8 4.3
Number of contributors as a 
percent of 2002 267 606
Islamic Republic of Iran
CSRO
Number of contributors as a No growth in the first seven 
percent of 2002 110 129 years, 50 percent of 
Average annual growth population growth 
rate, 2002 0.5 0.5 thereafter
Number of pensioners as a 
percent of 2002 226 336
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 4.6 2.6
SSO
Number of contributors as a Coverage assumed to 
percent of 2002 206 342 increase from 35 percent of 
Average annual growth the labor force in 2002 to 
rate, 2002 4.1 2.6 about 45 percent by 2050
Number of pensioners as a 
percent of 2002 370 2,075
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 7.5 6.5
Number of contributors as a 
percent of 2002 206 342
Jordan
SSC
Number of contributors as a Coverage assumed to 
percent of 2002 212 500 increase from less than 30 percent
Average annual growth of the labor force in 2002 
rate, 2002 4.3 3.4 to about 45 percent by 2050
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(Continues on the following page.)
Country, scheme, and 
indicator 2020 2050 Comments
Number of pensioners as a 
percent of 2002 387 2,426
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 7.8 6.9
Number of contributors as a 
percent of 2002 212 500
Lebanon
Civil servants
Number of contributors as a Steady state (no changes in 
percent of 2002 100 100 the total number of employees)
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 0.0 0.0
Number of pensioners as a 
percent of 2002 262 193
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 5.5 1.4
Number of contributors as a 
percent of 2002 100 100
Military
Number of contributors as a Steady state (no changes in 
percent of 2002 100 100 the total number of employees)
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 0.0 0.0
Number of pensioners as a
percent of 2002 202 291
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 4.0 2.3
Number of contributors as a
percent of 2002 100 100
Morocco
CMR
Number of contributors as a Excluding the military
percent of 2002 73 55
Average annual growth
rate, 2002 −1.7 −1.2
Number of pensioners as a
percent of 2002 345 256
Average annual growth
rate, 2002 7.1 2.0
Number of contributors as a
percent of 2002 73 55
RCAR
Number of contributors as a Total number of contributors 
percent of 2002 118 118 assumed to grow at 1 percent 
Average annual growth a year between 2002 and 2019
rate, 2002 0.9 0.4 and to remain constant thereafter
Number of pensioners as a
percent of 2002 449 782
Average annual growth
rate, 2002 8.7 4.4
(Continued)
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Country, scheme, and 
indicator 2020 2050 Comments
CNSS
Number of contributors as a Age-specific coverage rates 
percent of 2002 148 172 as a percent of the population
Average annual growth assumed to be constant over time
rate, 2002 2.2 1.1
Number of pensioners as a 
percent of 2002 249 617
Average annual growth
rate, 2002 5.2 3.9
West Bank and Gaza
West Bank
Number of contributors as a Steady state (no changes in 
percent of 2002 100 100 the total number of employees)
Average annual growth
rate, 2002 0.0 0.0
Number of pensioners as a
percent of 2002 328 472
Average annual growth
rate, 2002 6.8 3.3
Gaza
Number of contributors as a Steady state (no changes in 
percent of 2002 100 100 the total number of employees)
Average annual growth
rate, 2002 0.0 0.0
Number of pensioners as a
percent of 2002 439 681
Average annual growth 
rate, 2002 8.6 4.1
(Continued)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
General Guidelines 
for a Comprehensive 
Reform Program
CHAPTER 4
As shown in chapter 2, countries in the region are quite heterogeneous
in terms of demographic structure, macroeconomic performance, and
the level of financial sector development. Nonetheless, their pension sys-
tems share important similarities in institutional design and the types of
problems requiring attention. This chapter outlines general issues and
questions that all countries will have to address when engaging in a reform
program and offers a set of policy guidelines based on recent analytical
work and the experiences of countries outside the Middle East and
North Africa region. Clearly, future reform programs will have to be
country specific, reflecting local economic, social, and political realities.
The chapter is organized in four sections. The first is concerned with
the question that all societies need to answer when designing a program
of pension reform: What should be the role and mandate of the public
pension system? It also discusses, along general lines, major choices in
system design to implement this mandate, which are then developed in
the remainder of the chapter. The second section presents a series of
policy recommendations to improve the functioning of current defined-
benefit, pay-as-you-go systems. Indeed, regardless of the structure of
reformed pension systems, a defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go component
is likely to remain an important pillar in most countries. This section also
discusses implications for the design of disability and survivor pensions
and gender issues that policy makers will need to take into account when
designing a reform program. The third section discusses the costs and
benefits of introducing a mandatory funded component as well as the
conditions that countries will have to meet. The fourth section addresses
the issue of coverage and explores measures that governments can con-
sider to protect vulnerable groups during old age. The final section deals
with topics that, although important to a well-functioning pension sys-
tem, have received less attention in this report as a result of space and
data constraints. These include the institutional organization, adminis-
tration, and regulation of pension funds. The issue of pension fund man-
agement is treated separately in chapter 5. 93
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Choosing the Mandate of the Public Pension System
and Implementation Mechanisms
Three reasons are usually cited to justify government intervention in the
area of pensions. The first reason is poverty. Some individuals do not
have the means to save enough for retirement, and it is desirable for
governments to assist in the financing of a basic pension. The second
reason is the imperfection in financial markets. Individuals might not have
access to proper savings instruments (for example, some banks demand
a minimum level of income to open an account or do not have offices in
rural areas), available instruments can be too risky (for example, in the
case where banks are not regulated properly), or individuals cannot
insure against the risk of longevity (for example, annuity markets do not
exist). It is good policy, then, to develop long-term savings schemes that
pool longevity risks. Presumably, as capital markets develop and good
banks and annuity markets emerge, the role of government can dimin-
ish, giving more room to individual choice and allowing more diversifi-
cation of the sources of savings for retirement and therefore better risk
management. The third reason is myopia. The argument goes that indi-
viduals might have trouble planning for the future and save too little
when young, only to regret it later. Individual myopia, however, is diffi-
cult to correct through “forced savings.” The problem is that not all in-
dividuals have the same preferences: while the mandate of the public
pension system (that is, the contribution rate) might be optimal for
some, for others it can be too high and therefore welfare decreasing.
Thus countries considering pension reform ought to differentiate
policy discussions at two levels: (a) general principles and the objectives
for the pension system regarding income replacement targets and
(b) implementation mechanisms. Main issues at these two levels are
reviewed in the next two subsections. 
Making the Objectives of the Pension Systems Explicit and
Redefining Income Replacement Patterns
From our prior discussion, it follows that the primary objective of a pub-
lic pension system should be to ensure that older people have a decent
standard of living at retirement. However, there can be two different
interpretations of this primary objective:
• One interpretation is that the pension system should ensure only a basic liv-
ing standard. The main rationale for the existence of the pension sys-
tem in this case is poverty (measured in relative terms), and the focus
is on the “adequacy” of the pension benefit, which can be defined rel-
ative to the economywide average earnings.1
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• A second interpretation is that the pension system should ensure a reasonable
standard of living in retirement relative to that position before retirement.
Under this interpretation, the pension system plays an insurance
function in the context of imperfect financial markets and myopic in-
dividuals. The focus in this case is on the replacement rate: the value
of the pension relative to an individual’s earnings when working.
Across countries, there are various degrees of emphasis on “adequacy”
and “insurance” objectives. This point is illustrated by looking at the
experiences of OECD countries. The implicit focus in countries such as
Australia, Canada, Denmark, and the United Kingdom is on “adequacy.”
These countries provide a basic pension ranging between 30 and 50 per-
cent of average economywide earnings at all levels of income (see the
left top panel in figure 4.1). Pension systems in Finland and
Luxembourg, in contrast, emphasize the insurance function. These
countries guarantee relatively high replacement rates, between 60 and
75 percent of the last salary, even for individuals with incomes above the
average (see the right top panel in figure 4.1). Austria imposes a ceiling
on the covered wage of close to 1.6 times the average, so that replace-
ment rates decline for individuals with higher earnings. Luxembourg
also imposes a ceiling of close to 2.5 times average earnings. In between
are countries such as France, Germany, and the United States, which
balance adequacy and insurance objectives. These countries guarantee
not only a basic pension but also a replacement rate ranging between 25
and 50 percent of the last salary (see the bottom panel in figure 4.1). 
Thus Middle East and North African countries need to make explicit
choices regarding the level of income replacement that the pension sys-
tem will target for workers with different levels of earnings. Key param-
eters that need to be defined are (a) the level of the basic pension, (b) the
replacement rate for the average full-career worker, and (c) the ceiling
on the covered wage. Choices regarding these parameters necessarily
reflect social preferences and cultural factors but, at the same time, need
to be affordable. Replacement rates that need to be financed by a 40 per-
cent contribution rate or transfers from the central budget amounting to
5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) are not affordable. A high
level of taxation compromises economic competitiveness and the
efficient production of public goods. In fact, several OECD countries
are already facing this problem.
What factors should be taken into account when defining the level of
the basic pension?2 There are no formal rules for defining the proper
level of the basic pension, but choices need take into account economic
factors such as the general standard of living of the population, estimates
about minimum consumption needs (for example, the poverty line), level
of the minimum wage (the basic pension should be below this minimum
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wage), the existence of other formal and informal (for example, the
family) social assistance, and, of course, the costs. As discussed in chap-
ter 3, today in the Middle East and North African countries, targets for
the minimum pension expressed as a share of average earnings are at the
high end of the international distribution. Comparing the basic pension
with the general poverty line can also inform about its adequacy. In the
Middle East and North African countries where information is available,
basic pensions are considerably higher than the general poverty line at
the national level (see figure 4.2).3 In Algeria, the minimum pension rep-
resents four times the general poverty line. The minimum pension is
around 2.5 times the poverty line in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in
Jordan and 1.4 times the poverty line in Morocco. Only in Djibouti is
the minimum pension below the general poverty line.
What factors should affect the choices regarding replacement rates?
Again, there are no precise rules, but issues to consider include the fact
Figure 4.1  “Adequacy” versus “Insurance” Functions  in Select Pension Systems around
the World
Source: Whitehouse 2004.
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that consumption needs at retirement are lower (for example, no work-
related costs, no children to support) and taxes are lower (both income
taxes and social security contributions). Hence a replacement rate
below 100 percent—say, 80 percent—could preserve the standard of
living. Now this does not imply that the public pension system should
guarantee the totality of the 80 percent. This is particularly true for
middle- and high-income individuals, since the capacity of individuals to
diversify and manage risks during old age increases with the level of
income. Ideally, replacement rates for middle- and high-income workers
that are guaranteed by a public pension scheme should be lower than for
low-income workers.4 In general, except for individuals at the bottom of
the income distribution, there is no good reason to consider public pen-
sions as the only source of savings for retirement. For middle- and high-
income individuals, it would be difficult to justify targeted replacement
rates above 50 percent, meaning that individuals should be responsible
for financing the remaining 30 percent. Yet chapter 3 shows that, when
taxes are taken into account, net replacement rates in Middle East and
North African countries can surpass 100 percent, meaning that individ-
uals have more net income in retirement than when working!
Family structures are also important—for both the targeted replace-
ment rate and the basic pension. Although no statistics are available, it is
likely, for instance, that the share of the elderly living with their children
is considerably higher in the Middle East and North Africa and other
middle-income countries than in OECD countries (see figure 4.3). Pre-
liminary calculations for Jordan show, for instance, that 40 percent of those
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
Jordan
Algeria
Egypt, Arab Rep. of
Djibouti
Morocco
Percent of average earnings
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Minimum pension
General poverty line
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on various poverty reports. See World Bank 2001a, 2003c, 2004d,
forthcoming a, and forthcoming b.
Figure 4.2  Minimum Pension and General Poverty Line in Select Middle
East and North African Countries
98 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
aged 60 or older live with their children. The existence of these informal
mechanisms reduces the need for a large mandate of the pension system.
With these considerations, Middle East and North African countries
could consider reducing the mandate of their pension systems along the
following lines: (a) a basic pension guarantee representing 15–20 percent
of average economywide earnings (closer to the poverty line and below
the minimum wage), (b) a gross replacement rate for the average full-
career worker equal to or below 50 percent, and (c) a ceiling on the cov-
ered wage representing two to three times average earnings. The aver-
age worker would still have the possibility of replacing 80 percent of his
or her income or more, but the additional revenues would need to come
from a different source of savings. 
It is often argued that, even with currently high replacement rates
(often above 80 percent), most retirees do not receive an income that is
sufficient to satisfy basic needs. However, average wages and minimum
pensions are well above the poverty line. In fact, in most countries the
covered population is composed mainly of workers in the formal sector
and therefore unlikely to be at the bottom of the income distribution.
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countries, Palacios 2001.
Figure 4.3  Share of the Elderly Living with Their Children in
Select Countries around the World
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Countries where the average level of income is so low as to generate pen-
sions that are below the poverty line with an 80 percent replacement
rate—basically where the average wage is equal to or below 1.25 percent
of the poverty line—should question whether a contributory system is ap-
propriate. In the Middle East and North Africa region, however, even the
poorest countries (Djibouti, the West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic
of Yemen) have an average covered wage well above the poverty line.
Regarding the ceiling, the argument that excluding a portion of wages
of high-income workers would worsen the financial position of the sys-
tem does not hold. Indeed, high-income workers contribute higher
amounts but also receive higher pensions. Bringing more of them into
the system with current implicit rates of return on contributions can
actually worsen the long-term financial position of the fund.
Implementing the Mandate
Once the pattern of income replacement has been chosen, a large typol-
ogy of pension schemes can be designed to achieve the goals. These
pension schemes can be classified along three dimensions: (a) how
the system is financed (pay-as-you-go, funded schemes, general taxes, or
some combination); (b) how the risks are distributed (earnings-related
schemes that put most of the risks on plan sponsors or defined-
contribution schemes that put most of the risks on plan members, or
some combination); and (c) how the system is managed (public versus
private, centralized versus decentralized, individual accounts versus a
common pool). As shown in table 4.1, there is no universal model for the
pension system. Around the globe, choices are dictated by local
economic, social, and political conditions.5
At the international level, a majority of reforms have been limited to
adjusting the parameters of defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go schemes
without changing the financing and risk allocation mechanisms or insti-
tutional arrangements (Schwarz and Demirgüç-Kunt 1999). As an illus-
tration, between 1993 and 1998, 18 countries increased the retirement
age, 57 increased the contribution rate, 28 modified the benefit formula,
10 changed the vesting period, and 14 changed the contributory base or
indexation mechanism. Only 21 countries introduced systemic reforms.
In the Middle East and North Africa region, an important parametric
reform took place in Djibouti in 2002 (see chapter 6). Several other
countries also introduced adjustments, but these were often ad hoc and
did not always improve the financial situation of the schemes. For in-
stance, in 2000, Jordan’s Social Security Corporation increased both its
contribution and accrual rates, but the net effect on the finances of the
system was negative. 
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TABLE 4.1
Systemic Reforms in Select Countries in Latin America and Europe
Size of fully 
Financing and risk funded scheme Management of fully 
Country distribution (percent of wage) funded scheme Transition
Sources: Palacios 2003; Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2003; World Bank 2004f.
Note: a. Private ownership by industry.
Latin America
Argentina
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Mexico
Europe
Bulgaria
Croatia
Hungary
Latvia
Macedonia
Poland
Sweden
Basic pay-as-you-go
(reformed) plus choice of
pay-as-you-go or fully
funded
Fully funded (pay-as-you-go
phased out)
Choice of fully funded or pay-
as-you-go (reformed)
First pay-as-you-go and
second fully funded
Fully funded (pay-as-you-go
eliminated)
First pay-as-you-go (reformed)
and second fully funded
First pay-as-you-go (points
system) and second fully
funded
First pay-as-you-go (reformed)
and second fully funded 
First pay-as-you-go (notional
defined-contribution
system or virtual 
accounts system) and
second fully funded
First pay-as-you-go (reformed)
and second fully funded
First pay-as-you-go (notional
defined-contribution
system or virtual 
accounts system) and
second fully funded
First pay-as-you-go (notional
defined-contribution
system or virtual 
accounts system) and
second fully funded
7.72
10
10
4.25
12.07
2, growing to 5
5
6
2, growing to 9
7
7.2
2.5
Centralized collection; state-
owned managers allowed
Decentralized; no state-
owned managers allowed 
Decentralized; no state-
owned managers allowed
Centralized collection; state-
owned managers allowed
Centralized collectiona; state-
owned managers allowed 
Centralized collection, state-
owned managers allowed
Centralized collection; no
state-owned managers
allowed 
Centralized collection; no
state-owned managers
allowed 
Centralized collection; state-
owned managers allowed
Centralized collection; no
state-owned managers
allowed
Centralized collection; no
state-owned managers
allowed 
Centralized collection; state-
owned managers allowed
Fully funded scheme optional
for current plan members
Mandatory for new entrants;
optional for current plan
members
Optional
First pillar mandatory for new
entrants; fully funded pillar
mandatory for all workers 
Mandatory for all workers
Mandatory for workers less
than 42 years of age
Mandatory for workers less
than 40 years of age;
voluntary for workers
40–50 years of age
Mandatory for new entrants;
optional for current plan
members
Mandatory for workers less
than 30 years of age;
voluntary for workers
30–50 years of age
Mandatory for new entrants;
optional for current plan
members
Mandatory for workers less
than 30 years of age;
voluntary for workers
30–50 years of age
Mandatory for workers less
than 45 years of age
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The second type of reform has been systemic in nature and implied
the introduction of a defined-contribution, fully funded component.
The majority of these reforms have taken place in Latin America
and Eastern Europe, with a large variance in system design and
implementation arrangements (table 4.1). Chile, the first country to in-
troduce a defined-contribution, fully funded scheme, closed the “old”
defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go system to new entrants and began to
phase it out gradually. The new scheme is operated exclusively by private
pension fund managers in a highly decentralized fashion. Mexico also in-
troduced a defined-contribution, fully funded scheme but immediately
phased out the defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go plan (that is, current plan
members joined the new scheme). The collection of contributions
remained centralized, with public managers coexisting with private man-
agers. In Colombia, the defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go system was pre-
served but reformed, and workers were given the choice of enrolling in
one or the other. Costa Rica adopted a multipillar approach, with col-
lections remaining centralized; workers simultaneously contribute to
the defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go and the defined-contribution, fully
funded components. Thus part of the replacement rate targeted by
the public pension system comes from a defined-benefit component
(which is low risk for individuals) and part comes from a defined-
contribution component (which presumably has higher risks but also
higher rates of return on contributions). This multipillar arrangement is
mandatory for all workers.
Most systemic reforms in Eastern Europe have followed a multipillar
approach, combining reformed earnings-related schemes with a defined-
contribution, fully funded component. There are differences, however,
in the type of earnings-related scheme (standard defined-benefit, points
system, or notional accounts),6 the size of the defined-contribution, fully
funded scheme, and the transition mechanism. In most cases, the
collection of contributions remains centralized, but investments are
outsourced to private sector managers. In Bulgaria, the reformed pay-as-
you-go component is a standard defined benefit. The new system is
mandatory for individuals younger than 42 years of age. In Poland, the
pay-as-you-go component was transformed into a virtual accounts sys-
tem mandatory for those 30 years of age or younger. A similar scheme
was adopted in Latvia and Sweden.
Ultimately, the choice of system design needs to be based on sound
economic analysis, and the implementation should follow best practices.
By changing the status quo, any reform imposes economic and social
costs and benefits, so these should be outlined and quantified to the
extent possible (desirably in partnership with civil society), thus
maximizing the likelihood that the end program, while not necessarily
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optimal, is at least welfare increasing. Implementation and management
should respond to the needs of the system that is selected. Thus if a
country opts to finance part of its pensions on a pay-as-you-go basis,
then the parameters of the scheme should respond to the sustainability
principles of pay-as-you-go systems. Similarly, if a funded component is
implemented, the appropriate regulatory framework should be in place.
The necessary conditions for the efficient operation of the various
arrangements are discussed in the next two sections.
Bringing Current Defined-Benefit, Pay-As-You-Go
Systems up to the Standard
In most countries across the region, defined-benefit schemes are likely
to remain at the core of the public pension system. It is, therefore,
important to ensure that current benefit formulas and eligibility condi-
tions promote financial sustainability, efficiency, and equity. In a nutshell,
this implies having a system that pays an implicit rate of return on con-
tributions that is sustainable, avoids unnecessary variations in this rate of
return across individuals to prevent adverse distributional transfers, and
corrects distortions in labor supply, savings, and retirement decisions.
This section presents policy recommendations so that, gradually,
current earnings-related pay-as-you-go systems start complying with the
norms of design that guarantee their proper functioning. It begins by
discussing standard defined-benefit schemes, specifically (a) how to set
benefit formulas and (b) how to define eligibility conditions. It then
addresses the implementation of virtual account systems, which are
another type of earnings-related pension scheme (along with points
systems), and defines the conditions under which the virtual account
system and the standard defined-benefit system are equivalent and the
factors that make the virtual account system an attractive option for
earnings-related systems financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Next, it
raises the issue of how governments should treat the implicit pension
debt of pay-as-you-go schemes. Finally, it discusses necessary reforms in
disability and survivor pensions as well as gender issues that need to be
taken into account when implementing the various reforms.
Benefit Formulas in Standard Defined-Benefit Schemes
For discussion purposes, it is useful to deconstruct benefit formulas into
three components: (a) the measure of income, which is the reference
salary used to compute the pensions; (b) the accrual rate, which is the
percentage of the income measure that the individual receives for each
year of contribution; and (c) the mechanism used to index pensions,
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which affects the long-term real value of the benefit received on retire-
ment. Recommendations at these three levels are presented next.
Measure of Income Used to Compute the Pension
Countries should consider including all salaries across work history and
across income-generating activities in the formula for calculating the
pension, but they should be revalorized appropriately. The purpose of
this policy is not to reduce the level of the pension—on the contrary, the
opposite can occur—but to improve incentives and equity. Indeed, an
important part of the variation in the implicit rates of return paid on
contributions is due to the fact that still often only the last few salaries
count toward determining the pension. Implicit rates of return then
become sensitive to changes in wage history. Individuals with a flat wage
history (for example, blue-collar workers) receive a lower rate of return
than individuals with increasing wages (such as white collar workers).
This opens the door to adverse distributional transfers (that is, transfers
from low-income to high-income workers). Not using all wages in the
calculation of the pension also provides incentives for individuals to
manipulate wages, declaring too low wages early in the career and
declaring too high wages toward the end.
The increase in the number of salaries included in the calculation
should be gradual (that is, a number of additional years of salaries per
calendar year) to allow information systems to catch up. There are
various choices regarding the index that is used to revalorize past wages
and that ultimately determines the implicit rate of return that individu-
als receive on their contributions and therefore the financial sustainabil-
ity of the scheme.7 A technical discussion of the various methods and
their strengths and weaknesses can be found in Lindeman, Robalino,
and Rutkowski (2003). A good compromise is to use the growth rate of
the average covered wage. Making explicit the expected dynamics of this
growth rate is important, as it will affect the calibration of the other
parameters of the system.
Accrual Rate
The accrual rate should reflect the mandate of the pension system re-
garding income replacement for the average full-career worker at a
given retirement age. For instance, using life expectancies for Morocco,
if the targeted replacement rate is set at 50 percent for the individual
retiring at age 60 with 40 years of contributions, then the annual accrual
rate should be equal to 1.25 percent.
The accrual rate of a well-designed pay-as-you-go system, however,
is intrinsically linked to the contribution rate, the retirement age, sur-
vival probabilities after retirement, and the index used to revalorize past
wages.8 This rule is represented graphically in figure 4.4. Each line gives
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the possible combinations of the accrual rate and the contribution rate
for a given retirement age and a given growth rate for the index used
to revalorize wages that ensures financial balance.9 Figure 4.4 also
displays the current combination of the contribution rate (horizontal
axis) and the accrual rate (vertical axis) for various pension schemes in
the Middle East and North Africa. In most of the cases, the resulting
points fall outside the lines. This is the basic source of the current
financial problem.
The main message of figure 4.4 is that, from a sustainable pension
system, when determining the value of the accrual rate, the normal
retirement age, and the contribution rate, policy makers can choose only
two of the three. The third has to be computed endogenously. For
instance, if the accrual rate is set at 1.25 percent a year and the normal
retirement age is set at 60, the contribution rate has to range between 25
and 30 percent, depending on the growth rate of the index used to reval-
orize past wages. If the retirement age is set at 65 years, then the contri-
bution rate can be lower (between 15 and 20 percent).
What happens with individuals who retire before or after the normal
retirement age? In order to guarantee the same rate of return for all in-
dividuals, the relationship between the accrual rate and the contribution
rate depicted in figure 4.4 needs to hold for all retirement ages. This im-
plies that if the contribution rate is the same for all individuals, those
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who retire before the normal retirement age should have a lower accrual
rate (that is, individuals would pay an actuarially fair penalty for early re-
tirement). In a similar way, those retiring after the normal retirement age
should have a higher accrual rate (that is, individuals would receive an
actuarially fair compensation for deferred retirement).
Mechanism Used to Index Pensions 
Practices vary around the world, but prudence and the aim of preserving
a constant rate of return within and across generations suggest that the
proper index should be inflation. In most OECD countries, pensions
are indexed to prices. In Latvia, the index is an average of the average
wage and inflation. In Poland, the growth rate of the wage bill is used.
Sweden has the most complicated system, with an index that is a func-
tion of the growth rate of the average wage, inflation, and fluctuations of
the buffer fund. Indeed, the architects of the system show that simply
using the average wage as the index does not guarantee financial sus-
tainability (Swedish Pension System 2003). Again, with the idea of keep-
ing rates of return constant within and across generations, a more con-
servative index is simply inflation.10 Labor productivity gains that take
place in the economy at large are distributed indirectly to the elderly
through better-quality goods and services, a higher minimum pension,
and a higher sustainable rate of return that brings higher initial pensions
(for simulations of various indexing mechanisms, see Lindeman,
Robalino, and Rutkowski 2003).
Eligibility Conditions
To be eligible for a pension, individuals need to meet several conditions:
pay a minimum contribution rate, reach a minimum retirement age, and
accumulate a minimum number of years of contributions (a vesting
period). Here some additional observations are made regarding the
choice of each of these parameters as well as the vesting period.
Contribution Rate
Policy makers ought to be careful not to overtax labor, implying that the
contribution rate should not be used as the parameter that “closes” the
finances of the scheme. Moreover, when assessing the appropriate level
of the contribution rate to finance pensions, the payroll taxes financing
other benefits (for example, health, family allowances) should be taken
into account. In chapter 2, it is argued that payroll taxes can have im-
portant effects on the labor market, coverage rates, and individual wel-
fare. High payroll taxes can reduce the level of employment and expand
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the informal sector: first, because the cost of labor increases relative to
other production inputs and, second, because some firms and individu-
als experience liquidity constraints and cannot afford to pay the high
rates. High contribution rates can also reduce individual welfare, even
when the expected rates of return on these contributions are high.
Indeed, the contribution rate is a form of forced savings for workers. If
workers are forced to save well beyond their individual preferences, they
are worse off even if they enjoy high pensions when old.
This being the case, the recommendation is to set a contribution rate
to finance pensions that is affordable (say, 15 percent, taking into ac-
count the total payroll tax) and to keep it constant over time.
Normal Retirement Age
Because there is a limit to how much an economy can afford to pay on
contributions and because the accrual rate reflects the mandate of the
pension system regarding income replacement (which presumably also
should remain constant over the short and medium term), the recom-
mendation is to make the normal retirement age the parameter that
adjusts endogenously. Thus for a given contribution rate, the choice of
the accrual rate would determine the choice of the retirement age. The
higher the accrual rate and the higher the pension individuals receive, the
longer they have to work. Clearly, there is also a biological limit to how
long individuals can work on average, and this depends on the economic
sector. Thus choices regarding the value of the accrual rate are con-
strained: there is a maximum level that a given economy can afford to pay.
Another implication is that, as life expectancy increases (either at
birth or at retirement), the accrual rate and the contribution rate being
constant, the normal retirement age will need to be adjusted. Thus the
recommendation for a defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go system is to index
the retirement age to life expectancy.
Vesting Period
A minimum vesting period, in principle, is not a necessary condition to
receive a pension, except for the minimum pension guarantee, as long as
the accrual rate is set properly and all salaries are included in the calcu-
lation of the pension. Vesting periods traditionally have two functions.
One is to mitigate abuses of the system—for instance, individuals con-
tributing for only a few years and then returning to the system when they
are close to retirement, thus receiving higher implicit rates of return on
contributions. The other one is to mitigate individual myopia by ensur-
ing that the number of years of contributions is sufficient to generate an
adequate pension. An extra role that these could play in a badly designed
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defined-benefit scheme is to force individuals to delay retirement, thus
better aligning the accrual rate with the retirement age. It is unclear,
however, that vesting periods are effective in addressing these problems
with respect to abuses of the system. If incentives are set properly (that
is, benefit formulas and eligibility conditions follow the principles out-
lined in the previous sections), the likelihood that individuals will game
the system will be reduced. Moreover, strengthening mechanisms to
control compliance among employers and proper information and
reporting about the benefits that the system can deliver could be more
effective in inducing longer contribution periods. And often short
careers reflect adverse conditions in the labor market, (for example, long
unemployment periods). Requiring a minimum vesting period will do
little to improve the situation. Finally, if the accrual rate is set properly,
there is no need to encourage individuals to delay retirement. On the
contrary, the introduction of vesting periods becomes another source of
variation in rates of return that can deter enrollment. Individuals who
join the system late in their life can be penalized, since they are forced to
contribute past the normal retirement age without adjustments to their
pension. As the accrual rate is realigned with the retirement age and the
contribution rate and all salaries are included in the calculation of the
pension, vesting periods can be removed gradually. If the accrual rate is
set at 1.25 percent, an individual who retires at age 60 and has con-
tributed 20 years instead of 40 will simply receive a lower replacement
rate (for example, 25 percent instead of 50 percent). Individuals who
have contributed shorter periods will certainly have the incentive to
remain in the labor force until they are able to finance an adequate
pension or meet the vesting period for the minimum pension guarantee.
Summary
In summary, any well-designed defined-benefit scheme financed on a
pay-as-you-go basis should follow the principles outlined above (see also
table 4.2). Failing to do so will compromise the financial sustainability of
the scheme, economic efficiency, or equity.
It can be argued that mandatory pension schemes do not need to be
self-sufficient and that budget transfers to finance part of the pensions
are a perfectly defensible policy. This may well be a social choice, but the
costs in lost efficiency and the equity implications need to be acknowl-
edged. The resources used to finance the pensions of a few, usually well-
off, formal sector workers are necessarily removed from the production
of public goods, which brings higher social and economic benefits, while
affecting a larger share of the population (for example, education, health,
and well-targeted assistance programs).
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Some of the measures outlined, particularly the reduction in the accrual
rate, are difficult to implement politically. To ease resistance, reforms
could respect acquired rights, meaning that policy changes would apply
only to the new contributions. However, current plans members, not only
new entrants, need to be affected. Moreover, this gradual implementation
of reforms is only possible if these are not delayed. Waiting to intervene
will lead not only to drastic adjustments in the future but also to inequity,
as most of the cost of the adjustment will be imposed on future generations.
The Special Case of Virtual Accounts
In recent years, the so-called notional defined contribution or virtual ac-
count system has been introduced as a paradigm for reforming earnings-
related schemes. In essence, the virtual account system enforces the
standards and best practices of the traditional earnings-related pay-as-
you-go systems discussed in the two previous subsections. However, the
benefit formula is operationalized differently.11
In the virtual account scheme, contributions are registered in indi-
vidual accounts as a “virtual” capital. It is only a registration on “book”
because, contrary to funded schemes, individuals do not have real funds
TABLE 4.2
Best Practices in the Design of a Defined-Benefit, Pay-As-You-Go System
Parameter Best practice
Benefit formula
Sustainable rate of return Over the long run, use the growth rate of the covered wage bill; over the short run, use the growth rate of
the average wage or a moving average of the growth rate of the wage bill
In general, avoid paying real implicit rates of return on contributions in excess of 3 percent a year
Income measure Include all salaries in the calculation of the pension indexed by the sustainable rate of return of 
the system
Accrual rate Set the accrual rate in relation to the replacement rate for a full-career worker retiring at the normal 
retirement age
Adjust it downward for individuals retiring before the normal retirement age and upward for individuals 
retiring after the normal age
Index for pensions Index to inflation
Eligibility condition
Normal retirement age and Given the targeted accrual rate, the sustainable rate of return of the system, and life expectancy,
basic contribution rate recognize that the choice of one of these parameters implies the level of the other
If both are too high given workers’ preferences and what the economy can support, revise the accrual 
rate downward
Fix the contribution rate 
Determine the normal retirement age by the choice of accrual rate 
Index normal retirement age to life expectancy so that the system can keep its mandate constant 
over time
Vesting period Do not set a vesting period if the accrual rate is set properly
Source: Authors’ design.
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accumulated in their account. The contributions are indexed by the sus-
tainable rate of return of the system, again a function of the system’s
average wage and the covered population. When the individual retires,
the pension is computed as an annuity of the sum of revalorized contri-
butions (the “virtual” capital). This is done by dividing the total contri-
butions by a so-called G factor, which is simply the sum of the survival
probabilities at various ages after retirement, discounted at a given rate.
The virtual account system has three advantages over the standard
defined-benefit system, assuming that it is well designed: (a) precision in
the calculation of sustainable pension benefits, (b) a more transparent
link between contributions and benefits, which, among other things, can
facilitate the tracking of the implicit pension debt of the system, and
(c) a change in the paradigm, which can facilitate implementation of the
reforms discussed in the previous two sections. 
The virtual account formula and the standard defined-benefit for-
mula generate identical outcomes if the latter meets two conditions:
(a) all wages are included in the calculation of the pension and (b) the ac-
crual rate is computed at the time of retirement and respects the links
among the retirement age, the contribution rate, and survival probabili-
ties. However, when the accrual rate is announced ex ante (that is, when
the individual joins the system), its calculation needs to be based on ex-
pectations about survival probabilities at retirement and the growth rate
of the average covered wage or the covered wage bill. If these expecta-
tions do not materialize, the accrual rate could be too high (compromis-
ing the financial sustainability of the system) or too low (penalizing plan
members). In the virtual account system, the pension is calculated using
the latest information regarding survival probabilities and the growth
rate of the covered wage bill (or the average wage). Clearly, in a defined-
benefit scheme the accrual rate can be computed at the time of retire-
ment. In this case, however, the main benefit of the scheme, which is to
guarantee plan members a given replacement rate at retirement, is lost.
That being the case, one might as well move directly to the virtual
account formula, which could create a more transparent link between
contributions and benefits.
In the standard defined-benefit scheme, from the perspective of plan
members, the link between the absolute value of contributions and the
pension is blurred. On the contrary, by not relying on the concept of an
accrual rate but simply guaranteeing a rate of return on contributions to
its members (a concept similar to a bank account), the virtual account
system can improve transparency, promote ownership, and therefore
improve incentives to enroll in the system (provided that the rate of
return offered by the scheme is credible).12 The virtual account scheme
can also facilitate the transfer of acquired rights between funds (even
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across countries) in fragmented schemes.13 Finally, it can facilitate the
implementation of policies that make explicit the pension debt of the
scheme. 
Another potential benefit of introducing a virtual account system is
that the change in paradigm can facilitate the implementation of best
practices in the design of earnings-related schemes with pay-as-you-go
financing. Indeed, some of the necessary reforms might be difficult to
pursue using the language of traditional defined-benefit schemes.
The virtual account system is also subject to criticisms that policy
makers should take into account. Three stand out: (a) the scheme might
be more complicated to administer, particularly regarding record keep-
ing; (b) policy makers lose control over the contribution rate as an in-
strument to stabilize the finances of the system in the presence of unex-
pected shocks; and (c) the scheme generates more uncertainty among
plan members regarding the final replacement rate. The third point is a
fact. Higher variance in replacement rates is the price to pay for im-
proved financial sustainability (that is, more precision in calculating the
sustainable level of benefits). Policy makers need to resolve this trade-off.
The other two criticisms are less valid. 
The administration of a well-designed defined-benefit scheme should
meet the same standards as the administration of a virtual account sys-
tem. An important policy recommendation for all Middle East and
North African countries is to move to benefit formulas that include all
wages in the calculation of the pension. This requires proper record-
keeping procedures and information systems that are able to track past
wages for each plan member. Several countries already have the neces-
sary capabilities. Others should implement this measure gradually to
allow administrative capacity and information systems to catch up. The
implementation of a virtual account system in these countries could also
be gradual—for instance, it could apply only to new workers. 
Increases in the contribution rate to stabilize the finances of the pen-
sion system in the presence of unexpected shocks can be considered
an implicit tax on plan members. Indeed, the apparent attraction of a
defined-benefit design is that an increase in the contribution rate does
not imply an increase in the value of the pension, as in a virtual account
system. But this is the same as saying that plan members must contribute
an extra amount that does not accrue rights, which is a form of taxation.
The same type of tax can be envisioned in a virtual account system. The
difference is that, in the latter, the tax is explicit. This being said, a more
efficient approach to deal with unexpected macroeconomic or demo-
graphic shocks is to build a buffer fund: basically, a minimum level of
reserves that can be used during a crisis.
General Guidelines for a Comprehensive Reform Program 111
In conclusion, when thinking about reform of an earnings-related
scheme that meets the best practices in design, virtual account systems
deserve serious consideration. 
Making the Implicit Pension Debt Explicit
Whether financially sustainable or not, at any point in time, earnings-
related schemes have an implicit pension debt. This implicit debt is the
present value of pension promises to current retirees plus the pension
rights accrued to date by contributors. As shown in chapter 3, the im-
plicit pension debt for many countries in the region is several times
higher than the current level of reserves—probably the only exception is
Egypt—and on the same order of magnitude as the explicit public debt. 
Unfortunately, this implicit pension debt is seldom taken into account
when assessing the sustainability of the fiscal and macro frameworks.
This is unfortunate because, ultimately, it is the government that guar-
antees pension promises. Hence the analysis of the sustainability of the
public debt—and resulting policies regarding revenues and levels of
spending—can be severely biased. 
In the case of a well-designed earnings-related scheme, one way
around this problem is to transform the implicit pension debt into ex-
plicit government debt, by investing all of the contributions in special
government bonds. These bonds would have to pay the same rate of re-
turn, or a close proxy, as the implicit rate of return paid by the pension
fund on contributions. Initially, implementation of this arrangement
simply entails having a “line” on the liability side of the government bal-
ance sheet that grows as a function of (a) the index selected to revalorize
contributions, (b) the new flow of contributions, and (c) the liquidation
of accumulated contributions or pension payments. Another arrange-
ment would be, in effect, to issue bonds with different levels of maturity,
which are set to ensure that the liquidity needs of the pension funds are
met. Over time, these bonds could become tradable, thus allowing pen-
sion funds to diversify away from public debt. Effectively, this implies
converging to a defined-contribution, fully funded type of scheme (see
Valdés-Prieto 2004).
The advantage of the proposed arrangement is that at any point in
time the implicit debt of the pension fund (that is, the sum of the capi-
tal accumulated in the virtual accounts) is equal to the explicit pension
debt of the government. This is even easier to understand and calculate
in the case of a virtual account system.
When individuals retire, two scenarios can be considered. In one, the
general budget transfers the totality of the accumulated contributions
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plus interest for each of the plan members retiring, who then “purchase”
an annuity from the pension fund (continuing with the figure of the vir-
tual account system). The pension fund then would have to create a
mathematical reserve that is used to pool the longevity risks of the pop-
ulation of retirees. This, however, raises the issue of the management
and investment of the mathematical reserve. The second alternative is to
continue paying pensions on a pay-as-you-go basis, with the general
budget transferring only the funds necessary to cover expenditures in a
given period. This is equivalent to reinvesting the mathematical reserve
in government bonds. In both cases, longevity risks are managed
through sharing.
Egypt is one of the countries that should consider this approach:
indeed, a large part of the implicit pension debt is already in the form of
explicit government debt and is being serviced. The arrangement pre-
sented in this section would ensure that the implicit debt associated with
new contributions remains explicit. Moreover, there is room today to
change the maturity of the current pension debt of the government
(essentially debt with the National Investment Bank) without affecting the
need for liquidity of the pension funds and thus reducing financing costs.
Implications for the Provision and Financing of Disability
and Survivor Pensions
Given data constraints, the discussion in chapter 3 focuses on old-age
pensions and leaves aside consideration of disability and survivor pen-
sions. Yet all schemes in the region combine the three types of pensions.
Common issues that require attention over the short term include:
(a) reviewing benefit formulas to improve financial sustainability; (b) re-
viewing the certification and recertification processes for disability ben-
efits to reduce abuse; (c) rationalizing the transfer of survivor pensions
to control costs, while at the same time ensuring that divorced spouses
are not penalized, that children are protected in the event of the death
of the surviving spouse, and that the system does not discourage work
among individuals who have the capacity to work; and (d) ensuring that
rules apply equally to men and women. 
This short subsection focuses on the financing of disability and sur-
vivor pensions. Although the financing of disability and survivor pen-
sions should be separate from the financing of old-age pensions from an
accounting perspective, in all but a few schemes in the Middle East and
North Africa region, permanent disability and survivor pensions are fi-
nanced jointly with old-age pensions.14 The subsection starts by looking
at old-age survivor benefits and is followed by a discussion of young-age
survivor and disability benefits.
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Old-Age Survivor Benefits 
One possibility, although not likely to be applicable in the region, is not
to integrate survivor pensions with old-age pensions, as is the case in the
Swedish system. This individual-only option avoids complicated rules
about the inheritance of benefits or the rights of divorced spouses and
holds down total costs and contribution rates, enhancing individual wel-
fare and incentives. By the same token, it forces households to do more
of their own survivor planning and saving in their later working and
early retirement years. The individual-only approach, however, is feasi-
ble in countries, such as Sweden, with high rates of female labor force
participation and substantial access to private life insurance and annuity
markets.15 Middle East and North African countries might find it
difficult to implement this approach.
More realistically, survivor benefits for widows and widowers need to
be integrated with old-age benefits. In the case of a defined-benefit sys-
tem, the calculation of the accrual rate would need to be modified to in-
clude the survival probabilities of the spouse (or partner). This policy,
however, is likely to be difficult to implement. Alternatively, at least a
separate contribution rate would need to be set up to internalize the
costs of having to pay a pension for a longer period of time. If the
earnings-related scheme is managed through virtual accounts, a com-
mon provision is a husband and wife sharing their entitlements in
retirement in the form of joint-and-survivor annuities. This notion can
be extended to other individuals with an “insurable interest.” Such
relationships might include related siblings living together and so on.
Country customs dictate when the joint annuity is mandatory versus
elective, which relationships are recognized for elective purposes, and
what happens in the event of divorce (this is also an issue to consider in
the standard defined-benefit scheme). Thus handling survivor pensions
in the context of a virtual account system can be more transparent.
Young-Age Survivor Benefits
Young-age survivor benefits belong in the realm of insurance and not
forced savings. Ideally, these benefits could be outsourced to life insur-
ance companies. If this cannot be done, then young-age survivor benefits
should be managed in a separate fund, financed by a dedicated contribu-
tion rate.
If the earnings-related scheme is managed through virtual accounts,
one approach is to offset (reduce) the earnings-related survivor pension
by the annuity value of the virtual account. This is similar to what is
done in Latin American countries when mandatory funded accounts are
coupled with early death and disability insurance coverage. The second
approach is to hold the virtual account aside as deferred annuities, with
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no interaction with early death benefits. This approach is more likely in
countries concerned with elderly widows who depend heavily on their
husband’s pension rights. It also keeps the social insurance accounting
more transparent.
Disability Benefits
Disability benefits pose similar design challenges and belong in the
realm of insurance and not forced savings. When the benefit cannot be
outsourced, it should be covered through a separate fund financed by a
separate contribution rate. Morocco is already outsourcing to insurance
companies disability due to work accidents.
When the earnings-related scheme is managed through virtual
accounts, three options can be considered. One option is to compare
the defined-benefit disability insurance amount to the virtual account
annuity based on accumulations up to the time of disability; individuals
receive the higher of the two. Except for older workers, the disability
benefit typically exceeds the virtual account annuity. The disability ben-
efit can also be regarded as a permanent top-up of an underlying virtual
account annuity. Finally, the disability benefit can be a completely
independent benefit that lasts only to retirement. In this case, imputa-
tions to the virtual account are necessary to fill in the disability years.
In Sweden, the imputation treats the disability benefit as if it were
earned income.
Gender Issues
Chapter 3 shows that in several countries pension laws have tried to pro-
vide special treatment for women, albeit with a biased view regarding
their role in society. Women are often allowed to retire earlier than men,
and because they live longer on average, other things being equal, they
extract higher implicit rates of return on their contributions. 
The recommendations to reform current defined-benefit, pay-as-
you-go systems, through either parametric changes or the introduction
of virtual accounts, call for treating women and men equally at all levels
of the pension law, including the right to transfer pensions to their
dependents. Moreover, the proposed mechanism for computing the
accrual rate implies taking into account higher life expectancies for
women. The implication is that accrual rates will be lower for women
and, other things being equal, so will replacement rates and pensions.
The reform would, therefore, tend to impose higher costs on women
than on men.
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Policy makers ought to consider policies to mitigate the adverse im-
pact of pension reform on women. These policies include the following: 
• Apply a lower pace of adjustment of benefit formulas and eligibility condi-
tions for women. As an illustration, if in a country the normal retire-
ment age is 55 for women and 60 for men, and the new normal
retirement age is set at 65, women should be allowed to reach the tar-
get in twice as many years as men. So if the retirement age for men
increases from 60 to 65 during a period of 10 years, the retirement
age for women should reach 65 in a period of 20 years. 
• Use unisex mortality tables. By using the same mortality tables, the ac-
crual rate for women will not be reduced relative to the accrual rate
for men as a result of longer life expectancies. Implicitly, this involves
a subsidy or transfer from men to women.
• Finance and provide adequate maternity benefits. Countries should have
schemes that provide income support during periods of maternity
leave so that, among others, contributions to the pension system are
not interrupted. These programs can be financed either by employ-
ers, through payroll taxes to the social security system, or through
budget subsidies. In all cases, however, the costs should be explicit
and the programs affordable.
• Require additional savings for men with multiple wives. Men with multi-
ple wives create two types of problems. First, they impose higher
costs on the system since the old-age survivor pension has a higher
chance of being paid for a longer period of time. Second, wives are
poorly insured against the risk of death of their spouse, either as an
active worker or while in retirement. The recommendation is, first,
to include all potential survivors in the calculation of the accrual rate
or the virtual account annuity. This would imply a lower accrual rate
for men with multiple wives to keep costs under control. Second, plan
members with multiple wives should be mandated to pay a few per-
centage points in additional contributions for each wife. This would
allow the system to pay a higher accrual rate and therefore a higher
pension, which is then divided among the survivor spouses.16 This is
a transparent mechanism to internalize the extra costs to the system
and to make individuals accountable for the financial implications of
their decisions regarding marriage.
• Establish adequate protection and more flexible rules for divorced women.
Divorced women who do not remarry and do not work should be
protected during old age. It is desirable for these women to have
rights over part of the pension of their former husband on his death.
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Basically, women should have access to a fair share of the pension
rights accrued by the husband up to the time of divorce. As seen in
chapter 3, some countries do give divorced women rights over the
pension of their former husband. Rules, however, can be restrictive. 
• Provisions in the law whereby “free” years of contributions are credited for
periods during which women stop working to raise their young children.
Sweden has devised such a provision. This policy, however, generates
an implicit nontransparent subsidy within the pension system.
Moreover, it is expensive and likely to be unaffordable. When such pro-
grams are considered, their costs should be made explicit and financed
either through dedicated payroll taxes or from general revenues.
Benefits and Costs of Higher Funding
There are several ways to increase the level of funding of a pension sys-
tem: (a) increase the funding ratio of earnings-related plans;17 (b) switch
(completely or partially) from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded sys-
tem (as was done in Chile and other countries), in which all or part of
the targeted replacement rate is financed on a capitalization basis; and
(c) reduce the mandate of an earnings-related system with pay-as-you-
go financing and promote the development of voluntary complementary
funded pensions, for instance, through tax incentives.
In all cases, the operation involves benefits and costs. This section dis-
cusses the potential benefits of increasing levels of funding in Middle East
and North African countries as well as the main costs and constraints.
Potential Benefits of Higher Funding
International experience suggests that the benefits of higher funding are
related to higher rates of return on contributions and a better diversifi-
cation of risks, implying higher pensions for the same contribution rate;
potentially higher national savings; the development of securities mar-
kets; the reduction in financial risks confronting firms; and a more sta-
ble and efficient banking sector. Each of these is analyzed below in the
context of Middle East and North African countries. 
Higher Rates of Return on Savings for Old Age 
and More Efficient Diversification of Risks
Chapter 3 shows that current implicit rates of return on contributions
in most pension schemes are too high to be sustainable. Sustainable
rates would be closer to the long-term growth rate of the economy
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(for example, 3 percent a year). Contributions that are invested in financial
instruments, as opposed to “human capital,” as in a pay-as-you-go scheme,
can receive higher rates of return, at least over the long run. Given that
the rate of return on contributions ultimately determines the level of the
pension (that is, the affordable replacement rate), increasing the level of
funding of the pension scheme can be a mechanism for offering higher
pensions. Clearly, higher rates of return are also associated with higher
risks. A well-diversified portfolio of investments, however, needs to
include assets with various levels of risk. Higher funding can thus
encourage better diversification of the sources of savings for retirement.
National Savings
The impact that higher funding in mandatory systems has on national
savings depends, in part, on the government’s strategy to finance the
transition (for a discussion, see also Bailliu and Reisen 2000 and Bosworth
and Burtless 2003). If current unfunded liabilities are financed through
debt, the short-run impact will be neutral, as the implicit debt of the
pay-as-you-go system is simply transformed into an explicit liability. If,
however, this transitional cost is financed via adjustments in the budget
for items other than pensions, through either increases in taxation or
reductions in other expenditures, national savings may increase. In par-
ticular, in the presence of credit constraints, or if current savings are
motivated by precautionary rather than life-cycle reasons, agents will be
unwilling to reduce their savings in response to a transition tax.
In the case of voluntary complementary pensions, the effects are
more uncertain. Simply replacing one form of voluntary savings with
another is unlikely to affect aggregate savings. Even if pension funds
offer greater (long-term) returns than other savings instruments, it is
well known that the effect of a higher real return on savings is ambigu-
ous, as the income effect might offset the substitution effect. Further-
more, if the government decides to encourage voluntary contractual
savings plans through income tax incentives, the impact on national
savings would depend primarily on the government’s fiscal stance. A
positive effect on aggregate savings would require that the reduction in
income tax revenue be compensated through either higher taxes or
lower expenditures.
The most recent empirical studies regarding the impacts of mandatory
funded systems on national savings suggest a positive relationship, on
average (for a cross-country empirical assessment, see López-Murphy
and Musalem 2004). Within a given country, however, institutional
factors ultimately can stimulate or preclude a positive effect on national
savings rates (for a discussion, see Bosworth and Burtless 2003). In
Middle East and North African countries, due to their frail fiscal position,
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a higher level of funding is unlikely to be associated with higher national
savings, at least over the short term. By reducing the long-term implicit
debt of the government, however, higher levels of funding today could
positively affect national savings over the medium term.
Development of Securities Markets 
There is a rapidly expanding literature on the role of funding in pro-
moting the development of financial markets. Funded pension plans
affect securities markets through different channels. First, funded pen-
sions (and life insurance) can increase the demand for long-term finan-
cial assets, thus stimulating the development of the securities market.
Indeed, these funds are more willing than individual investors to hold
long-term securities and require lower risk and liquidity premiums. This
is, in part, because of transaction costs in capital markets, their ability
to diversify risk, and the long-term nature of their commitments.
Moreover, funded schemes, because of their size, have the potential to
enhance market discipline and promote the interests of minority share-
holders in the firms where they invest.18
The development of securities markets can also be stimulated if the
additional demand of funded schemes is matched by an additional sup-
ply of government debt. Indeed, funded schemes create demand for
long-term public debt that is matched by the issuance of bonds. This
provides a benchmark for setting interest rates and eventually helps to
build the yield curve. Of course, the issuance of public debt may come at
the expense of the equity and corporate bond markets. Nonetheless, in
Middle East and North African countries, where securities markets and
the appropriate regulatory framework are still in the making, more re-
liance on bonds is desirable.
Funded schemes also can contribute indirectly to the development
of small and medium enterprises. In Middle East and North African
countries, and in developing countries generally, small and medium en-
terprises have either restricted or no access to bank credit and other
financial services due to poor legal and accounting standards, less sup-
portive judiciary systems, and higher transaction and monitoring costs.
As a result, small and medium enterprises are often financed by the cor-
porate sector. This is particularly true in industrial structures where
large corporations operate in collaboration with a large number of small
and medium enterprises, involving the supply of inputs, purchase of out-
put, control of quality, transfer of technology, and financing. Because
funded schemes have the potential to shift financial intermediation from
banks to capital markets, positive spillovers to small and medium enter-
prises can be expected (see Musalem and Tressel 2003).
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Clearly, not all Middle East and North African countries are ready to
capitalize on these benefits. As discussed in chapter 2, stock exchanges
have yet to emerge in Djibouti, Syria, and the Republic of Yemen. In the
others, with the exception of Jordan, financing through the stock ex-
change still plays a minor role relative to bank lending. The number of
listed companies remains low despite government incentives, and firms
are reluctant to dilute ownership, particularly state-owned enterprises.
Nonetheless, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia are reviewing their
capital market laws and regulations and have strengthened their super-
visory authorities significantly. In these countries, funded pensions could
contribute to the development of securities markets and, through this
channel, to economic growth.
Mitigation of Firms’ Financial Risks
Empirical results suggest that the development of funded pension (and
life insurance) schemes influence the financing decisions of firms (for
other discussions and empirical evidence, see Impavido, Musalem, and
Tressel 2001, 2002, 2003). This is important, particularly in the recent
context of currency and financial crises associated with asset-liability
mismatches in the balance sheets of banks and firms and an excessive re-
liance on short-term debt denominated in foreign currency. As seen in
chapter 2, this is an issue in Middle East and North African countries:
even in countries moving forward with banking reform, loan maturities
are generally very short. The same is true of corporate debt.
To the extent that funded pension systems increase the availability of
long-term funds to financial intermediaries, these, in turn, are able to al-
locate a higher proportion of their loan portfolio in long-term credit to
the enterprise sector, without the intermediaries themselves undertaking
excessive term-transformation risks. Thus longer maturity of debt is
likely to induce a shift in resources from low-return, short-term projects
to high-return, long-term projects, thus fostering growth.
In the Middle East and North Africa region, these potential benefits
are dampened in the presence of business environments that tend to dis-
courage private investments and often constrain the allocation of do-
mestic credit to the private sector. As seen in chapter 2, the majority of
countries are struggling to unleash private sector investments by reduc-
ing the costs of doing business. In Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Libya, and Syria, the allocation of domestic credit is influenced largely
by the financing needs of the public sector. Nonetheless, in Jordan,
Morocco, and Tunisia, with larger shares of domestic credit going to the
private sector, the development of funded pensions could be associated
with an increase in leverage and the maturity of debt among firms.
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Increased maturity of corporate sector liabilities should increase
resilience to various shocks.19
Bank Stability and Efficiency
The development of funded schemes can also increase the stability of the
banking system by reducing systemic risks that can potentially lead to a
banking crisis (see Impavido, Musalem, and Tressel 2001). First, credit
risk may be reduced if funded pensions promote the development of
public information on capital markets and thus improve bank monitor-
ing of borrowers. Second, funded pensions provide resources to the
banking system (in the form of loans, deposits, or the purchase of secu-
rities issued by banks), making them less vulnerable to liquidity risks for
a given level of long-term assets. Banks would therefore be able to avoid
losses caused either by unexpected increases in short-term interest rates
or by sudden withdrawals.
In countries moving to private ownership of the banking system,
funded schemes can also promote efficiency through increased competi-
tion. Indeed, these funds compete on the savings side by capturing sav-
ings from households, particularly in the case of complementary pension
schemes or life insurance, and on the lending side by increasing the de-
mand for long-term securities. This competition can affect prices. As al-
ternative sources of financing become available, banks have incentives to
reduce net interest margins, in part because higher liquidity in the capi-
tal market reduces issuance costs. Increased competition, however, is not
relevant for countries where the ownership of banks is largely public (for
example, Algeria, Egypt, and the Islamic Republic of Iran) or where in-
terest rates are capped (for example, Libya and Syria).
Costs of and Constraints on Higher Funding
While there are benefits to increasing the level of funding of pension
plans, there are also welfare costs related to sourcing the funds and the
risk of capital loss. This is true even for voluntary complementary pen-
sions, which usually involve the setup of tax-incentive policies. In gen-
eral, the welfare cost is a result of the need to raise additional funds by
introducing distorting taxes (including higher contribution rates) or cut-
ting other expenditures (including lower plan benefits). Costs could be
exacerbated in the presence of an unstable macroeconomic environ-
ment, weak banking system, volatile capital markets, or high risks of cap-
ital losses in the funded system as a result of weak institutional capacity
to manage investments and inappropriate governance structures and
regulations. 
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In several countries, higher funding in mandatory schemes is con-
strained by the frail fiscal position (for a discussion of fiscal conditions
for introducing funded systems and the implications for the fiscal stance,
see Holzmann 1998 and MacKenzie et al. 2001). As some of the contri-
butions are diverted to funded accounts, governments will have to inter-
vene to finance current pensions (that is, current reserves will be de-
pleted sooner). Payments to the current generation of pensioners as a
share of GDP are already in the 1–3 percent range. In most countries,
the central budget continues to generate primary deficits above 5 per-
cent of GDP and to have a large share of incompressible expenditures
(see chapter 2). The most worrisome cases are Jordan, Lebanon, and
Morocco. A stronger fiscal stance is observed in Algeria and Tunisia, the
former mainly due to high oil revenues. Egypt also has a large fiscal
deficit (7 percent of GDP), but the implicit debt of the pension fund is
backed almost fully by explicit government debt that the general budget
is already servicing. Although no analyses have been conducted to assess
the fiscal impacts of alternative transition strategies toward higher levels
of funding, it is likely that only a very gradual approach could be con-
sidered in most cases.20
In some circumstances, a weak fiscal position could be considered an
argument in favor of the implementation of a defined-contribution, fully
funded scheme. Lebanon provides an illustration. The country still has
not implemented a pension fund for private sector workers—they only
have access to an end-of-service indemnity. With public debt above
170 percent of GDP, the government is concerned that the introduction
of a defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go system could make things worse.
Indeed, the system is prone to political manipulation and, if badly
managed, would add implicit debt to the high explicit debt of the gov-
ernment, further threatening macroeconomic stability. By doing so, it
would increase the risk premium demanded by investors, thus raising the
cost of domestic credit, with obvious consequences for economic growth
and the cost of servicing the explicit debt. Hence a defined-contribution,
fully funded scheme is considered preferable in the Lebanese case.
A more important challenge to higher levels of funding, or the im-
plementation of a mandatory defined-contribution, fully funded scheme,
is the presence of weak governance structures and the lack of institu-
tional capacity. As discussed in chapter 5, in the majority of countries,
governance structures are not conducive to managing pension funds in
the best interests of plan members. Most funds are managed by tripar-
tite boards lacking the necessary expertise; responsibilities are blurred;
there are no clear objectives or benchmarks for investment policies,
which are poorly shielded from political influence; and no system of
incentives ensures proper accountability to plan members. Hence in
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Algeria, Djibouti, Tunisia, and the Republic of Yemen, most of the
reserves of the pension funds are in the form of government arrears and
informal loans. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, two pension funds are
involved in the management of a large number of companies, some of
which are nonperforming companies transferred by the government to
cover part of its debt with the funds. In Libya, the pension fund is also
an important entrepreneur mostly involved in the tourism sector. Only
in a few cases (for example, Jordan and Morocco) have governments
attempted to give more independence to pension funds, staff the invest-
ment units or committees with professionals in the field (for example,
Jordan and Morocco), and rationalize the investment process by defin-
ing clear objectives and benchmarks (see chapter 5). Weak governance
structures, accountability, and investment policies also affect the
management of reserves in earnings-related schemes.
Incomplete financial markets can also act as a barrier to higher fund-
ing in some cases. Chapter 2 shows that only some countries verify the
minimum conditions for the implementation of funded pillars, which in-
clude having a core of sound banks and insurance companies. In the
large majority, investment opportunities remain limited and more risky.
Shallow capital markets and an underdeveloped insurance sector also
imply less private sector capacity and expertise in the area of fund man-
agement. This limits the implementation of outsourcing policies to
improve the management of pension funds.
While recent reforms suggest that inappropriate governance struc-
tures and weak institutional capacity in the public sector, along with in-
complete financial markets, do not necessarily preclude the movement
to mandatory funded schemes, these are still being implemented, and it
is premature to derive lessons. As discussed in more detail in chapter 6,
the West Bank and Gaza, where the various problems discussed in this
section are pervasive, is transforming the current defined-benefit sys-
tem for civil servants into a defined-contribution, fully funded scheme.
Policy makers considered this less risky under the current circum-
stances than preserving a defined-benefit system that would continue
to be subject to political manipulation, thus constituting an important
contingent liability. To ensure the proper functioning of the new
scheme, the West Bank and Gaza is launching an ambitious plan to
strengthen institutional capacity. More important, it plans to outsource
the management of funds and allocate the majority to foreign assets.
Toconclude, countries canbegrouped in twobroadcategories: countries
that are better placed to increase funding and countries where the benefits
of higher funding are less evident and the risks and constraints more severe.
Countries that are better placed to increase funding—for instance, by
implementing a defined-contribution scheme or developing voluntary
private funded pensions—include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
General Guidelines for a Comprehensive Reform Program 123
and probably Tunisia. These countries have a core of sound banks, are
engaged in reforms of the financial sector, and have a nascent insurance
industry with know-how in the management of funds that could serve as
the basis for the development of private voluntary pensions. In Egypt
and Jordan, particularly in the former, current occupational plans could
also serve as the basis for the take-off of voluntary pension plans (the
main constraints are still the large mandates of the public sector and the
average level of income of the population). In these countries, the main
risk regarding a higher level of funding in the mandatory system is
related to weak governance and institutional capacity. Morocco is an
exception, given that the Régime Collectif d’Assurance et de Retraite
(RCAR) is already managing a funded scheme. In all cases, it is impor-
tant to promote outsourcing policies for the management and even the
administration of funds. Given a frail fiscal stance, the transition to
higher levels of funding will need to be gradual.
Regarding the management of funds, there is mounting evidence that
centralized systems are less costly from an administrative point of view.
The model that generates the lowest management cost is a centralized
structure such as the Swedish second pillar or the Thrift Savings Plan for
Federal Employees in the United States. These provide limited portfo-
lio options to plan members and outsource fund management to mutual
funds. Countries where the benefits of higher funding are less evident
and the risks and constraints more severe include Algeria, Djibouti, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the Republic of Yemen. The
West Bank and Gaza also belongs in this category. A priority for this
group is to bring the defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go system up to stan-
dards by modifying benefit formulas and eligibility conditions, improv-
ing administration, developing management and information systems,
and, to the extent possible, improving investment policies. In parallel,
governments need to continue with structural reforms for private sector
development, including the financial sector. These countries could then
create the conditions for voluntary private pensions. The constraint in
this case is given by lower levels of income per capita and therefore less
savings capacity. A more important role for voluntary schemes would
also imply reviewing the mandate of the mandatory system, at least in
the case of middle- and high-income workers. 
Expanding Coverage to the Vulnerable and Poor:
A Role for Social Pensions?
It has been argued that the coverage of the mandatory pension system is
constrained mainly by the structure of the labor market and institutional
arrangements, with administrative capacity and incentives probably
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playing a secondary role. Individuals employed in small enterprises
(many of which are short lived) and subsistence agriculture or as self-
employed and seasonal workers constitute a considerable share of the
labor force in the region. They create a challenge for the authorities in
facilitating and enforcing collection of pension contributions. In addi-
tion, for many of them, including the long-term poor, current contribu-
tion rates are simply unaffordable. The implication is that, even with
better administrative capacity, lower transaction costs, expanded geo-
graphic distribution of banks, postal offices, or pension branches, and a
credible reform program that creates stronger links between contribu-
tions and benefits, important segments of the labor force are likely to re-
main outside the contributory system. Here we discuss two general
groups: (a) poor individuals with no savings capacity and (b) vulnerable,
low-income self-employed or seasonal workers with some savings capac-
ity, but for whom current contribution rates are not affordable or who
are excluded from the contributory system. 
Noncontributory pensions (also called social or basic pensions) could
be a mechanism for expanding the coverage of the pension system in
order to guarantee a minimum level of retirement income to all.
Contrary to earnings-related or defined-contribution pensions, social
pensions are flat payments to individuals that depend primarily on age,
residency, and, in some cases, means-testing provisions. Policy choices
have important implications for costs and incentives. There is also the
question of whether social pensions are needed when other assistance
programs are in place. These issues are discussed next with reference to
international experience.
Choosing the Level of Benefit
There are no stringent rules to define the level of the basic pension,
and choices at the international level vary considerably (see chapter 3).
The basic pension is equal to 25 percent of average earnings in
Australia, 24 percent in Brazil, 18 percent in Kosovo, 19 percent in
Mauritius, and 40 percent in New Zealand (see table 4.3). Policy mak-
ers, however, need to pay careful attention to the financial and fiscal
implications and incentive effects. High benefits—for instance, a min-
imum pension set at the same level as the minimum wage—can dis-
courage work, particularly in old age, and be financially unsustainable.
The goal should be to set a benefit that is adequate and affordable. A
possible reference could be the poverty line. Ideally, the level of the
basic pension for individuals outside the contributory system should be
the same as the minimum pension guarantee provided by the contrib-
utory scheme (see chapter 3).
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TABLE 4.4
Cost of a Flat Pension of 15 percent of National GDP per Capita in Select Middle East
and North African Countries, by Eligibility Age, 2004–40 
Percent of GDP
2004 2010 2025 2040
Country or territory 60 65 60 65 60 65 60 65
Algeria 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.6 1.0 2.6 1.8
Bahrain 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.8 1.0 3.7 2.7
Djibouti 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.5
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.8 1.2 2.4 1.7
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.6 1.0 2.5 1.6
Iraq 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.8 1.9 1.3
Jordan 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.8 2.3 1.5
Lebanon 1.2 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.9 1.2 3.0 2.2
Libya 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.6 1.1 2.5 1.7
Morocco 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.1 2.5 1.8
Tunisia 1.3 0.9 1.4 1.0 2.1 1.4 3.2 2.3
West Bank and Gaza 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.6 1.1
Yemen, Republic of 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.6
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Choosing the Minimum Eligible Age and Residency Conditions
The eligibility age is another important parameter affecting costs. In
Middle East and North African countries, for instance, providing a flat
pension equal to 20 percent of GDP per capita to all of the population
older than 65 would cost, on average, 0.8 percent of GDP over the short
term, increasing to 2.1 percent over the long term. Providing the same
benefit to the population older than 60 would cost 1.2 and 3.1 percent
over the short and long terms, respectively. Table 4.4 reports projected
costs by country for the level of flat benefit of 15 percent of GDP per
capita. In general, the minimum age should be set equal to or above the
normal retirement age in the contributory system. The benefit can also
be adjusted as a function of the length of time that the individual resides
in the country prior to retirement. In Sweden, for instance, the full flat
benefit is paid to individuals with at least 40 years of residency. For
individuals with a shorter period of residency, the flat pension is pro-
rated. Such testing in the Middle East and North Africa region could be
complicated, however, by the lack of reliable records.
Means Testing
Means can be defined broadly or narrowly, thus including all income
and assets, only income, or only pension income. Countries such as
Botswana and Brazil provide universal flat pensions that are not means
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tested. A similar approach is being proposed in the West Bank and Gaza.
This greatly simplifies administration and associated costs. Indeed,
means testing can demand a great deal of institutional capacity and data,
particularly when based on total income and assets. However, failing to
implement means tests increases benefit expenditures. Policy makers
need to address a delicate trade-off between the cost associated with tar-
geting and the benefits related to lower pension payments. 
An interesting approach that is used in New Zealand is simply to tax
the flat pension as other income. Hence, low-income individuals pay
lower tax rates than high-income individuals (that is, they receive a
higher share of the flat payment). This, however, requires a well-
functioning tax system.
Other alternatives involve means testing the basic pension on the basis
of earnings-related or defined-contribution pensions, including private
pensions. One approach, which is implicitly being used in several contrib-
utory schemes in the region, is to provide a top-up to the earnings-related
pension. Basically, individuals with an earnings-related pension below a
minimumreceivea supplement so that thisminimumis reached.Theprob-
lem with this approach is that it reduces the incentives to contribute. In-
deed, for low-income individuals, additional years of contributions might
not bring the total pension payment above the minimum. In other words,
each time the earnings-related pension increases, the top-up is reduced by
the same amount (that is, there is a 100 percent implicit marginal tax rate
on the top-up). This problem is represented in the left panel of figure 4.5:
the total benefit received increases only after several years of contributions.
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Note: In both figures, the accrual rate is set at 1.5 percent per year. The individual is assumed to earn 30 percent of average earnings. The basic
pension is set at 20 percent of average earnings. In the left panel, the reduction factor is 100 percent; in the right panel, 30 percent.
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A more efficient approach is to reduce the top-up by only a fraction
of the marginal increase in the earnings-related pension. The right panel
of figure 4.5 represents this alternative. In the example, the complemen-
tary pension or top-up is reduced by 30 percent of the earnings-related
pension, and thus the total benefit received increases with the number of
years of contributions. This preserves the incentives to work and con-
tribute. For this same reason, there is less need for a minimum vesting
period in this type of arrangement. The approach provides a good com-
promise for controlling the cost of the basic pension without dramati-
cally increasing the costs of administration.
Links to Current Contributory Systems
While designing the noncontributory scheme, it is important to ensure
that individuals with savings capacity have incentives to enroll in the
contributory pension scheme. This is the case, for instance, for workers
in small enterprises and a portion of the self-employed. To this end, sev-
eral reforms in the contributory scheme can be considered.
The first recommendation is to allow workers in small and medium
enterprises, part-time or temporary workers in the agricultural sector, or
the self-employed to enroll voluntarily in the contributory scheme and
to offer the possibility of paying a lower contribution rate linked to a no-
tional covered wage, thus addressing the issue that, for several of these
groups of individuals, it is not possible to measure wage levels. However,
lower contribution rates should also be associated with lower accrual
rates for a given retirement age. In this way, there are no implicit subsi-
dies within the contributory scheme. Redistribution takes place in a
transparent manner through payment of the basic pension. 
For this to work, it is necessary to change the current mechanism used
to provide the basic pension guarantee in the contributory system. The top-
up approach does not introduce incentives to contribute at low levels of in-
come and it needs to be replaced by a flat pension that can be reduced or not
as a function of the earnings-related pension (see the previous section).
In general, countries should be discouraged from creating special
pension funds or schemes for certain categories of workers, yet several
countries in the region have been following this strategy. Algeria, for in-
stance, has a separate scheme for the self-employed, where contribution
rates and benefits are lower. Tunisia has a special arrangement for
workers in the agricultural sector. Egypt has a quasi-noncontributory
scheme for casual workers and schemes for the self-employed and work-
ers abroad. All these systems are financially unsustainable (in part
because of a narrower base of contributions), demand nontransparent
subsidies from the other regimes or the government budget, discourage
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enrollment in the main scheme, and fragment the labor market. The
Islamic Republic of Iran has an integrated scheme in which the self-
employed are allowed to join the system at a lower contribution rate. But
because benefits (that is, accrual rates) are the same, this creates an im-
plicit nontransparent subsidy within the contributory system.
Financing
There are two mechanisms for financing the basic pension: contribu-
tions (basically a tax on labor) and general revenues. When the basic
pension is limited to individuals within the contributory scheme, it is ar-
gued that the tax on labor is a superior option for equity reasons. Basi-
cally, using general revenues to finance the basic pension of a minority
of the labor force is regressive. A counterargument, however, is that the
tax on labor introduces distortions in labor markets and, in particular,
can reduce wages for workers in agriculture and in the informal sector:
neither category of worker usually is enrolled in the contributory sys-
tem. There is a consensus, however, that when the basic pension is
universal and offered to individuals outside the contributory scheme, it
should be financed out of the general revenue.
Links to Core Social Assistance Programs
Social pensions can be redundant given the existence of safety nets,
which already target poor households. In fact, there is little evidence that
the elderly are poorer than the rest of the population in the region (see
table 4.5). At the same time, there is limited information about family
structure (for example, what proportion of the elderly live with their
children?) and no information regarding the distribution of income
within households. Hence it is difficult to assess the impact that current
safety nets have on the well-being of the elderly and, conversely, that so-
cial pensions would have on the well-being of other members of the
household. This issue deserves more research and analysis. Under ideal
conditions, social pensions and safety nets do not need to be duplicative.
As an illustration, an individual participating in a public works program
that allows for self-targeting already would have discounted other
sources of household income, including the pension of the elderly. The
design of conditional cash transfers, in contrast, should not be affected
because the focus is on promoting changes in behavior by increasing
household income at the margin. Other types of cash and in-kind trans-
fers would be targeted, taking into account the effect of social pensions,
either implicitly (as in the case of geographic targeting on the basis of
poverty rates) or explicitly (as in the case of means tests). Under this
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approach, social pensions could become a transparent, and relatively
easy to administer, mechanism for redistributing income toward poor
households, while other safety nets are used to fill in the gaps. 
Improving the Institutional Configuration,
Administration, and Regulation of Pension Systems
Several areas are not discussed extensively in the section on diagnostics
and yet are critical for the proper functioning of the pension system:
(a) institutional organization, meaning the types of programs in place and
the institutions in charge of managing them; (b) the way in which the
administration is designed and implemented; and (c) the way in which
pension funds are regulated. This last section raises a series of policy
questions and recommendations in these three areas that countries ought
to consider when designing an integrated pension reform program. 
Institutional Organization of the Public Pension System
Ideally, the reform of pension systems in the Middle East and North
Africa region should aim at full integration. Countries would basically
converge to a unique pension system covering all categories of workers,
although there could be differentiated contribution rates to facilitate the
TABLE 4.5
Age and Poverty in Select Middle East and North African Countries
Percent of total population in age group
Country and age group Poor Nonpoor
Yemen, Republic of 
0–25 38.0 62.0
26–64 42.0 58.0
65 39.0 61.0
Jordan
0–14 13.5 86.5
15–24 14.7 85.3
25–53 14.1 85.9
54 12.7 87.3
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
0–29 9.9 90.1
30–49 59.3 40.7
50–64 23.6 76.4
65 7.2 92.8
Sources: World Bank 2003e, and forthcoming b; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) 2002.
Note: For Jordan, data refer to 2002; for the Islamic Republic of Iran, data refer to urban households for
1998; for the Republic of Yemen, data refer to 1998. The age refers to the head of household.
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enrollment of vulnerable groups on a voluntary basis.21 Countries like
the Islamic Republic of Iran would also need to seek the integration of
occupational plans, which currently operate as substitutes to the main
scheme (the SSO). These plans could continue to operate, under appro-
priate supervision and regulation but would become complements to the
SSO. Morocco has recent experience in this area, having integrated the
occupational plans of public enterprises into the scheme for contractual
workers in the public sector. 
The main benefits of integrating the pension system include a more
mobile labor force, economies of scale in management and administra-
tion, a larger base of contributors in the case of pay-as-you-go systems,
and a more equitable pension system. The integration can be conducted
in one of two ways: (a) only new entrants are affected or (b) new entrants
and also part or all of current plan members are affected.22 The two
approaches are discussed below.
Only New Entrants Are Affected
This approach can be illustrated in the Jordanian case. Jordan had three
main mandatory schemes: a mandatory scheme for private sector work-
ers, a scheme for civil servants, and a scheme for the military. Both the
civil service and military pension schemes were in a deplorable financial
situation. Hence, in 1995, the civil service pension fund was closed to
new entrants, and the Social Security Corporation (SSC) was opened to
all new civil servants (except for special categories of high-ranking offi-
cers). Similarly, in 2003, the regime for the military was closed to new
entrants, who began joining the SSC.23 The closed funds will continue
operating until the last of the current contributors retires and dies
(around 2060), possibly with some adjustment to benefit formulas.
Afterward, Jordan will have a fully integrated public pension system.
This approach is attractive because it reduces political resistance from
current plan members, who would face a reduction in benefits. Also,
because more individuals continue contributing to the old system, tran-
sition costs for the government are lower (that is, the share of pension
expenditures that need to be financed through the general budget is
lower). The drawback is that it takes a long time for the old system to be
phased out (that is, for new benefit formulas to sink in) and thus increases
the present value of pension expenditures. 
Current Plan Members Are Also Affected
The second approach is to mandate, or give the choice to, some or all of
current contributors to transfer to the integrating system, which is as-
sumed to be a reformed system. As in the Jordanian case, those who stay
in the current systems still might face some adjustments to their benefit
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formula and eligibility conditions. Most countries in Latin America and
Eastern Europe adopted this approach. Two issues are important in this
case: (a) to recognize the acquired pension rights of those who transfer
to the new system and (b) to ensure that the reformed integrated scheme
does not assume the implicit pension debt of the old systems.
To recognize accrued rights, the basic approach, albeit with several
variations, is to estimate pension payments at retirement, under the as-
sumption that the individual will continue to contribute and accrue ben-
efits under the current rules, and to prorate these as a function of the
time that the individual has been in the system when the transfer takes
place. The present value of future pension payments estimated in this
way is then transferred to the integrating fund, for instance, in the form
of a bond that matures when the individual retires. On retirement, the
individual’s pension will have two components: the pension under the
old rules, which is linked to contributions in the old system, and the pen-
sion under the new rules, which is linked to contributions in the new
system.24 There are two problems with this approach: the potential
resistance of current plan members, at least when the transfer is manda-
tory, and the fact that a higher share (or maybe the totality) of the pen-
sion for current retirees needs to be paid out of the general budget. The
benefit of the approach is its transparency, as the implicit debt is made
explicit. The cost of the transition, of course, is higher.
In the case of earnings-related schemes, the contributions in the new
system could still be used to pay the pensions of plan members, but
through a transparent financial transaction in which the old system—the
government—issues debt (that is, bonds) that is appropriately remuner-
ated. This retains the pension debt of the old system as explicit debt.
Countries should also consider the possibility of keeping the implicit
pension debt of the new system as explicit government debt, by invest-
ing the contributions in government bonds that are indexed by a proxy
of the implicit rate of return that the system pays on contributions.
If full integration is politically difficult, a compromise in the case of
countries with multiple systems is to reduce the number of mandatory
earnings-related schemes to two: one for public sector workers and one
for private sector workers. This implies integrating workers who are in
occupational plans. The occupational plans can continue to exist, if
properly regulated, but as complements to the mandatory schemes, not
as substitutes. Under this dual-system approach, benefits need to be har-
monized to the extent possible between the funds, following the best
practices discussed earlier. Clearly, because both systems have a different
base of contributors, the parameters cannot be identical. Under either of
the two approaches, bilateral agreements (bridges) to facilitate labor
mobility need to be put in place. 
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Improving Administration
The success of any policy initiative aiming to reform the national pen-
sion program will depend heavily on administrative capacity and plan-
ning. Analysis of the existing systems, procedures, and institutions
should be part of any comprehensive reform effort. The focus is on the
division of responsibilities among the various public agencies involved in
the process, on expenses associated with administering the system, on
the administrative burden on employers and employees, and on issues
related to the (a) administration of collection, (b) identification of plan
members, (c) procedures for paying contributions, (d) process for paying
benefits, and (e) information technology infrastructure. To date, this
area has received little systematic research and policy advice. This sub-
section raises a few questions that countries will need to answer when
designing and implementing pension reform. 
Administration of Collection
Generally the integrated collection of taxes and pension contributions
is associated with significant systemic cost savings (for both the gov-
ernment and employers). In all countries of the region, however,
pension funds have a separate collection system. This might have the
advantage of shortening the circuit between the pension agency and
the employer, particularly when the tax administration is institutionally
weak. Nonetheless, in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, the autonomous
operation of multiple funds suggests the existence of costly duplication.
Identification of Plan Members
In all countries in the region, there are several parallel systems for iden-
tifying individuals and businesses (for example, social security, tax ad-
ministration, national identification). The duplication of identification
systems is costly and complicates cross-checks of information. A sound
registration system should be able to ensure the uniqueness of identifi-
cation numbers, appropriate verification mechanisms, and quality of the
registration process. If an agency, such as the tax administration or the
institution in charge of the civil register, does a good job of managing
registrations, there is little rationale for favoring an alternative identifi-
cation system for pensions.
Procedures for Paying Contributions
The key objective of this system should be to ensure accurate and secure
transfers of information and funds, while minimizing transaction
costs for employers. In most Middle East and North African countries,
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employers can pay contributions through the banking system. Paying
contributions directly to pension fund agencies is another option, al-
though inferior given the lack of specialized financial services. In some
cases (for example, Egypt), simplified payment procedures also exist to
attract small businesses and the self-employed. The variety of payment
procedures usually reflects an effort to expand coverage and promote
compliance, but keeping a delicate balance with administrative costs is
an important objective. The challenge in most countries is related to the
capacity of the pension fund to verify the accuracy of the data and to
track payments efficiently. Usually, payments are made in lump sums and
then supplemented with a detailed reconciliation report that presents in-
dividualized data on employee contributions. Little is known, however,
about reconciliation procedures. Weak capacity to define, manage, and
enforce procedures that outline what to do with the unreconciled bal-
ances, erroneous overpayments, mistakes in reports, unidentified indi-
vidual records, and so forth will always lead to a poor quality of pension
records. 
Procedures for Paying Benefits
Key issues to consider include (a) how to reduce the time needed to
process benefit applications, (b) how to verify the information regarding
beneficiaries, (c) how to track deceased retirees, (d) how to reduce the ef-
fect of fragmentation in pension administration on entitlement to full
benefits, (e) and how to make payments in an efficient and secure way.
The existence of underdeveloped or decentralized information systems
makes processing benefit applications a lengthy procedure in most coun-
tries. Furthermore, verification of the applicant’s age may be a complex
task when the national registration systems are weak (for example, in
Djibouti and the West Bank and Gaza).
Tracking deceased beneficiaries is a challenge in most cases. In Egypt,
the problem has been addressed by collaborating with the banks in ex-
changing information on the individual’s accounts and by requiring ben-
eficiaries to appear regularly in person to confirm eligibility. 
Finally, regarding payment mechanisms, several countries make good
use of bank deposits (for example, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco). In rural
or remote areas, various other delivery methods (for example, direct cash
delivery, post offices, or pension fund agencies) could be normally used.
In Djibouti, however, payments are made only through the pension
branch in the capital. Eventually, the mechanism selected should be
cost-effective and provide for quality services. Generally, the banking
system, if sufficiently developed, should be a preferred method of
delivery.
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Information Technology Infrastructure
In the majority of countries in the region, information systems are out-
dated or underdeveloped, and access to modern information technology
is limited. Exceptions include Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and
Tunisia. In all the other cases, records regarding contributors and bene-
ficiaries are out of date. Countries such as Djibouti and the Republic of
Yemen are investing in information technology infrastructure, but there
are concerns regarding the cost-effectiveness of the proposed designs. A
good-quality information technology system should provide for efficient
management of the process, integration of multiple business operations,
effective monitoring, and easy processing of and access to data. It is very
important for the design of information technology systems to follow,
not precede, the design of the pension system.
Administrative Costs
The level and structure of expenditures associated with administering
national pension plans in the region require further analysis, but they
should clearly be of concern to managers and policy makers. Inefficien-
cies in administration and overstaffing, poor infrastructure, and frag-
mented pension provisions result in higher operational costs. In
Djibouti, administrative expenditures of the Organisme de Protection
Sociale (OPS) reach 29 percent of program expenditures; in the Republic
of Yemen, the cost of administering the Private Pension Fund (GCSS)
represents 10 percent of contributions (see table 4.6). For comparison,
the average administrative expenditures for public pension agencies in
Central and Eastern Europe is under 3 percent. In part, high expense
ratios in Middle East and North African countries reflect low coverage
of the system so that economies of scale cannot be used fully. 
TABLE 4.6
Administrative Expenditures for Select Middle East and North African Countries
Percent
Share of total Share of total
Country Scheme Year expenditures contributions
Bahrain GOSI 2001 9.5 6.8
Djiboutia OPS 2002 29.0 33.0
Egypt, Arab Rep. of PPEEPF 1997 3.9 4.0
Iran, Islamic Rep. of SSO 2000 6.8 6.3
Libya SSF 2003 2.7 3.1
Morocco CNSS 2002 5.6 5.0
Yemen, Republic of GCSS 2003 50.0 9.8
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of various operational reports.
Notes: Total expenditures include benefits and operational expenses.
a. Unusually high administrative expenses were reported in 2002.
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General Issues on Regulation
Another area where work is required concerns the regulation of
mandatory and voluntary pension plans. In general, public pension
funds are not formally regulated. Morocco can be considered an ex-
ception, since the regulator of the insurance industry also “monitors”
the mandatory pension plans. Regulation is lacking also in the case of
occupational pension plans, for instance, in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and in Jordan. In most cases, there are defined-benefit schemes or
defined-contribution schemes on “book.” Little is known about their
financial sustainability, and their investment policies are not transpar-
ent. This raises a problem not only for plan members but also for gov-
ernments, since occupational plans often are part of public companies
and thus add to the government’s contingent liabilities. Egypt and
Morocco regulate voluntary plans. The Islamic Republic of Iran and
Jordan are working on regulations to allow these plans to operate
through insurance industries. In the other countries, little progress has
been made. 
The general recommendation is that countries where voluntary
plans have the potential to develop should set the necessary regulatory
and supervisory framework from the beginning; it is desirable that
mandatory defined-benefit schemes and occupational plans also be cov-
ered by this framework. Regulation is needed at the following levels:
(a) appropriate licensing and capital requirements for providers; (b) full
asset segregation among pension assets, sponsors, management firm,
and custodian and the use of external custodian banks; (c) asset diversi-
fication and the rules of asset management (the qualifications and
licensing of internal or external managers); (d) asset valuation rules
(mark-to-market) and rate-of-return calculations (the mutual fund
instead of the savings account model); (e) periodic actuarial reviews and
financial audits; (f) transparency and information disclosure; and (g) ef-
fective supervision. For occupational plans, regulations should also deal
with funding, investment, and portability rules. As markets develop,
however, the approach of requiring legal investment limits should be
relaxed gradually so that, in the long run, it converges to the prudent
main principle. 
Countries wishing to develop voluntary schemes should also review
taxation rules. The tax treatment of pension plans, either mandatory or
voluntary and independent of the provider, should be the same: either
exempt-exempt-tax or tax-exempt-exempt treatment.25 This is to pre-
serve neutrality in the mobilization of savings. To this end, governments
need to consider providing tax exemptions for the investment income of
pension funds and the reserves of life insurance plans.
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Notes
1. In low-income countries where national statistical systems are not well de-
veloped, and therefore estimates of average earnings are either not available or
not reliable, a better reference could be income per capita.
2. When implementing a basic pension guarantee, there are key issues to
consider with regard to the financing mechanism and eligibility conditions. 
3. Countries report various poverty lines. The most common are the food
poverty line and the general poverty line. Usually, these are reported separately for
urban and rural areas and at the national level. The general poverty line is always
higher than the food poverty line. Rural poverty lines in all the countries
reviewed are lower than urban poverty lines.
4. This is achieved by introducing a ceiling on the covered wage. See chap-
ter 3 for a review of choices at the international level.
5. For surveys of international experience with pension reform, see Bonnerjee
(2002); Lindeman, Rutkowski, and Sluchynskyy (2001); and Schwarz and
Demirgüç-Kunt (1999). Useful international comparisons can be found in
Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles (2000). For a discussion on new perspectives on
pension reform, see Holzmann et al. (2005).
6. The various systems are discussed in appendix E.
7. See appendix E for further discussion.
8. See appendix E for a derivation of this result.
9. The obvious technical problem is that, in a standard defined-benefit
system, the accrual rate is calculated ex ante—that is, when individuals join the
system as opposed to when they retire. Therefore, the calculation needs to be
based on expectations regarding (a) survival probabilities at retirement and
(b) the value of the growth rate of the average covered wage or the covered wage
bill. This can reduce the precision of the calculation and compromise the finan-
cial sustainability of the scheme. Alternatives around this problem are discussed
in the section on virtual account systems.
10. See appendix E for a discussion of the determinants of rates of return of
defined-benefit schemes.
11. See appendix E for a description of the virtual account formula and its
equivalence to the traditional defined-benefit formula. See also Disney (1999)
for a critical review of the scheme, Gorá and Palmer (2003), and Holzmann and
Palmer (2005).
12. Although appealing, this idea still needs to receive empirical support.
13. See appendix F for a discussion of transfer formulas.
14. One exception is the Caisse Marocaine de Retraite (CMR) in Morocco,
where disability benefits are financed directly from the central budget. Another
exception is the RCAR, also in Morocco, where there is a special account for
disability pensions, but where survivor pensions are financed through individual
accounts and the general fund.
15. A loss under the individual-only approach is that the market prices for
private life insurance and annuities are higher to filter high risks (adverse
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selection). However, it is not clear if the welfare gains from reducing adverse
selection through mandatory pooling exceed the losses for those who are pulled
into the pool on an involuntary basis. Pooling also achieves cross-subsidies be-
tween genders, but these also can be achieved by using unisex mortality tables. 
16. This policy of making husbands accountable for their decisions should
be extended to disability and young-age survivor pensions. One mechanism is
to require these individuals to purchase additional policies through private
companies.
17. This operation does not necessarily imply increasing the level of
reserves, because higher funding, for instance, can be achieved by cutting bene-
fits and therefore reducing the implicit pension debt. Here we are more inter-
ested in the case where higher reserves are allowed to accumulate, either because
contributions increase or because the government assumes part of the implicit
debt of the system.
18. Pension funds hold productive policy dialogues with regulators and
successfully monitor corporate performance, which improves regulations and
corporate governance to the benefit of minority shareholders.
19. In market-based economies, an increase in the proportion of shares in
the portfolio of pension funds is associated with a decrease in the leverage of
firms. This makes firms more robust to economic cycles and changes in interest
rates (see Impavido, Musalem, and Tressel 2001).
20. However, this type of operation does improve the long-term fiscal posi-
tion of the government by making explicit part of the implicit debt of the pay-
as-you-go system, while avoiding its buildup. Hence, government borrowing is
justified.
21. In defined-benefit schemes, a different contribution rate also implies a
different accrual rate.
22. The discussion here applies to transfers from a fund that is being phased
out to the integrating fund. The issue of transfers, however, also emerges in an
integrated system that is being reformed—for instance, if a parametric reform is
combined with the introduction of a defined-contribution, funded component.
Policy makers then need to make decisions regarding which individuals are
affected by the reform (that is, who should join the new system).
23. What is problematic in the case of Jordan is that the merger was imple-
mented before the SSC scheme was reformed. 
24. If the receiving fund is a defined-contribution, fully funded scheme, the
pension can be computed by adding the acquired rights (the value of the recog-
nition bonds at the time of retirement) to the capital accumulated in the
individual account and then purchasing an annuity. Depending on the market
interest rate, the resulting benefit can be higher or lower than if part of the pen-
sion is computed as a defined benefit (that is, on the basis of the replacement rate
accumulated at the time of the transfer).
25. See appendix D for a review of tax regulations across the region.
Management of the Public
Pension Funds
CHAPTER 5
Although not managed as prefunded schemes,1 most of the public
pension schemes in the Middle East and North Africa region have accu-
mulated reserves. Among the countries reviewed, the reserves range
from 4.2 percent of GDP in Djibouti to 52.5 percent of GDP in
Bahrain. At the aggregate level, the reserves of mandatory pension sys-
tems account for 14.4 percent of regional GDP. This is among the high-
est levels in the world, second only to South Asia (see figure 5.1).
Recently, the issue of pension fund management has attracted con-
siderable attention by policy makers, practitioners, and development
agencies. One of the main motivations is that, in general, public pension
funds have been mismanaged and performance, as measured by most
reasonable standards, has been poor (Iglesias and Palacios 2000). Around
the world, reserves in partially funded public schemes have been used to
subsidize housing, state enterprises, and various types of economically
targeted investments. They have been used to prop up stock markets and
as a captive source of credit, and they probably have allowed govern-
ments to run larger deficits than they would have otherwise. Investment
decisions typically occur in a regulatory vacuum, with little public
accountability, limited access to information, and obscure management
processes.
International experience suggests that progress toward improving
the management of public pension funds relies on the presence of
good governance, meaning the systems and processes that a company or
the government uses to manage its affairs. The main components of
good governance include transparency, systems for conflict resolution,
and accountability for each function and role.
This chapter compares the management practices of pension funds in
Middle East and North African countries with best practices at the inter-
national level and identifies realistic options for reform. The chapter
starts by outlining core principles for better governance, accountability,
and investment policy. It then benchmarks current practices along
these three dimensions in Middle East and North African countries and 139
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identifies major weaknesses. The final section discusses the constraints on
introducing structural reforms in the region and proposes a set of practi-
cal guidelines to improve management in the short and medium terms. 
Lessons from International Experience 
in Pension Fund Management
A recent comprehensive review of international best practices identifies
core principles for good governance, accountability, and investment
policies.2 These are summarized in this section and presented as a bench-
mark to assess the current challenges that countries in the region face.
General Principles of Good Governance
The governance provisions of public pension schemes should aim to
establish good business practices and avoid corruption, mismanagement,
and abuses by the government itself. According to recent evaluations of
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Figure 5.1  Pension Assets as a Percentage of GDP in Middle East
and North African Countries and World Regions
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international experience, the following principles and guidelines should
improve the governance of publicly managed pension schemes.
Mandate of the Governing Body
Within the pension fund, roles and responsibilities should be clearly de-
fined. An example can be found in the Canadian pension reforms carried
out between 1995 and 1998. Under the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP)
Investment Board Act of 1998, the board has a clear fiduciary duty to
(a) manage CPP funds in the best interests of contributors and benefici-
aries and (b) invest its assets to achieve the maximum rate of return,
without incurring undue risks and while taking into account the factors
that may affect the funding and ability of the CPP to meet its financial
obligations.
Selecting the Governing Body and Shielding Funds from 
Political Interference 
The law establishing the management agency should provide unam-
biguous conditions under which members of the governing body of the
agency can be appointed and removed. For example, in Canada, the fi-
nance minister, in consultation with provincial governments, appoints
the 12 members of the CPP board. The appointment process involves
a nominating committee that recommends qualified candidates to the
federal and provincial governments. The board and the appointment
process are subjected to close public scrutiny, and candidates for the
board, in addition to having suitable qualifications, must meet demand-
ing skill and character requirements.
The managing agency should be free from inappropriate interference
from the government in pursuing its objectives and meeting its respon-
sibilities. Ideally, the government should remain at arm’s length from
the investment decisions of the fund manager. New Zealand has chosen
the route of full disclosure. Under New Zealand law, the minister has
explicit power to direct the governing board of the public pension
fund. However, directions must be submitted in writing, presented to
Parliament, and published in the official gazette. Ireland takes a slightly
different approach, explicitly prohibiting investments in Irish govern-
ment securities and thus restricting one avenue by which the govern-
ment could misuse the fund for its own purposes.
Minimizing Corruption and Fraud 
The management agency should be required by law to establish internal
governance structures and processes aimed at minimizing corruption,
mismanagement, and fraud. Governance procedures should include
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(a) the mandatory establishment of a risk management and audit com-
mittee; (b) a code of conduct for staff and senior executives; (c) a detailed
description of the roles and responsibilities of different groups within
the agency; and (d) a process of quality control and rigorous documen-
tation, review, and audit requirements for investment decisions and
information technology support systems.
Supervision
The government should require the management agency to be regulated
and supervised by the same agency responsible for regulating private
pension providers and, where feasible, to meet the same standards im-
posed on private providers. Canada has not placed its public fund under
the jurisdiction of any of its private sector financial regulators, but it has
imposed a similar set of standards for governance and investments as
those required of the private sector. In contrast, Indonesia is proposing
to place the public pension fund under the same regulator as private pen-
sion funds. This is already the case in Costa Rica, Kenya, and Morocco.
General Principles of Accountability 
Structures that provide managers with incentives to comply with their
mandate and run the pension fund in the best interests of plan members
are central to the achievement of good governance. To this end, two
basic elements need to be considered: transparency and reward struc-
tures. Regarding transparency, the objective is to fully disclose informa-
tion (for example, the financial situation of the scheme, the composition
of the portfolio, investment decisions, and performance). Regarding
reward structures, the goal is to ensure that those making decisions are
held accountable. Good judgment and good performance should be
rewarded, while poor judgment and bad results should be penalized.
Disclosure of Governance Structures and Responsibilities 
There should be full and open disclosure of the governance structure of
the scheme and the managing agency, including rules for selecting mem-
bers of the governing body and managers. Accountability requires that
details about the governance structure be made public. In particular,
there should be adequate disclosure of the arrangements put in place
to detect and prevent fraud. As part of its disclosure of governance
arrangements, the managing agency should be required to publish its
formal delegations of powers and responsibilities. Once the agency has
formalized its structure of delegations, it should make these available to
all stakeholders.
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Disclosure of Policy Making, Performance, and Financial Situation 
The management agency should be required to report comprehensively
on its decisions and performance. This is arguably the key accountabil-
ity issue. Full disclosure of performance in both absolute and relative
terms is fundamental to protecting the interests of plan members. Fund-
ing shortfalls should be identified and disclosed, along with the govern-
ment’s proposed remedial actions. The process for assessing and dealing
with a funding shortfall should be transparent and preferably contained
in law. Where the government has an explicit policy of partial funding,
the extent of the underfunding should be assessed and reported in the
government’s accounts. Both Canada and Ireland use publicly disclosed
benchmarks for comparing performance. Canada uses the benchmark of
fund performance in the private sector, while Ireland uses a predeter-
mined set of benchmark indexes. In addition, Canadian fund managers
are required to hold public meetings in each province at least every two
years to discuss performance. Since instituting this type of public
reporting, administrative costs have fallen more than 60 percent.
The management agency should be subject to regular governance
and performance audits. This practice is common in many countries. In
Canada, in addition to the annual financial audit, the CPP is required to
initiate a special examination of management practices at least once
every six years.
Incentives, Rewards, and Sanctions 
To the greatest extent possible, incentives and rewards for performance
should be linked to delegated responsibilities and should be risk based.
Those who make delegated decisions should be rewarded or sanctioned
according to the way in which they exercise their delegations. Managers
should be required to review periodically the exercise of delegations they
have made. Compliance should be rewarded, and breaches of guidelines,
either for governance or for investment, should be penalized, even
where the returns are higher than expected.
General Principles of Investment Policy 
Public pension fund managers have the responsibility to select an
investment strategy that balances risks and returns appropriately for plan
members. The investment policy comprises three main components:
setting long-term performance targets, defining an acceptable level of
risk tolerance, and setting parameters for short-term asset allocation.
These need to be set out clearly in an investment policy statement.
The primary focus of investment policies for private investment funds
is to balance market risks and returns. Three types of risks need to be
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managed: (a) the risk of loss due to counterparty default, (b) the risk of
loss due to movements in market prices, and (c) the risk of loss due to
operational failure. In addition to these risks, public investment funds
need to be concerned about their role in the domestic capital market and
their exposure to government debt. In the private sector, the market risk
dimension of investment strategies is increasingly expressed as a com-
prehensive measure of risk, such as value at risk. This comprehensive
measure of risk automatically signals inadequate diversification. There-
fore, funds can be managed effectively in the absence of strict sectoral
limitations or target ratios. However, this approach has yet to reach far
into the public sector, where investments often are handicapped by
limited mandates and restrictions that militate against modern risk
management practices. Nevertheless, some principles emerge from in-
ternational practice to ensure prudent management and improve the
efficiency of public funds. These principles are discussed below.
Setting Investment Policy 
The investment policy should be set by the board of directors or
trustees. It should be fully documented and should be available in sum-
mary form to members of the scheme. Clearly, for competitive reasons,
the publicly disclosed elements of the investment policy should focus
only on general strategies and attitudes toward risk. The strategy should
be aligned with the objectives of the fund and should be shielded from
political influence.
Mandate of the Investment Policy
The investment policy should state that the purpose of accumulating
and investing pension reserves is solely for the benefit of members of the
pension plan. A policy that is directed solely to the interests of fund
members will have few, if any, prohibitions on investments. The inter-
ests of fund members will be enhanced by sound diversification of risks.
In general, rules that limit or prohibit investments, including invest-
ments in foreign securities, reduce the capacity of the fund to diversify
and to serve the interests of fund members. The two exceptions to this
general rule are loans to related parties—either the government or plan
members—and investments in risky derivatives.
Market Power and Corporate Governance 
The investment policy statement should identify the potential for the
fund to be or to become a dominant force in the domestic market
and should specify how the fund would resolve such a situation. The
investment policy should be explicit about how the pension fund would
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exercise its voting rights as a shareholder. The exercise of voice is im-
portant but, to avoid a situation in which the government de facto di-
rects private business, it is usually better to delegate this power to the
fund managers. One way to minimize the conflicts of interest that may
arise from such situations is for the fund to publish, with a lag time, a
summary of the way in which it voted in its various shareholder capaci-
ties. Fearing the potential for pressure on the public fund to influence
corporate governance for purposes other than those in the interests of
the fund itself, some countries have imposed concentration limits or del-
egated voting rights to fund managers; others, such as Sweden, have put
a cap on the effective voting power of the fund. In all cases, however, a
policy for shareholder voice should be explicit and documented.
Assessing and Managing Risks
The investment policy should identify all relevant risks and the board’s
approach to measuring, monitoring, and managing each risk. A particu-
lar problem arises from investments in nonmarketable assets. These
investments reduce the liquidity of the fund and are more prone to mal-
practice at the time of acquisition, valuation, or sale. Assets can be pur-
chased above market prices or sold below market prices to benefit fund
managers. Even in the absence of corrupt practices, valuation problems
can make it difficult to assess whether the asset is generating gains or
losses.
In general, the investment policy should seek to minimize investment
in illiquid assets. However, in many countries this may not be practicable,
especially where funds are prohibited from investing in foreign assets.
One way to contain the risks involved with investments in illiquid assets
is to limit the amount to a benchmark maximum, set by the board,
according to a realistic assessment of the spectrum of investments avail-
able. Where such investments are permitted, the board should establish
a clear policy for their purchase, disposition, and valuation. The policy
could include either mandatory independent assessment of each purchase
and sale of illiquid assets or supervision by the audit committee of the
board before the transaction occurs. This assessment should evaluate the
price set for the transaction, the independence of the parties involved,
and the appropriateness of the transaction for the fund, with respect to
the targeted rate of return. To reduce the scope for corrupt practices, the
prices and details of all transactions in illiquid assets should be disclosed
to fund members and the public.
Investment policies should respect exposure limits, too. To diversify
risk, funds should not invest more than 5 percent of their reserves in a
single asset and should not own more than 5 percent of the liabilities of
a given company. Respecting these rules reduces the influence that funds
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might have on corporate governance and thus reduces the possibility of
conflicts of interest.
Pension Fund Management in the Middle East and
North Africa Region 
None of the surveyed countries in the Middle East and North Africa
region complies with the best practices of governance, accountability,
and investment policies discussed in the previous section. In general,
there are no clear mandates for the governing body of the pension funds,
pension funds are not shielded from political pressure, investment poli-
cies tend to be opaque and do not respect guidance regarding risk expo-
sure, and disclosure and accountability to plan members is weak.
Current Practices in Governance 
Governance covers the mandate of the governing body, the process for
selecting the governing body and shielding it from political pressure,
mechanisms for minimizing corruption and fraud, and supervision.
Mandate of the Governing Body
Very rarely does the law establish the mandate of managing the fund in
the best interests of plan members. Pension funds often have mandates
that are not related to their core functions. In Egypt, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Lebanon, and Libya, for instance, the funds are ex-
plicitly mandated to finance economic and social development projects.
The Conseil National de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS-Djibouti) in Djibouti
and the Social Security Investment Unit (SSIU) in Jordan are the only
institutions within the sample that endow governing bodies with the
unique mandate of collecting contributions, paying benefits, and man-
aging the funds in the best interests of plan members.
Selecting the Governing Body and Shielding 
It from Political Pressure 
All of the pension funds under review have tripartite governing bodies
that are poorly shielded from political pressure. While the number of
governors varies, the composition in all cases includes representatives
from the government, plan members, and employers. None of the coun-
tries has specific criteria regarding the profile of members of the
governing body. As a result, selected members often lack the credentials
and experience to manage the fund in the best interests of plan members.
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Governments have a dominant representation, mainly through staff
from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, or
the central bank.
The chairman of the board is usually a representative of the head of
one of these institutions. The fact that the chairman of the governing
body and the director general are political appointees also creates high
turnover in the governing body and the management team. This is par-
ticularly problematic in the region, where cabinets are subject to fre-
quent reshuffling. These reshuffles are especially prevalent in Jordan
and Lebanon.
In the majority of cases, the director general of the pension fund is
appointed and removed by a high-level government official. In Djibouti,
the appointment and removal of the director general are made jointly by
the minister of labor and the minister of finance, although the president
can overrule them. In Libya, the director general of the Social Security
Fund is appointed by the prime minister without consultation. In the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the heads of the two pension funds are ap-
pointed by the equivalent of the minister of planning, who is also the
chairman of the governing bodies of the two institutions.
The main consequence of this type of arrangement is the emergence
of conflicts of interest between the government and plan members, which
impede effective control of corruption and fraud. There are many exam-
ples of such conflicts. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Civil Servants
Retirement Organisation (CSRO) and the Social Security Organization
(SSO) have recently signed an agreement accepting public companies—
often with dubious financial situations—as payment for part of the gov-
ernment debt with the fund. Both funds plan to keep some of these com-
panies and sell others after restructuring and recapitalization. De facto,
both funds have been transformed into government agencies to restruc-
ture and privatize public enterprises. In the case of the SSO, the trans-
ferred companies represent roughly 40 percent of reserves. This policy
benefits the government, but it is unlikely to benefit plan members.
Minimizing Corruption and Fraud
In general, responsibilities of the members of the governing body are
loose. Very rarely does the law establish the mandate of managing
the fund in the best interests of plan members. With the exception of the
SSIU in Jordan and the Caisse Marocaine de Retraite (CMR) in Morocco,
none of the laws creating the funds or the associated regulations clearly
specifies the responsibilities of board members. Only the SSIU defines in
general terms a code of conduct for staff and senior executives.
However, supervisory committees, investment committees, and audit
committees are common, but their structure is likely to reduce their
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effectiveness. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, both the CSRO and the
SSO have investment and audit committees, but these are formed
mainly by representatives of the government, managers of key compa-
nies owned by the funds, and senior members of the management team
of the funds. The CMR in Morocco has an investment committee that
determines internal rules, a placement committee that implements in-
vestment policies, and a supervisory committee that assesses perform-
ance, ensures that the implementation of the investments conforms to
strategy, and ensures compliance with prudential rules. The supervisory
committee, however, reports mainly to the minister of finance and in-
cludes three members from that institution. Moreover, the Ministry of
Finance mandates the CMR to keep close to 90 percent of its reserves in
government debt.
Weak governance also reflects weak administrative capacity. All funds
define the organic structure of the agency and the functions of the
different departments, but they do not evaluate the performance of the
various units and their staff or implement quality control processes.
With a few exceptions (for example, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Morocco), information technology support systems are underdeveloped.
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, even senior management has difficulty
obtaining an integrated view of the allocation of assets and their
performance.
Supervision
There is no explicit framework for regulation and supervision in any of
the countries surveyed. Pension funds usually fall under the umbrella of
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs or the Ministry of Finance (this
is always the case in schemes for the military and civil servants). These
ministries have representatives on the boards of the pension funds. Only
in Morocco is the regulator for the insurance industry, which is within
the Ministry of Finance, also in charge of monitoring all mandatory
schemes. 
Current Practices in Accountability
Accountability covers the disclosure of governance structures and re-
sponsibilities, the disclosure of policy making and performance, and the
creation of incentives, rewards, and sanctions.
Disclosing Governance Structures and Responsibilities 
All pension funds in the region make public the information regarding
the structure of the governing body, which is part of the law. However,
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the rules for nominating members, other than government repre-
sentatives, as well as their specific responsibilities to the board are not
transparent.
Disclosing Policy Making and Performance 
Little information is made available to the public regarding the decision-
making process within the governing bodies. For instance, none of the
funds reports making public the minutes of the meetings of the govern-
ing body.
The main weakness, however, relates to reporting procedures and
investment policies. All funds publish annual reports describing their
financial situation, but these often are subject to significant delays, and
the information tends to be neither relevant nor sufficient. For instance,
with the exception of Bahrain, none of the reports reviewed contains suf-
ficient information about investment strategies and outcomes.3 In the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the annual reports are prepared for the gov-
erning body and other government institutions; the public does not have
access to them. The publications that are targeted to the public take
more the form of an advertising brochure listing the various activities in
which the pension funds are involved.
Benchmarking of performance and independent auditing are insuffi-
cient, and the results are not properly disclosed. Overall, no clear crite-
ria for benchmarking the operations and performance of pension funds
have been defined yet. 
In all cases, periodic audits and evaluations of investments are required,
but these often are not executed by independent agencies. With the
exception of Algeria, all pension funds conduct periodic actuarial valua-
tions, either internal or external, but the results often are kept confiden-
tial. Only in Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco do the pension funds report
making use of external auditors who disclose the results of these valua-
tions automatically. In the other countries, the auditors are government
agencies or specialized departments within the institutions that adminis-
ter the funds. Even in Jordan, where efforts have been made to improve
transparency, the results of the actuarial valuations are not published or
made publicly available. This situation impedes good governance and
creates an additional avenue for the emergence of conflicts of interest.
This lack of transparency is likely to be amplified by, in general, lim-
ited understanding of plan members regarding the finances and func-
tioning of the pension fund. In this context, information asymmetries are
exacerbated, and the main stakeholders (contributors and beneficiaries)
have limited ability to safeguard their interests. This reduces the incen-
tives of managers to make policy decisions in the best interests of plan
members.
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Creating Incentives, Rewards, and Sanctions 
The incentives of fund managers are not aligned with the interests of
plan members in any of the countries surveyed. The delineation of
responsibilities between the governing body and the management team
is often blurred. This is evident in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan,
and Libya, where the managing director is also the chair of the govern-
ing body, which also includes other senior managers. In none of the cases
does the governing body have the power to elect and remove the man-
aging director, who is appointed directly by the government. Remuner-
ation policies are not set by the governing bodies and are not linked to
the performance of the management team. Mechanisms for rewarding
good performance and penalizing bad judgment are lacking. The fact
that the governing body does not appoint and remove the general man-
ager of the fund also reduces incentives to respond to board policies.
Current Practices in Investment Policy
In the large majority of cases, investment policy is set on an ad hoc basis.
Few funds attempt to define a coherent strategy that sets targets for ac-
ceptable levels of risk, expected rates of return, and asset allocations that
match the maturity of liabilities. With few exceptions, there are no ex-
plicit mechanisms to assess and manage risks, and exposure limits in in-
vestments are not respected. The resulting investment policies are risky,
with many funds overexposed to explicit and implicit public debt as well
as direct investment in companies, which interferes with corporate gov-
ernance. Lending to plan members and investments in real estate (and
management of real estate property) are also widespread. Clearly, non-
existent or shallow and narrow capital markets constrain investment
choices over the medium term (see chapter 2). Still, with the exception
of the Caisse Interprofessionnelle Marocaine de Retraite (CIMR) and
the Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) in Morocco, which outsource
the management of reserves, the majority of funds remain large players
in these markets, which can discourage private investors. Some of these
issues are illustrated next by reviewing investment policies in Egypt, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and Morocco.
In Egypt, all surpluses of the pension funds are invested in the
National Investment Bank (NIB). Today, 63 percent of the NIB’s liabil-
ities are with the pension funds (see table 5.1). By law, the NIB finances
the government’s capital expenditures. In fact, the government is man-
dated to borrow from the NIB at a predetermined interest rate, which is
currently above market levels (see figure 5.2). Interest paid on this debt
accounts for 40 percent of revenues of the pension funds (see World
Bank 2005c). When employer contributions and other transfers are
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included, the government is basically providing 80 percent of the rev-
enues of the funds, which are generating a surplus of 6 percent of GDP.
This surplus is deposited back into the NIB. This practice is contrary to
the more common case, where governments consider pension funds to
be a low-cost source of funding. In Egypt, the current arrangement
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Figure 5.2  NIB and Market Interest Rates in Egypt, 1979–2000
TABLE 5.1
Balance Sheet of the National Investment Bank in Egypt, 2002–4 
Percent
Item 2002 2003 2004
Assets
Government 46.8 45.1 43.6
Economic authorities 19.4 18.2 17.5
Other investments 10.1 10.3 13.8
Soft loans 2.5 2.3 2.1
Public companies 6.5 7.0 7.4
Joint venture companies 0.7 0.6 3.8
Other investments 0.4 0.5 0.4
Bank deposits 1.2 3.2 1.3
Other 22.5 23.2 23.8
Liabilities
Social security funds 63.6 63.6 63.7
Investment certificates 23.2 22.5 21.7
Development bonds (US$) 0.5 0.6 0.6
Post office savings 7.0 8.1 9.0
Other 0.5 0.7 0.7
Other debt 5.1 4.5 4.3
Source: National Investment Bank (NIB).
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increases financing costs. In principle, this situation could be considered
ideal for the pension fund, but it is unlikely to be sustainable in the long
run. Close to 70 percent of the portfolio of the NIB is made of public
debt (table 5.1). Ultimately, the liabilities of the NIB are a direct re-
sponsibility of the government. Given these circumstances, it might be
more appropriate to consider the NIB not as an entity with an au-
tonomous balance sheet but rather as a liability line in the general
budget. At the same time, any reform program of the Egyptian pension
system should aim at keeping the implicit debt of the scheme in the form
of explicit government debt (see the discussion in chapter 4).
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, investment policies for both the SSO
and the CSRO are highly complex and risky. The SSO has become a
large industrial conglomerate with considerable market power in several
economic sectors, which can impede private sector development and
interfere with corporate governance. Up to 1976, the SSO invested its
cash reserve fund in the Worker’s Welfare Bank in the form of fixed
deposits. After creation of the Social Security Fund in 1976, the SSO
started to diversify its investment activities, but by 1989 close to 80 per-
cent of the portfolio was still composed of long-term deposits. By 2000,
however, the share of deposits had dropped to 10 percent, while the
share of indirect and direct investment had increased to 27 and 43 per-
cent, respectively, or 70 percent of the total portfolio. The companies
owned by the SSO (directly and through its investment company,
Shasta) produce 43 percent of pharmaceutical and hygienic products,
36 percent of cement, 35 percent of televisions, 25 percent of fireproofing
products, 31 percent of refrigerators and freezers, and 35 percent of rub-
ber. The SSO is one of the most active investors in the stock exchange,
with 11.3 percent of market capitalization in 2001. In addition, the SSO
invests in government securities, provides financial support for public
construction projects, accords liquidity to the banking system, and gives
financial assistance to pensioners and contributors (for example, housing
loans, marriage aid) at subsidized interest rates (see figure 5.3).
Clearly, the SSO has expanded its mandate too far, rendering it diffi-
cult for managers to assess the performance of investment policies and
to implement corrective measures when necessary. Beyond problems
of governance and disclosure, it is unclear whether the SSO has the
resources (human and physical) to monitor effectively the operations of
the large number of companies it owns directly or indirectly through
Shasta. Since the managing directors of the companies know the limita-
tions of the monitoring system, they are more willing to take risks. Some
SSO staff have observed, for instance, that the managing directors of
the companies often present unrealistic cost-benefit analyses to justify
additional investments. During implementation, results usually diverge
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dramatically from predictions and yet are approved during the meetings
of the General Assembly. Another problem with the direct management
of several corporations is that considerable resources need to be allo-
cated to deal with administrative problems.
Other SSO activities, such as housing projects, lending to the corpo-
rate sector (including its own companies), and subsidized lending to ben-
eficiaries, also incur administrative problems that divert the attention of
the board and create conflicts of interest. A pension fund that concen-
trates on collecting contributions, paying benefits, and allocating invest-
ments does not need to consume resources for other activities. The
Department of Economic, Investment, and Planning Affairs is currently
proposing to break Shasta into smaller holdings that are more special-
ized but that would respond to the same governance structure. This is
unlikely to bring sizable improvements in management, since incentives
would remain unchanged.
The CSRO pursues two types of investment activities: direct invest-
ments, which are executed by the Department of Investments and
Economic Affairs of the CSRO, and indirect investments, which are
executed by the newly created investment company. Direct investments
refer to investments in companies (that is, equity positions) that do not
take place through the stock market. The level of CSRO ownership in
these companies varies from 100 percent of assets, as in the case of a
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construction company, to less than 13 percent. Companies where CSRO
ownership exceeds 50 percent of assets are managed directly. In compa-
nies where the CSRO owns between 13 and 50 percent of the assets,
CSRO has representatives on the board of directors, and in companies
where ownership is below 13 percent, the CSRO has no representation.
Direct investment activities have intensified with the recent transfer of
public companies to cover part of the government debt with the fund.
Looking forward, however, the strategy is to prioritize indirect invest-
ment activities through the investment company, which was created to
manage investments in the stock market. It currently has assets equiva-
lent to 5 percent of total reserves (see table 5.2). In practice, fund
managers have a very narrow margin of maneuver in which to reallocate
assets and improve rates of return. To give the company some degree of
autonomy from the CSRO, the investment company was created with its
own “supreme council.” However, its supreme council is composed of
the same members as the supreme council of the CSRO. There is no
information about company-specific investment policies or strategies,
except that investments cannot be above 15 percent of the capital of
a given company (to avoid involvement in decision making) and
that, above a given threshold, approval is required from the board of
directors.
In Jordan, important reforms have recently taken place with the
creation of the SSIU. The SSIU was established as an entity with its
own board of directors, which has a classic tripartite structure (that is,
representatives of government, employees, and the private sector).
Three of the seven members are representatives of the Social Security
Corporation (SSC), including the director general. The design of the
SSIU’s organizational structure has been completed, and the majority of
TABLE 5.2
Structure of Reserves of the CSRO in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 2001 
Category Amount (millions of US$) Percent
Companies transferred by the government 500 19.60
Investment company 125 4.90
Construction company 37 1.45
Long-term deposits 25 0.98
Government bonds 63 2.45
Loans 1 0.04
Government arrears, including interest and penalties 1,800 70.57
Total 2,551
Share of GDP 3.29
Source: Authors’ calculations based on interview with the head of the Investment Department.
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personnel have been hired. The hiring process has been conducted on
the basis of detailed descriptions of functions, skills, and required quali-
fications for each of the positions. Candidates were selected through a
highly competitive process. Personnel were not transferred automati-
cally to the SSIU from the former investment unit within the SSC.
The SSIU has prepared a statement of investment policy that follows
internationally accepted principles and practices regarding investments.
The statement emphasizes two principles of investing: (a) long-term
investment and (b) diversification. It states that investment policies will
be conducted with the main objective of benefiting plan members.
Although SSIU investments could contribute to the development of the
financial sector in Jordan, this is considered a by-product of investment
policies. The statement also emphasizes adherence to a strict code of
ethics, which forbids SSIU staff from taking advantage of information
gained in the execution of their function for their personal benefit. It
also forbids speculative investments and investment practices such as
short sales, complex derivatives, use of leverage, or speculation in for-
eign currencies. It calls for periodic evaluation and benchmarking of
performance. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of research and ed-
ucation: in particular, continuous training for staff and the systematic
evaluation of the various investment strategies that are implemented to
identify those that work, those that do not, and why.
After the reforms, which took place in 2001, the SSC portfolio moved
more aggressively into equities, while the share of real estate and of
loans and bonds was reduced considerably (see figure 5.4). Bank deposits,
100
Pe
rc
en
t
Source: Calculations based on data provided by the SSIU. 
Figure 5.4  Composition of the Portfolio of the SSC in Jordan,
1980–2002
80
60
40
20
0
1980 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1996 2000 20021982 19981994
90
70
50
30
10
Real estate
Equities
Loans and bonds
Bank deposits
156 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
however, continue to capture more than 40 percent of reserves. This can
be risky, as all deposits are treated as a single account and thus insured at
only JD 10,000. The main challenge is to develop and implement ade-
quate outsourcing policies. Currently, the SSC remains a large player in
a shallow capital market (see chapter 2). This can interfere with corpo-
rate governance and discourage the participation of other investors.
In Lebanon, the institution that runs the End-of-Service-Indemnity
Program for Private Sector Workers (NSSF) has a tripartite board and an
investment committee. The board is nominated for a period of four years.
The investment committee is chaired by the general director of the NSSF
and has as members a general manager from the Ministry of Finance, the
general manager of accounting in the NSSF, and 11 members of the
tripartite board. The chair of the investment committee is a political
appointee, so there is little continuity, with frequent changes in govern-
ment. The responsibilities of the investment committee of the NSSF are
very limited. The present rule is that pension assets have to be invested
50 percent in bank deposits and 50 percent in government bonds. The
Accounting Department of the NSSF makes decisions regarding the
allocation of these assets among the different maturities. Investments in
other types of instruments are prohibited according to the current rules.
Table 5.3 provides details regarding the maturity of instruments in the
two categories of investments and the average nominal interest rate
earned. This investment strategy precludes the efficient diversification of
risk, in particular through investment in long-term instruments.
In Libya today, no governing body is in place. The chairman of the
Social Security Fund is nominated by the prime minister and his cabinet
and has discretion in setting investment policies. In practice, the
TABLE 5.3
Distribution of NSSF Assets in Lebanon, 2002, 2003
Percent
Average nominal 
Type of investment and maturity Total portfolio Allocation interest earned
Bank deposits, 2003 50
3 months 25.0 8.52
6 months 39.6 8.66
12 months 35.5 8.86
Government bonds, 2002 50
3 months 0
6 months 0
12 months 0
24 months 100.0 14.14
36 months 0
Source: NSSF.
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decisions are subject to approval by the Ministry of Finance. The result
is that the largest share of reserves, around 64 percent, is allocated to
government debt, which is often not explicit (see table 5.4). For instance,
26 percent of this debt is related to arrears in the payment of military
pensions, which are supposed to be financed directly by the government.
No interest is recognized on this debt. Other sources of investments are
hotels, resorts, and real estate, which capture 25 percent of reserves. The
hotels and resorts are managed by administrative companies also owned
by the SSF. Finally, the SSF has full ownership of companies operating
in the sport garment, pharmaceuticals, and maintenance sectors. The
managers report that the company in the sport garment business is not
operating but that employee continue to be paid. Nonetheless, these
companies represent less than 3 percent of total assets.
In Morocco, the public pension fund managers have a reasonable insti-
tutional capacity, but performance is compromised by the lack of inde-
pendence from the government. The funds of the CMR are managed
through an internal investment unit. This unit has three committees:
(a) the investment committee, which provides the investment strategy
based on the planned financial needs and market conditions, fixes the
short-term investment objectives, and assesses performance; (b) the
placement committee, which proposes the placement policy to the invest-
ment committee, implements the investment strategy, taking into
consideration market conditions, and reports on performance; and
(c) the supervisory committee, which assesses performance, controls the
conformity of the implementation of investments with the strategy,
TABLE 5.4
Distribution of Reserves of the Social Security Fund in Libya,2002
Category Assets (LD) Total share (percent)
Hotels and resorts 268,055,302 9.1
Administration and maintenance companies 12,225,000 0.4
Factories and sport garment 3,000,000 0.1
Medical services 3,000,000 0.1
Maintenance company 500,000 0.0
Hotels and resorts 3,000,000 0.1
Administration, east region 2,000,000 0.1
Administration, Hotel Almahari 725,000 0.0
Real estate 350,000,000 11.9
Investment in companies 57,486,624 1.9
Other machinery and factories 12,459,000 0.4
Bank deposits 214,100,000 7.3
Government debt 1,601,329,395 54.2
Military pensions 424,349,470 14.4
Total 2,952,229,791 100.0
Source: Social Security Fund.
158 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
ensures compliance with prudential rules, and sends proposals on in-
vestment policy and strategy to the Ministry of Finance, if necessary.
The unit has competent personnel, but intervention on the part of the
Ministry of Finance has placed excessive restrictions on investments, in-
cluding the use of these funds as a quasi-captive source of financing for
the public sector. Indeed, the minimum requirement for investments in
government securities recently was increased from 80 to 88 percent of
the portfolio; the remainder can be invested in securities listed on au-
thorized exchanges and in real estate. Ineligible assets, among others, are
foreign assets, mortgages, bonds, and investment funds. The CMR uses
acceptable exposure limits, which are 10 percent per issue or issuer.
The CDG manages the funds of the scheme for private sector work-
ers (CNSS-Morocco) and the scheme for contractual workers (RCAR).
The CDG has built an impressive structure, with highly qualified staff;
however, it is not fully independent from the government, and its gover-
nance, accountability, and investment policy do not meet modern good
practices. The CDG does not charge management fees on market-based
investments (the RCAR and the CNSS-Morocco mutual funds). In the
case of the deposit account with the CNSS-Morocco, which earns a fixed
interest rate, it charges 0.7 percentage point. The CDG implements the
investment policy of each fund through its own investment management
unit. In 2002, it outsourced only DH 3 billion out of DH 30 billion in
funds to two fund managers. It is not allowed to invest abroad and has
one investment committee per portfolio. It uses its own fund managers
and does not seek the advice of external experts or investors. The CDG
participates in the shareholder general assemblies of the corporations in
which it has invested. In addition, it is a dominant player in the securi-
ties market, which has the ability to discourage the participation of other
institutional investors. The CDG holds about 25 percent of govern-
ment bonds, 20 percent of corporate bonds, and 30 percent of mortgage
bonds and represents only 5 percent of stock market capitalization (see
table 5.5). This high concentration on the demand side could create
TABLE 5.5
Portfolio Allocation of CDG
Assets in Morocco, 2003
Percent 
Type of investment Portfolio allocation 
Government bonds 25
Corporate bonds 20
Mortgage bonds 30
Source: CDG.
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uncertainties in market behavior and discourage the participation of pri-
vate investors. Further uncertainties could result from the fact that the
CDG is both the market maker for public debt and a fund manager.
Improving the Management of Public Pension Funds:
Constraints and Opportunities 
This section starts by examining some of the constraints that limit the
ability of Middle East and North African countries to adopt the set of
good practice principles for pension fund management outlined in this
chapter. It then highlights areas where even marginal changes could lead
to better governance and management. The chapter closes with specific
recommendations regarding investment opportunities.
Limitations on Better Governance and Better Management 
In order to make realistic recommendations to improve governance and
management in the Middle East and North African countries, it is
important to understand local institutional and economic constraints.
These constraints come from four main sources: (a) a legal framework
that makes the application of best-practice models difficult, (b) gover-
nance problems at the macro level, (c) limited administrative and insti-
tutional capacity, and (d) the level of development of financial markets.
These are discussed below.
A first observation is that the best-practice models and principles for
improved management and governance have limited applicability in
Middle East and North African countries because they were constructed
based on the experience of developed countries founded on a legal sys-
tem of English common trust law. The principles discussed in the previ-
ous sections are based on practices observed in countries like Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, where the implicit responsibilities of the trustees for supervision
and good conduct stem from the very nature of English trust law (see
Clark 2004). The actions of the trustees and their ability to take on
responsibilities with discretion are crucial to the efficient provision of
pension benefits. Because code law traditions prevail among Middle East
and North African countries, the behavior and responsibilities of
trustees have to be codified. This process is inefficient and hinders
improvement of accountability and other governance processes.
A second observation is that progress on pension fund governance
needs to build on the level of governance in the whole economy, which
remains weak for the region. Most of the principles of good governance,
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accountability, and investment policy involve clear, high-quality rules
and regulations to enforce good behavior, control corruption, limit gov-
ernment interference, and ensure proper accountability.
Since the management of pension funds in Middle East and North
African countries is heavily linked to management in the public sector,
applying these principles successfully depends to a great extent on
political stability, accountability, effective government, regulatory
quality, control of corruption, and enforcement of the rule of law
throughout the economy. These factors are considered to be the main
indicators of good governance for the economy as a whole (see
Kaufmann and others 2003). Evidence suggests that many Middle East
and North African countries are located on the lower end of the interna-
tional distribution on most indicators (see figure 5.5). Therefore, rapid
progress toward better governance in pension fund management is
limited in the context of political instability, low accountability, and poor
regulatory quality.
Country’s percentile rank
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Source: Kaufmann and others 2003.
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Finally, there are economic constraints, the level of development of
financial markets being a critical one. As pointed out in chapter 2, debt
instruments and publicly traded equity instruments are available in most
Middle East and North African countries, but the supply is limited.
Stock exchanges exist in most countries reviewed in this report, but
financing through the stock exchange is marginal, and the number of
listed companies is very small. The insurance industry, and in particular
the life segment, remains small in most countries.
These incomplete or shallow financial markets pose an additional
constraint on good governance because they limit the availability of ap-
propriate structures for outsourcing pension administration functions to
independent and qualified third parties. For example, management of
pension assets cannot be outsourced to private parties such as specialized
securities or equities trading companies because such institutions do not
exist or are in an incipient stage of development. Furthermore, experi-
enced trustees and pension professionals are in very short supply even in
developed countries, and systemic problems of asymmetrical informa-
tion and moral hazard work against the efficacy of pension fund gover-
nance in all countries (see Clark 2004; Myners 2001).
Opportunities for Better Governance and Better Management
Even in the context of the limitations discussed earlier in this section,
there are real opportunities for all the Middle East and North African
countries to improve the governance and management of their pension
systems. The main argument is that, in the absence of drastic changes to
governance structures, reforms over the short term should focus on
(a) improving transparency, which involves mandating pension funds to
fully disclose their operations; (b) building technical capacity to design
investment policies and reducing constraints on investments; and
(c) where possible, promoting the outsourcing of fund management.
Practical recommendations in each of these areas are offered below.
Transparency
Governance of public pension funds in the region could be improved by
increasing transparency of management processes and stakeholder ac-
cess to information. These objectives could be achieved by combining
several measures, as follows.
First, public pension funds should issue formal mission statements to
focus the functional mandate of the scheme and explicitly list the cate-
gories of actions that would accomplish this mandate, while promoting
the best interests of stakeholders. Even if a mission statement does not
have immediate practical implications, it would significantly improve
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transparency because it states explicitly the connection between the in-
terests of stakeholders and the mandate and role of administrators in
pursuing them.
Second, it is desirable to review internal regulations or procedures
in order to define clear responsibilities and benchmarks for each of the
three main functions performed by a pension fund: administration
(that is, collection of contributions, custody of assets, and protection of
contributions); determination of benefit eligibility; and management of
assets. This potentially could be achieved, even in countries where
governance bodies are not separated from management bodies, by
making use of internal committees, specialized in the main functional
activities of the fund. This could significantly improve the accounta-
bility and transparency of management processes. An example to that
effect is the CMR in Morocco, where operations are managed inter-
nally by different committees with specific functional responsibilities,
specified in detailed internal regulations. The draft law on public pen-
sions in the West Bank and Gaza is another example of the use of spe-
cialized committees as a tool for improving transparency and efficiency
of the management processes for public pension assets. The draft law
mandates the establishment of an audit committee and an investment
committee, with detailed responsibilities and reporting requirements
(see box 5.1).
Third, transparency and stakeholder access to information could be
improved by setting up a routine of standardized reporting to all stake-
holders and to the supervisory and regulatory entities. Basic reporting
requirements within the pension fund include annual financial reports
prepared by the management entity for the board of directors of the
pension fund;4 internal audit reports of accounting and asset valuation
procedures, giving preference to market or mark-to-market proce-
dures; audit reports prepared by external, independent auditors for the
managing entity; and investment reports prepared by the investment
entity for the managing entity. Disclosure of information to members is
also very important. In the Middle East and North Africa region, there
is much room for improvement in this area, since mandatory reporting
is scarce.
Finally, transparency and governance would improve if countries
would put management processes under mandatory supervision by a
third-party entity. Best-practice examples delegate authority for supervi-
sion either to specialized entities or to financial market supervisors, such
as the central bank, insurance supervisor, or security market supervisor.
Delegating supervisory authority to the financial market supervisor
would be most advisable for Middle East and North African countries
because it would draw on existing technical capacity in these institutions
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BOX 5.1
Provisions of the Draft Law on the Public Pension Scheme in the 
West Bank and Gaza
The West Bank and Gaza has an ambitious draft law for the public pension scheme that
dedicates an entire chapter to governance and management of pensions. The provisions
proposed by this draft law are in line with international best practices in pension fund
governance and management. According to the draft law, the pension fund will have a
multipartite board of directors that is nominated by the prime minister, at the recom-
mendation of an independent nomination committee that is multipartite as well. There
are clear provisions regarding the obligations and responsibilities of the members of the
board of directors, including the obligation to adopt an investment policy. Management
of the pension fund will be undertaken by a general manager, who will oversee imple-
mentation and management of individual accounts for participants, accounting of con-
tributions and benefits, and reporting to participants and the governing board. The draft
law states expressly the annual obligation to prepare detailed financial reports for the
board and to undertake actuarial valuations every two years. An audit committee and an
investment committee will carry out the regulations and functions stipulated by the law. 
The main responsibilities of the audit committee are as follows: (a) oversee the selec-
tion process for an independent external auditor and recommend an auditor for ap-
pointment by the board, (b) order that an audit be performed at the end of each finan-
cial year, (c) receive and review the audit report and accompanying financial statements,
(d) discuss with the auditor the methodology used and the findings, (e) present a report
to the board on the results of the audit and a letter to management, (f ) make recom-
mendations to the board for improving weaknesses in accounting and associated internal
controls, and (g) review the activities and results of the internal auditor quarterly. 
The main responsibilities of the investment committee are as follows: (a) oversee de-
velopment of investment guidelines for consideration by the board, (b) recommend in-
vestment options for consideration by the board, (c) oversee the criteria for selecting a
custodian and asset manager and make recommendations regarding their appointments,
(d) undertake quarterly reviews of portfolio allocations and investment returns using ap-
propriate indicators of performance, and (e) periodically review the asset management
operations of the fund.
The assets of the pension fund are entrusted to an independent custodian that has at
least 15 years of experience and is licensed within the jurisdiction of an internationally
recognized regulatory authority of well-established and widely acknowledged expertise
as a supervisory agent. Investment of assets is done by an asset manager that is subject to
similarly strict criteria and has to comply with a full disclosure policy regarding fees and
transaction costs. These requirements ensure that the custodian and the asset manager
are recognized international institutions with substantial experience in the field. 
These new legislative efforts seek to reform weak governance structures that lack
internal resources and infrastructure. The success of implementing the draft law remains
to be seen, but the effort to devise a solution to improve governance and management is
commendable.
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and add an additional layer of protection against discretionary interven-
tions of the government. Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia could make
significant progress in this direction since they have the opportunity to
capitalize on the positive developments that have taken place in their fi-
nancial markets with regard to growth of the banking sector and efforts
to strengthen the financial regulatory environment (see chapter 2).
Progress toward implementing these measures could be achieved
gradually within the existing framework, without a major redesign of
the system providing retirement income. If successfully implemented,
these measures would improve both internal and external transparency
of the management process, therefore improving accountability and
stakeholder voice. Such developments would reduce the opportunities
for discretionary government interventions, directly addressing the most
serious threats to governance for the countries in the Middle East and
North Africa region.
Capacity to Design and Implement Investment Policies
Pension fund management could be improved by strengthening the
capacity to design and implement investment policies and by defining
explicit investment strategies. Investment strategies should be designed
and executed by investment committees composed of qualified profes-
sionals, with the only objective being to benefit plan members. The
SSIU in Jordan is a good example.
Investment committees should be able to assess the investment op-
portunities available in both domestic and international markets and
tailor portfolio allocation to the specific characteristics of the pension
fund they are advising. Expectations regarding targeted rates of return
and risk exposure should be consistent with the interests of members and
beneficiaries.
Pension funds should issue investment statements or policies that,
given estimated future liabilities, define investment objectives and, in
particular, the risk tolerance of the portfolio and the expected rate of
return. Investment policies should include explicit standards and proce-
dures regarding limitations on allowable asset classes, concentration of
ownership, issuer, risk, and type of financial instruments. The focus
must be on long-term investment and diversification. Investment state-
ments could also prohibit unauthorized use of pension assets to finance
budget deficits, lend funds to employees, or invest in various economic
or social development projects. It is very important that the statement of
investment policies define benchmarks against which the performance of
investment policies can be evaluated. 
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Countries should also pursue opportunities to outsource the manage-
ment of part of the funds. It is essential to promote outsourcing under
contracts with clear investment strategies and benchmarks. Countries
where management capacity is limited or not available at the local level
(for example, Djibouti, Iraq, Libya, the West Bank and Gaza, and the
Republic of Yemen) should consider foreign managers. Outsourcing
should be pursued through public bids, and the funds should monitor
outsourced fund managers and assess their long-term performance. The
outsourced contracts could be terminated in cases where the contractor
does not comply with the agreed upon conditions, including perform-
ance relative to benchmarks. In order to preserve market competition
and transparency, no fund manager, including the in-house operation,
should manage resources in excess of 5 percent of the country’s total fi-
nancial resources (the aggregate of money, quasi-money, and bond and
stock market capitalization). The funds should delegate the representa-
tion on corporate boards, including decisions on voting, to outsourced
fund managers.
Investment Opportunities
These vary across countries, depending on the level of development of
the financial sector (see chapter 2). In general, given poorly developed
stock markets, the main sources of potential investments will continue
to be (a) direct investments in companies, (b) loans to plan members,
(c) public debt, (d) bank deposits, (e) real estate, and (f ) foreign assets.
Exceptions are Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, where listed equities and
collective investment schemes could capture between 15 and 30 percent
of pension reserves. The main issues to consider when investing in these
asset classes are as follows:
• Direct investments in companies. Direct investments can be risky, par-
ticularly when the funds have majority ownership and are involved di-
rectly in management (for example, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, and Libya). Countries are encouraged to minimize this type of
investment and certainly not to interfere with corporate governance:
management of companies is not a function of pension funds.
• Loans to plan members. While most pension funds face strong pressure
to offer loans to plan members (for instance, loans for housing), such
loans entail high administrative costs and excessive risks to the sys-
tem. Moreover, if public pension funds are to provide adequate in-
come replacement for retirement, they should be exposed to a set of
risks that are as different as possible from those that members face
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during their working life. Therefore, this type of investment should
be discouraged. When it occurs, rules, including selection proce-
dures, should be transparent, and no implicit or explicit subsidies
should be involved.
• Public debt. Government debt continues to be an important compo-
nent of the portfolio of most pension funds. This debt is not always
explicit; it simply is related to arrears in contributions or loans that
have not been documented properly (for example, Algeria, Djibouti,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Libya). In all countries, the supply
of treasury bills and tradable public bonds is low relative to the size
of the total explicit government debt, and governments are encour-
aged to review the structure and maturity of this debt. Over the short
term, an effort should be made to make explicit part of the implicit
debt with the pension funds and to ensure that this debt is remuner-
ated appropriately. Morocco, where the government recently issued
tradable bonds to cover its debt with the scheme for civil servants
and the military, is an example to follow. In countries without a core
of sound banks (for example, Djibouti and the Republic of Yemen),
explicit public debt is likely to be the most promising source of in-
vestment over the short and medium terms. In any case, public debt
should not be imposed on pension funds. The demand for this asset
class should respond to the objectives set in the statement of invest-
ment policies.
• Bank deposits. In countries with a core of sound banks (for example,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), public debt can play a less
prominent role, while long-term bank deposits capture the largest
share of the nonequity portfolio. Clearly, in cases where the banking
sector is overexposed to government debt, bank deposits will not be
a substitute.
• Investments in real estate. Real estate investments are likely to remain
important for most countries. These should not involve the manage-
ment of hotels or office buildings but rather should focus on actual
real estate. Because investing in illiquid assets creates opportunities
for corruption, clear procedures for purchasing and disposing of these
assets should be approved by the board. By the same token, inde-
pendent assessors should value these assets at least once a year.
• Foreign assets. To improve risk diversification, pension funds should
be allowed to invest part of their portfolio abroad (for example, in
treasury bills or indexes). An interesting initiative in this area comes
from the West Bank and Gaza, where a significant component of
pension assets is expected to be invested abroad.
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Conclusions
The region faces a compelling challenge in improving governance and
management outcomes for public pension funds. Indeed, the examina-
tion of governance structures and management of public pension fund
systems in the Middle East and North Africa region reveals a serious gap
when compared with best international standards and practices for good
governance and sustainable management.
However, structural constraints might continue to hinder progress.
These include (a) a legal framework that makes the applicability of best-
practice models difficult, (b) governance problems at the macro level,
(c) limited administrative and institutional capacity, and (d) the level of
financial sector development. Major changes in governance and admin-
istrative structures are unlikely to be feasible in the current context. 
Nevertheless, there are encouraging stories. Recent progress in
Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza in improving governance and man-
agement of their pension systems suggest that there are real opportuni-
ties to make changes that will have a large positive impact.
Governance overall would benefit significantly from increased trans-
parency of management processes and stakeholder access to informa-
tion. Feasible actions include mission statements, internal regulations
that define management responsibilities, routine standardized reporting
to stakeholders and regulators, and independent supervision of public
pension funds.
Pension fund management could be improved by strengthening the
capacity to design and implement investment policies. Countries need to
invest in teams of qualified professionals to manage their pension funds.
There should be clear guidelines for investment policies that, given
estimated future liabilities, define investment objectives, including the
risk tolerance of the portfolio and expected rates of return. Asset alloca-
tions should respect clearly defined exposure limits. In particular,
pension funds should not be involved in the direct management of com-
panies; in financial, economic, or social development projects; or in
lending to plan members. Finally, there should be clearly defined bench-
marks to evaluate investment policies.
Finally, countries should actively pursue outsourcing the manage-
ment of part of the funds. Outsourcing contracts should be based on
clear investment strategies and benchmarks. In countries where man-
agement capacity is limited or not available at the local level, foreign
managers should be considered. Outsourcing should be pursued
through a process of public bids. In order to preserve market competi-
tion and transparency, no fund manager, including the in-house
operation, should manage resources in excess of 5 percent of the
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country’s total financial resources. Funds should delegate the represen-
tation on corporate boards, including decisions on voting, to outsourced
fund managers.
Notes
1. The only exception is the RCAR in Morocco.
2. All the issues and principles discussed in this section are based on
Carmichael and Palacios (2004) and Musalem and Palacios (2003).
3. This is likely to change in Jordan, where the SSIU is reviewing reporting
procedures.
4. A complete annual financial report should include the following: a balance
sheet, a statement of revenues and expenditures, a statement of change in net as-
sets, and a statement of investments.
Progress to Date and Prospects
CHAPTER 6
This final chapter assesses progress on pension reform across countries
in the non-gulf region of the Middle East and North Africa and explores
political and economic factors that could explain the observed differ-
ences. For discussion purposes, countries are organized into three groups.
The first group includes three countries, which are in the very early
stages of the reform process: Algeria, Libya, and Syria. The second
group involves the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Tunisia, and the
Republic of Yemen, where policy discussions are more advanced but
governments still have not arrived at a coherent reform strategy. The
third group refers to countries that are leading pension reform and have
either (a) developed detailed reform proposals and laws or (b) introduced
important structural reforms, even if only in parts of the pension system.
These countries are Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and
the West Bank and Gaza. The ensuing discussion is based on the work
and experience of various technical teams advising governments
throughout the Middle East and North Africa region on social protec-
tion and pension reform. The classification of countries is necessarily
subject to some degree of discretion on the part of the authors.
Countries in the Early Stages of Reform
In countries at the very early stages of reform, the challenges facing the
pension system are poorly understood and are not part of the govern-
ment’s agenda. Discussions of the issue remain enclosed within the
pension funds and probably the ministries in charge. These countries
have not undertaken an in-depth assessment of the financial situation of
the funds. Only Algeria and Libya are discussed here, but Syria, for
which scant information is available, also falls in this group.
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Algeria
The Algerian government, through the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, acknowledges that the pension sys-
tem and the social insurance system more generally are facing problems.
However, there has been no mandate to conduct an in-depth analysis of
the issues facing the pension system and initiate preparation of a reform
program. Recently, resources were mobilized to prepare an evaluation of
the financial situation of the pension funds. This task had been delayed
because poor record keeping made it difficult to generate the data
necessary to conduct the analysis. 
From discussions with technical staff and managers, there seems to be
a tendency to underestimate the magnitude of the problems facing the
Caisse Nationale des Retraites (CNR) and the Caisse d’Assurance
Sociales des Non-Salariés (CASNOS). The reasons for the lack of wide-
spread interest in pension reform are difficult to discern. Powerful
unions dominate labor negotiations and wage-setting policies in Algeria,
yet in Morocco, where labor unions are also important, the reform
process is considerably more advanced.
In Algeria, the pension system is sometimes perceived as a social as-
sistance program. Within this framework, the use of government trans-
fers to cover the deficits of the pension funds is considered appropriate.
The presence of high oil revenues might also reduce the incentives for
reform, as future pension payments might appear to be affordable. 
Libya
Discussions of pension reform in Libya are still not part of the broad policy
debate. This reflects, in part, the lack of information regarding problems
facing the fund. As in Algeria, the presence of oil revenues might reduce
the incentives to assess and correct the financial situation of the scheme. It
is interesting that, even with lax budget constraints, the government has
not been complying with its obligations toward the fund. Today, 70 percent
of the assets of the Social Security Fund are constituted by public debt,
which is often implicit (for example, arrears on contributions).
The newly appointed chairman of the Social Security Fund (SSF) is
undertaking a detailed assessment of the institution, including of its
medium- and long-term financial situation, and there seems to be a com-
mitment to introducing reforms to improve the management system,
information system, and investment policies as well as to controlling the
growth of implicit pension debt. The main constraint at this stage is the
lack of institutional capacity. Although the management team is highly
qualified, technical and support staff lack the necessary experience and
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qualifications to undertake this type of assessment. Serious problems
with record keeping (which is not centralized) further complicate prepa-
ration of the data necessary to conduct the analysis.
Countries in Motion
In countries in motion, the main challenges facing the pension system
have been diagnosed and various options for reform have been evalu-
ated, but the government does not yet have a strategic, unified vision as
to where the pension system is going. This group includes the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iraq, Tunisia, and the Republic of Yemen.
The Islamic Republic of Iran
Pension reform was not an issue of concern in Iran until 2002. In that
year, under the leadership of the Management and Planning Organiza-
tion (MPO), a technical team with representatives from the MPO and
the two main pension funds—the CSRO and the SSO—prepared a de-
tailed assessment of the main challenges facing the pension system and
explored options for reform.
In the same year, the MPO and the Ministry of Finance organized a
seminar to present the results of the assessment to a large audience that
included representatives of civil society. The event received broad media
coverage. The government also established a commission in charge of
preparing a multiyear program on pension reform. The work of this
commission provided input to the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan,
which now incorporates pensions and social security in general as an
important area for reform.
While an integrated reform program has failed to emerge, the policy
dialogue continues. Five groups or stakeholders are at play: the MPO,
the Ministry of Finance, the SSO, the CSRO, and a commission in
charge of social security reform within the Parliament. Both the CSRO
and the SSO favor the status quo and mostly seek reforms to improve
the financial situation of the funds and investment policies, although the
current proposals are not aligned with the recommendations presented
in chapter 4. 
Recently, a new Ministry of Social Welfare was put in place. This cre-
ates new opportunities for reforming the pension system and the social
protection system at large. Indeed, the new ministry has the mandate to
identify mechanisms to integrate or better coordinate dispersed social
programs and to prepare a strategy for pension reform. One of the op-
tions under discussion is the gradual merger of the CSRO and the SSO. 
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Iraq
Iraq is, of course, in a unique position. After the end of major military
operations, the Coalition Provisional Authority replaced regular pensions
with emergency “flat” payments that are now capturing an estimated
3.5 percent of GDP (estimated 5 percent in 2006). At the same time, the
SSW reserves (ID 19 billion, less than half a percentage point of GDP)
were frozen in Al Rafaidin Bank (the central bank). Since then, emergency
payments have been supported by the state budget and represent a grow-
ing expenditure item. This has provided incentives to think about mech-
anisms to normalize the situation. The transitional government realizes,
however, that the Iraqi pension system has an opportunity to be fully
redesigned, instead of converging back to the old rules. The strategy’s
core is to move to an integrated system that is self-sustainable and built
on the basis of best international practices. The Ministry of Labor, in
coordination with the Ministry of Finance, is working on a draft law. At
the same time, the two pension funds have launched an evaluation of their
financial situation.
Yet important challenges lie ahead, as the war has disrupted financial
and information flows, leaving contribution records outdated and liqui-
dations severely backlogged. There are also significant administrative
problems regarding the payment of benefits, particularly in rural areas.
In the scheme for private sector workers, the system for tracking contri-
butions is weak, and underdeclaration of wages, evasion of payment, or
moratoria are pervasive.
Tunisia
In 2002, the Tunisian government completed a comprehensive and am-
bitious assessment of the pension system, which outlined various reform
options, including mechanisms to cover seasonal workers in the agricul-
tural sector and fishermen. A steering committee was put in place with
the task of preparing a reform strategy on the basis of recommendations
in the report. 
The strategy at this stage is to focus on implementing measures to
improve the financial sustainability of the pay-as-you-go system. Struc-
tural reforms will require further discussions and negotiations. 
The Republic of Yemen
Discussions of pension reform in the Republic of Yemen go back to the
late 1990s. Initially, the focus was on integrating the schemes for gov-
ernment employees and for private sector workers, which took place in
2000. The merger implied a transfer of pension liabilities from the civil
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service scheme, which is more mature and has higher wages, to the pri-
vate sector scheme. As a result, the merger was ultimately reversed, and
today both funds are pursuing reforms independently, without the
benefit of an integrated framework.
A recent actuarial valuation of the pension funds for private sector
workers presented several recommendations to improve the long-term
financial position of the system. There were also recommendations to
improve the management of reserves, although investment possibilities
remain limited. The fund is preparing a proposal to reform the relevant
law, but progress has been slow. The focus instead has been on building
institutional capacity and particularly on upgrading information systems.
Similarly, the scheme for government employees is introducing
legal amendments to increase retirement ages, the wage base, and the
minimum pension. No assessment of the financial situation of the
funds has been conducted. There also has been a series of initiatives to
improve administration (for instance, by reducing the time necessary to
process pensions from six months to one week) and to reduce costs.
These include decentralizing various activities to the 22 branches of
the fund and implementing an integrated management and informa-
tion system.
The challenge in the Republic of Yemen is to take an integrated and
long-term view of pension reform.
Countries Leading Pension Reform
In addition to solid analysis of the problems facing the schemes and the
outline of options for reform, countries in the lead have identified an in-
tegrated vision for the pension system, or are close to doing so, and have
implemented important reforms. This group includes Djibouti, Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza.
Djibouti
In 2002, the Djibouti Parliament adopted a comprehensive reform pro-
gram aimed at improving the financial position of the pension system,
integrating the CNR with the scheme for private sector workers (OPS),
and reviewing governance structures to strengthen investment policies.
The reform program included (a) a series of parametric adjustments to
reduce the mandate of the public system; (b) creation of the Conseil
National de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS-Djibouti) to integrate the OPS and
the CNR with a more independent governance structure; and (c) adop-
tion of a statement of investment policies that mandates the use of funds
174 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
in the sole interests of plan members and limits the types of asset classes
in which funds can be invested.
The motivation for reform was the frail financial situation of the
schemes, particularly the CNR, the large outlays to finance the pensions
of the military and civil servants, and the refusal by the OPS to retire
government contractual workers until government contributions were
normalized.
The minister of finance and the minister of labor led the design of the
reform program in coordination with the pension funds and were in
charge of creating consensus at various levels of the government and in
Parliament. The Office of the Prime Minister undertook the negotia-
tions with employees and retirees, and the directors of the CNR and the
OPS were in charge of the communication campaign through the media.
The leadership of the president was crucial in the final stages of parlia-
mentary negotiations. 
The challenges that Djibouti now faces are related to implementation
of the new laws, particularly with respect to the creation of the CNSS-
Djibouti, the implementation of appropriate administrative processes,
and the development of the necessary information systems. Current
benefit formulas and eligibility conditions, although improved, are still
not in line with best practices discussed in chapter 4. Moreover, the pen-
sion fund for the military has not been reformed and continues to be
open to new entrants. Thus its implicit pension debt continues to grow.
Finally, as the mandate of the public pension system is reduced over
time, it is necessary for other long-term savings instruments to develop
and for the government to prepare the necessary regulations. 
Egypt
During the last decade, several assessments of the Egyptian pension sys-
tem were conducted by international organizations, academics, and pri-
vate consulting companies. A recent report prepared by the Ministry of
Social Insurance summarizes the results of these studies and the recom-
mendations for reform (Egyptian Ministry of Social Insurance 2003).
The minister of social insurance, the minister of finance, and the
minister of investments have put pension reform high on their reform
agenda. The first two are responsible for the mandatory public compo-
nent, while the latter is responsible for the voluntary private component
(Egypt has around 600 occupational plans).
The government is currently working on the design of a new inte-
grated public health system and the rationalization of voluntary private
pensions. The general strategy is under discussion and a final draft is
expected by the end of the year.
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Jordan
Since 1995 pension reform in Jordan has been an important component
of the policy agenda of the government. Early efforts focused on the
civil service pension system, given its budgetary implications, and
resulted in the system’s closure to new entrants in January 1995. Subse-
quently, new civil servants have enrolled in the Social Security Corpora-
tion (SSC), along with employees from the private sector.
In 2002, under the leadership of the minister of finance, a reform pro-
gram for the military was prepared. The core of the proposal was to
close the military pension scheme to new recruits and to enroll them in
the SSC, while rationalizing the benefits offered to current military
personnel. Because military personnel are unlikely to retire at the same
age as other members of the SSC, this measure will be accompanied by
the creation of individual accounts to complement the SSC early-
retirement pension or to assist in the transition to private sector work.
The Council of Ministers adopted the reform program, and implemen-
tation started in 2003, although progress has been slow.
The focus of the government is now switching to the SSC, which
eventually will become the integrated pension system. So far, important
measures have been adopted to strengthen investment policies by creat-
ing a more autonomous investment unit, appropriately staffed, with a
clear mandate and statement of investment policies. In 2003, a detailed
assessment of the SSC was conducted, and several measures to
strengthen the system were recommended to the prime minister and his
cabinet. In parallel, the Ministry of Planning has been working with the
Insurance Commission to prepare the necessary regulatory framework
to allow life insurance companies to offer pension products. A draft
regulation is now under review by the industry.
An integrated reform program, however, remains elusive. To date,
discussions of pension reform have taken place with little or no coor-
dination among the various institutions involved. These include (a) the
SSC, ( b) the military and civil service pension funds, (c) the occupa-
tional plans, and (d) the insurance industry. Policy measures at these
four levels are interrelated. For instance, the mandate given to the SSC
regarding income replacement will depend on the choices regarding
the role of occupational plans and voluntary private pensions as
sources of complementary savings for old age. Similarly, the design of
individual accounts for military personnel joining the SSC will depend
on changes in benefit formulas and eligibility conditions implemented
by the SSC.
Hence the government is considering setting up a steering commit-
tee supported by a technical unit that would guide the preparation of a
multiyear, integrated pension reform program. The steering committee
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would be composed of representatives from key ministries as well as the
SSC and the Insurance Commission. The responsibilities of the steering
committee would be to define the principles to guide the reform of the
pension system (for example, the roles of the public and private sectors)
and create consensus regarding the general strategy. A technical unit,
composed of full-time, independent consultants and technical staff from
the represented institutions would (a) conduct the technical and analyt-
ical work necessary to operationalize the strategic guidelines provided by
the steering committee; (b) draft a multiyear reform program for the
pension system; (c) draft the necessary regulations to implement the
reform program; and (d) contribute to the design of information and
awareness campaigns. 
Lebanon
After seven years of analytical work and consultations, the Lebanese
government submitted to Parliament a draft law closing the current end-
of-service indemnity (EOSI) scheme to new entrants and creating a new
institution that will manage a fully funded, defined-contribution pension
system for private sector workers. Parliament recently approved this law,
marking the beginning of the first major systemic reform in the region.
Part of the motivation in Lebanon was the realization that the EOSI
program did not provide adequate protection for workers during old
age and operated poorly as an income protection system for workers.
Looking forward, the challenge now is to implement the law, ensuring
that the new institution meets the necessary standards of administration,
governance, accountability, and investment policy. There are also im-
portant questions to answer regarding transition mechanisms and the
financing of the fiscal impacts of reform. Indeed, the EOSI is likely to
have accumulated a substantial implicit debt that is not backed with
sufficient reserves. Moreover, the majority of reserves are invested in
government debt. A unique feature of the EOSI is that employers also
have an implicit liability toward plan members. Finding the appropriate
financing mechanisms of this implicit liability is another issue that will
require attention.
Regarding the schemes for civil servants and the military, the govern-
ment recently finalized an assessment of their financial situation. As
reported in chapter 3, the results are worrisome. A draft law that closes
these two schemes to new entrants is under consideration. New person-
nel are expected to join the newly created pension system for private sec-
tor workers. If this law is approved, Lebanon, like Jordan, will converge
to an integrated pension system.
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Morocco
The policy dialogue on pension reform in Morocco is very advanced, with
discussions going back at least to 1997. At the time, the prime minister
established the Comité de Suivi des Etudes Actuarielles (CSEA) to assess
the financial sustainability of the various funds and explore options for
reform. Five years later, in February 2002, the CSEA presented a report
to the prime minister that emphasized the worrisome financial position of
the various schemes and evaluated plausible strategies to redress the situ-
ation. The pension funds, too, have conducted independent assessments
of their financial situation and have proposed, and in some cases adopted,
measures to strengthen their systems, albeit with little or no coordination.
The most important reform achieved to date is the integration of various
large occupational plans within state-owned enterprises under the
Régime Collectif d’Assurance et de Retraite (RCAR).
The special feature of Morocco’s political strategy is the transparency
of the policy dialogue and the willingness of the government to create
consensus for reform with all segments of civil society. On December 16,
2003, the prime minister held a national conference on pension reform
that involved various representatives from civil society, including labor
unions. More than 200 participants attended, and the conference re-
ceived broad media coverage. The directors of the various pension funds
and the Ministry of Finance presented the main challenges facing the
system and outlined options for reform that were openly debated.
As a result of the discussions, two tripartite commissions were estab-
lished to pilot the reform program. One of the commissions is technical
in nature and has the mandate to validate the studies and assessments
conducted to date and to evaluate the financial, economic, and social im-
pacts of alternative reforms. The second commission has a political
role that consists of providing general strategic guidelines for reform on
the basis of the recommendations and proposals of the technical com-
mission. The predominant strategy arising from the discussions seems to
be two separate defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go schemes (one for civil
servants and one for private sector workers), but one integrated defined-
contribution, fully funded system.
The West Bank and Gaza
In the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Authority is well advanced
in its effort to reform the public sector pension system. The Palestinian
Authority first became aware of potential problems within the existing
system as early as 1997, when a report prepared by the Ministry of
Finance urged and recommended reforms. At the time, however, the
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Palestinian Authority took no action. Work began again in 2001 under
a new minister of finance. A more in-depth assessment of the pension
schemes was prepared that quantified, for the first time, the full extent
of the problem and set out possible scenarios for reform. It was recog-
nized that the large implicit pension debt threatened the fiscal sustain-
ability of the Palestinian government. International donors had been,
largely, financing civil service salaries since the start of the intifada, but
under the status quo the pension system’s cash flow would start showing
a negative balance within three to five years. In addition, the hope for
progress in reaching a peaceful settlement of the conflict with Israel in-
voked a sense of urgency to ratify the draft law on pensions for security
forces, since the security services, previously not covered by any pension
system, would be looking for the means of retiring older staff.
To develop and promote the reform agenda, the Palestinian cabinet
established a national pension committee under the chairmanship of the
minister of finance, made up of civil and security service officials, repre-
sentatives of the legislative council, and the judiciary. The draft public
sector pension law envisions a multipillar system, with defined-benefit
and defined-contribution components, managed by a new independent
institution. In addition, the committee is looking to introduce a “citizens
pension” to provide a basic level of support for all old-age Palestinians.
The Palestinians are also taking particular care to develop a new pension
agency to improve the governance and administrative structures and to
minimize the risks to pension assets.
If the legislature passes the reform, implementation could begin in
2005. Substantial assistance from the international donor community will
be required for financing the technical assistance to introduce the new
system and implement the transition from the existing systems. 
Conclusions
This short review displays countries in very different stages of the
reform process and following very different strategies toward reform.
Commonalties across the spectrum, nevertheless, highlight a few
patterns:
• In countries that are leading reform efforts, crises of civil servants’ and
military pension schemes have been an important motivation. This is the
case of Djibouti and Jordan as well as the West Bank and Gaza. It has
also been a push factor in Lebanon, although the lack of a proper pen-
sion system for private sector workers has been the main driver of re-
form. In Egypt, the fact that the implicit pension debt is matched by
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explicit debt with the National Investment Bank (close to 50 percent
of GDP) and that the government is already servicing this debt also
create incentives for reform.  
• Good analyses and diagnosis have also played an important role in putting
countries into motion. This is definitely the case in the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Jordan (in the case of the SSC), Morocco, and Tunisia. In all
these countries, discussions about pension reform within and outside
the government followed the publication of reports highlighting the
problems of the various pension schemes.  
• In all countries leading pension reforms, a high-level policymaker or institu-
tion has been driving the reform process. Basically, a person or a group of
persons understands the issues, takes the initiative to create awareness
about the need for change, proposes solutions, and generates consen-
sus for reform within the government. 
• In those countries lagging behind, these three elements are not present. In
Algeria and Libya, the availability of significant oil revenues might be
minimizing the magnitude of the financial problems facing the pen-
sion system and their threat to fiscal stability.  
Differences in the political process surrounding pension reforms are
evident in various countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, and
Morocco included the civil society in the policy dialogue from the out-
set. To this end, multisectoral commissions were put in place. Morocco
also took a comprehensive approach to reform, including all pension
funds and relevant institutions. On the contrary, in Djibouti, initially the
policy dialogue and preparation of the reform strategy took place with-
out consultations outside the government. Plan members were involved
only toward the end. No commission was set up to design the reform
program. In Jordan, the discussions are taking place within the SSC,
with little coordination with the various ministries and other relevant in-
stitutions (for example, the Insurance Commission). 
With regard to reform strategies, the inclination is to preserve, but
rationalize, defined-benefit schemes, while allowing voluntary pensions
to develop. There is, however, considerable variation in reform strate-
gies. Djibouti and Jordan have integrated earnings-related schemes,
and Jordan is also developing voluntary private pensions. Morocco is
considering two earnings-related schemes and one integrated fully
funded, defined-contribution scheme. Lebanon is proposing an inte-
grated defined-contribution scheme with a basic pension guarantee. A
similar approach is being taken in the West Bank and Gaza.
Challenges for the future are necessarily different in the three groups
of countries. Among the countries in the early stages of the reform
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process, the goal should be to prepare the necessary baseline data to
conduct a proper assessment of the financial problems facing the
schemes. Without this baseline, it is not possible to initiate discussions
about the costs and benefits of alternative reform packages. In the sec-
ond group of countries, the goal should be to move from strategic guide-
lines to a detailed reform concept, which will require further analytical
work and consensus building. The remaining group needs to consolidate
an integrated reform strategy or move toward implementation. 
In all cases, it is hoped that this report will raise awareness about the
need for prompt interventions, thus allowing governments to take a
gradual approach toward reform and avoid drastic adjustments in the
future. The report also is intended to provide an analytical framework to
guide discussion about options for reform as well as the implementation
of new laws. In all Middle East and North African countries, the time for
change is now.
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TABLE A.1
Population Size in Middle East and North African Countries and World Regions,
1960–2000
Thousands of persons
Country or region 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Algeria 10,800 11,923 13,746 16,018 18,669 21,879 25,022 28,060 30,385
Bahrain 149 182 210 262 334 425 503 577 670
Djibouti 83 114 155 210 300 354 490 580 666
East Asia and the Pacific 9,02,224 9,79,833 11,17,980 12,54,985 13,59,404 14,68,735 15,96,706 17,08,449 18,05,490
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 3,38,476 3,63,357 3,84,878 4,05,704 4,25,820 4,46,889 4,66,230 4,72,724 4,75,029
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 25,922 29,389 33,053 36,289 40,875 46,511 52,442 58,180 63,976
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 21,554 24,661 28,429 33,206 39,124 47,100 54,400 58,954 63,664
Iraq 6,847 7,976 9,356 11,020 13,007 15,317 18,078 20,779 23,224
Jordan 844 1,128 1,508 1,810 2,181 2,644 3,170 4,195 4,887
Kuwait 278 471 744 1,007 1,375 1,712 2,125 1,802 2,190
Latin America and the
Caribbean 2,14,531 2,46,349 2,80,557 3,17,317 3,56,417 3,95,468 4,34,236 4,73,143 5,10,040
Lebanon 1,968 2,280 2,617 2,947 3,002 3,275 3,635 4,005 4,328
Libya 1,349 1,623 1,986 2,446 3,043 3,786 4,306 4,751 5,237
Middle East and 
North Africa 99,655 1,13,639 1,30,344 1,49,389 1,73,682 2,04,025 2,37,132 2,67,005 2,94,431
Morocco 11,626 13,323 15,310 17,305 19,382 21,648 24,043 26,386 28,705
OECD 6,55,391 6,95,041 7,28,851 7,63,232 7,90,438 8,13,997 8,39,918 8,69,368 8,98,541
Oman 558 631 723 847 1,101 1,397 1,627 2,135 2,410
Qatar 45 70 111 171 229 358 485 505 585
Saudi Arabia 4,075 4,793 5,745 7,251 9,372 12,379 15,803 18,205 20,723
South Asia 5,62,319 6,31,809 7,11,828 8,01,344 9,01,258 10,05,209 11,20,422 12,35,272 13,54,192
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,23,765 2,53,802 2,89,427 3,30,967 3,83,247 4,43,109 5,10,406 5,80,401 6,58,296
Syria, Arab Rep. 4,561 5,325 6,257 7,438 8,704 10,397 12,116 14,221 16,189
Tunisia 4,221 4,630 5,127 5,611 6,384 7,260 8,154 8,958 9,564
United Arab Emirates 90 120 220 505 1,043 1,379 1,844 2,341 2,809
West Bank and Gaza 1,970 2,396 2,966
Yemen, Republic of 5,247 5,843 6,332 6,991 8,538 10,078 11,876 15,200 17,507
World average levels 30,20,382 33,11,960 36,75,589 40,58,401 44,30,067 48,21,152 52,52,836 56,57,296 60,51,380
Source: World Bank 2003f.
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TABLE A.3
Average Population Growth Rates in Middle East and North African Countries, 1960–2003
Percent
Country 1960–4 1965–9 1970–4 1975–9 1980–4 1985–9 1990–4 1995–9 2000–3
Algeria 1.91 2.74 3.05 3.06 3.16 2.80 2.40 1.71 1.49
Bahrain 3.90 3.07 4.07 4.87 4.87 3.67 2.60 3.27 2.07
Djibouti 5.82 6.22 5.89 7.49 3.70 5.16 4.71 2.94 2.08
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 2.46 2.46 1.88 2.28 2.57 2.46 2.15 1.91 1.86
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 2.64 2.80 3.06 3.22 3.62 3.23 1.72 1.57 1.46
Iraq 3.02 3.17 3.26 3.32 3.26 3.34 2.93 2.35 1.95
Jordan 5.52 6.07 3.92 3.66 3.90 3.61 5.69 3.09 2.90
Kuwait 9.59 9.93 6.33 6.27 4.89 4.26 3.95 4.52 3.32
Lebanon 2.96 2.82 2.46 0.60 1.55 2.09 1.96 1.66 1.30
Libya 3.64 3.99 4.14 4.31 4.49 3.11 1.84 1.95 1.96
Morocco 2.70 2.82 2.51 2.29 2.22 2.13 1.92 1.71 1.62
Oman 2.78 2.64 2.91 4.98 5.09 3.17 5.51 2.46 2.59
Qatar 7.95 9.12 9.20 5.63 8.73 6.98 1.45 2.44 2.55
Saudi Arabia 3.12 3.44 4.49 5.01 5.60 5.06 3.20 2.60 2.68
Syria, Arab Rep. 3.05 3.16 3.47 3.14 3.51 3.11 3.25 2.72 2.43
Tunisia 1.78 2.09 1.76 2.47 2.50 2.45 2.04 1.40 1.13
United Arab Emirates 5.00 10.18 16.17 16.14 6.98 4.81 5.85 3.22 6.02
West Bank and Gaza — — — — — — 3.92 4.20 4.28
Yemen, Republic of 2.18 1.68 1.70 3.81 3.48 3.15 5.12 2.82 2.97
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank 2003f.
Note: — = Not available.
TABLE A.2
Average Growth Rates, by Region and Period, 1960–2003
Percent
Region 1960–4 1965–9 1970–4 1975–9 1980–4 1985–9 1990–4 1995–9 2000–3
Middle East and North Africa 2.63 2.79 2.74 3.00 3.25 3.01 2.68 2.02 1.91
OECD 1.20 0.98 0.95 0.74 0.62 0.59 0.70 0.67 0.62
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.82 2.67 2.51 2.39 2.15 1.92 1.76 1.56 1.44
East Asia and the Pacific 1.48 2.61 2.50 1.70 1.55 1.67 1.44 1.17 0.92
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.54 2.65 2.69 2.92 2.98 2.87 2.63 2.64 2.30
South Asia 2.35 2.41 2.40 2.39 2.25 2.19 2.01 1.88 1.75
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.44 1.24 1.05 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.38 0.11 0.14
World average levels 1.81 2.10 2.05 1.80 1.72 1.72 1.55 1.39 1.23
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank 2003f.
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TABLE A.4
Labor Force Participation Rate, by Gender, in Middle East and North African Countries
and World Regions, 1960–2003
Percent of the population ages 15–64
Country or region and gender 1960–4 1965–9 1970–4 1975–9 1980–4 1985–9 1990–4 1995–9 2000–3
Female
Algeria 17.1 17.4 17.9 18.7 19.3 19.8 22.2 27.8 32.5
Bahrain — — 6.7 13.2 19.6 26.0 30.8 33.0 34.7
East Asia and the Pacific 66.3 67.0 68.1 69.8 71.7 73.8 75.2 75.4 75.2
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 63.4 65.7 67.4 68.4 68.3 66.5 65.6 66.2 66.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 26.2 27.0 27.8 28.7 29.8 31.2 33.0 35.6 37.7
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 19.8 19.8 20.0 20.4 21.0 21.7 23.8 27.9 31.5
Iraq 16.4 16.4 16.3 16.3 16.0 15.5 16.0 18.2 19.9
Jordan 13.8 13.9 14.2 14.4 15.3 17.1 20.0 24.9 28.6
Kuwait 6.8 10.0 13.8 18.3 24.6 33.5 39.2 40.8 43.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 24.1 25.7 27.9 31.2 34.8 38.9 42.2 44.1 45.6
Lebanon 13.6 16.5 18.9 20.5 22.4 24.7 27.5 30.7 32.8
Libya 20.4 19.7 20.1 22.1 22.9 22.0 22.3 24.7 26.6
Middle East and North Africa 22.3 22.7 23.4 24.3 25.1 25.8 27.5 30.5 33.0
Morocco 32.9 33.7 35.0 37.0 38.6 39.8 41.1 42.7 44.0
OECD 37.0 40.0 43.7 48.7 53.2 56.7 59.7 61.6 62.6
Oman 4.4 5.3 6.1 7.0 8.6 11.6 14.7 18.0 21.0
Qatar — — — — 16.7 27.3 34.2 35.9 38.4
Saudi Arabia 3.7 4.5 5.9 8.2 10.8 13.7 16.8 20.2 23.5
South Asia 50.1 49.5 48.9 48.2 47.1 45.1 44.4 45.7 46.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 65.0 64.6 64.1 63.4 62.8 62.4 62.2 62.1 62.1
Syria, Arab Rep. 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 23.8 24.2 25.5 28.2 30.5
Tunisia 22.7 24.3 27.1 31.7 34.5 34.6 35.6 38.1 40.1
United Arab Emirates — — 8.6 13.2 18.8 25.8 30.9 32.7 33.8
Yemen, Republic of 27.6 27.9 28.2 28.4 28.7 29.1 29.8 30.9 31.7
World average levels 52.8 53.8 55.0 56.5 57.7 58.7 59.6 60.4 60.8
Male
Algeria 87.6 85.2 83.0 81.4 80.3 79.8 79.5 79.5 79.7
Bahrain 86.7 85.4 85.5 87.7 89.2 89.7 89.0 87.8 88.1
East Asia and the Pacific 93.4 92.5 91.6 90.8 90.0 89.1 88.7 88.7 88.2
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 86.8 85.0 83.9 83.7 83.1 81.7 80.7 80.2 79.8
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 89.4 87.3 85.6 84.3 83.5 83.4 83.2 82.5 82.2
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 91.3 88.6 86.4 84.8 83.5 82.6 81.5 80.4 79.8
Iraq 87.3 85.0 82.9 81.1 79.3 77.5 76.4 76.3 76.2
Jordan 85.4 85.2 83.8 80.7 78.5 78.0 77.9 78.8 79.4
Kuwait 89.7 88.9 88.0 87.0 86.2 85.8 83.5 80.0 79.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 90.6 89.1 88.0 87.2 86.6 86.3 86.0 85.7 85.5
Lebanon 84.2 81.7 79.7 78.5 77.7 77.6 78.4 80.3 81.1
Libya 87.7 86.8 86.1 85.8 85.0 83.5 81.7 79.4 77.8
Middle East and North Africa 89.4 87.3 85.5 84.1 83.0 82.4 81.7 81.1 80.8
Morocco 89.7 87.7 86.2 85.2 84.3 83.5 82.8 82.6 82.6
OECD 89.7 87.9 86.4 85.2 83.9 82.5 81.7 81.5 80.9
Oman 91.1 90.2 89.4 88.7 87.3 84.9 82.6 80.3 78.3
Qatar 88.4 90.7 91.9 91.7 92.0 93.4 93.4 91.6 90.2
Saudi Arabia 92.3 90.6 89.0 87.3 86.3 86.3 85.2 83.0 81.4
South Asia 91.5 90.7 89.9 89.1 88.6 88.2 87.8 87.3 86.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 91.7 91.0 90.3 89.6 88.9 88.4 87.8 87.2 86.7
Syria, Arab Rep. 86.8 85.6 84.4 82.9 81.8 81.1 80.6 80.3 80.3
Tunisia 89.0 86.9 85.4 85.1 84.5 83.6 83.0 83.0 83.2
United Arab Emirates 91.7 91.7 92.4 93.9 94.4 93.1 91.9 90.1 88.2
Yemen, Republic of 89.4 89.2 87.9 84.8 82.9 82.8 83.1 83.9 84.2
World average levels 90.8 89.7 88.7 88.0 87.2 86.5 86.0 85.8 85.4
Source: World Bank 2003f.
Note: — = Not available.
Methodology for Demographic
and Employment Projections 
APPENDIX B
Survival and fertility rate forecasts are provided by staff of the World
Bank’s Human Development Network. Survival and fertility rates, the
current age distribution of the population, and net migration flows rep-
resent the main input of the calculations explained below (see figure B.1). 
Life Expectancy, Total Fertility Rate,
and Population Projections
Future life expectancy and total fertility rates are calculated using a stan-
dard life table methodology. In order to be consistent with the modeling
of pension reform options, population projections are generated using a
standard linear model. Being µMt and µ
F
t , the male and female age
distributions of the population at time t, population dynamics can be
described by the following linear model:
µMt+1 = Mt µMt + γttµFt + ηMt
µFt+1 = Ft µFt + (1 − γt)tµFt + ηFt ,
where Mt and 
F
t are the transition matrixes for males and females,
which are functions of the age- and sex-specific survival rates prevailing
at time t; t is the fertility matrix, which is a function of the age-specific
fertility rates prevailing at time t; γt is a coefficient that is a function of
the sex ratio at birth prevailing at time t; and ηMt and η
F
t are the net
migration flows for males and females for time t. Finally, the size of the
total population is obtained by summing the male and female popula-
tion: µt = µMt + µFt . In order to generate population projections, the sex
ratio is kept constant and exogenously set to 104, meaning that 104 male
babies are born for every 100 female newborns. With σ as the sex
ratio, γ is calculated as follows: γ = σ/1001+σ/100 . Finally, net migration flows
are naively assumed to converge to zero by 2030. The results of the pro-
jections are presented in table B.1 and figure B.2.
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Labor Force Projections
The labor force is projected using demographic projections as well as
current and projected age-specific activity rates for males and females.
Regarding activity rate projections, values for the years between 2002
and 2010 are calculated by linearly interpolating current estimated age-
and sex-specific activity rates and projected age- and sex-specific activity
rates provided by ILO (2003). For the years beyond 2010, values are lin-
early interpolated assuming that age- and sex-specific activity rates in all
Middle East and North African countries will converge to the average
levels currently observed in the OECD by 2040. The resulting activity
rates are shown in figure B.3. Having generated activity-rate projections,
labor force projections are obtained by multiplying each activity rate
with the associated projection for the population bracket (see table B.2).
Unemployment Projections
In order to evaluate the potential dynamics of the unemployment rate, a
relatively simple accounting framework should be used to ensure consis-
tency among economic aggregates.
TABLE B.1
Projected Population Growth Rates, 2003–39
Average by period
Country 2003–4 2005–9 2010–4 2015–9 2020–4 2025–9 2030–4 2035–9
Algeria 1.68 1.64 1.51 1.36 1.25 1.09 0.94 0.80
Bahrain 2.13 1.98 1.70 1.38 1.11 0.91 0.77 0.65
Djibouti 2.05 1.83 1.65 1.59 1.48 1.33 1.21 1.29
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 1.76 1.68 1.48 1.25 1.17 1.05 0.93 0.80
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 1.58 1.67 1.59 1.32 1.13 0.99 0.92 0.84
Iraq 2.17 2.06 1.84 1.60 1.48 1.29 1.10 0.96
Jordan 2.69 2.47 2.05 1.68 1.51 1.36 1.22 1.09
Kuwait 2.58 2.18 1.71 1.32 1.05 0.84 0.64 0.46
Lebanon 1.31 1.24 1.18 1.13 1.03 0.89 0.75 0.63
Libya 2.30 2.15 1.75 1.33 1.22 1.16 1.09 0.96
Middle East and
North Africa 1.99 1.94 1.77 1.53 1.38 1.21 1.07 0.97
Morocco 1.56 1.49 1.35 1.20 1.12 0.99 0.86 0.72
Oman 2.33 2.28 2.12 1.89 1.70 1.44 1.22 1.11
Qatar 2.15 1.91 1.53 1.09 0.71 0.41 0.20 0.07
Saudi Arabia 3.25 3.01 2.70 2.43 2.17 1.87 1.60 1.51
Syria, Arab Rep. 2.46 2.30 1.95 1.57 1.46 1.35 1.23 1.08
Tunisia 1.30 1.33 1.28 1.13 0.94 0.79 0.70 0.61
United Arab Emirates 2.35 2.11 1.68 1.18 0.83 0.60 0.47 0.39
West Bank and Gaza 3.63 3.39 3.01 2.60 2.20 1.80 1.49 1.42
Yemen, Republic of 3.02 3.06 2.92 2.62 2.24 1.88 1.63 1.63
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Starting from a Cobb-Douglas production function, such as 
(B.1) Y = AK α L1−α ,
where Y is real output, A is the productivity level, K is physical capital,
and L is labor supply. Expressing the equation in terms of variable
growth rates, it is possible to obtain the following relationship:
(B.2) y˙ = a˙ + αk˙ + (1 − α)l˙ .
Economic Effects of the Demographic Transition
Different assumptions about the dynamics of each variable in the equa-
tion lead to different approaches in evaluating the economic effects of
the demographic transition. In order to understand the differences
among them, a brief description of the most common assumptions fol-
lows (Dhonte, Bhattacharya, and Yousef 2000 for approaches A and B). 
Approach A 
By assuming that l˙ is equal to the growth rate of the labor force and by
specifying a given dynamic for k˙ and w˙, it is possible to calculate the rate
TABLE B.2
Excess Growth Rate of Working-Age Population over Dependent Population, 2003–39
Percent
Country or territory 2003–4 2005–9 2010–4 2015–9 2020–4 2025–9 2030–4 2035–9
Algeria 2.7 2.6 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6
Bahrain 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.4 2.6 3.2
Djibouti 0.1 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.8
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 2.5 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 4.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.7
Iraq 2.9 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.1
Jordan 1.0 1.2 1.8 2.2 2.2 0.9 0.2 1.2
Kuwait 1.2 0.7 0.1 1.0 2.6 2.8 2.8 1.6
Lebanon 2.6 2.9 1.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.4 1.3
Libya 0.5 0.7 0.3 2.1 2.1 1.0 0.8 1.3
Middle East and 
North Africa 2.3 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2
Morocco 2.2 2.1 1.9 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.6
Oman 3.7 3.0 2.5 0.7 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.9
Qatar 2.5 0.3 2.4 4.8 4.4 1.7 0.9 1.7
Saudi Arabia 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6
Syria, Arab Rep. 3.3 1.9 1.6 2.5 2.0 0.7 0.6 0.6
Tunisia 2.7 1.7 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.2
United Arab Emirates 2.5 0.2 2.2 2.5 2.3 0.1 1.2 0.3
West Bank and Gaza 3.6 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.1
Yemen, Republic of 2.4 0.8 0.3 1.1 2.1 2.8 2.8 1.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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of growth of the productivity that does not increase current levels of
unemployment:
(B.3) a˙ = w˙ + l˙(1 − α) − αk˙.
Approach B 
By assuming an exogenous dynamic for the real wage—that is,
w˙ = y˙ − l˙—there is a unique relationship between the growth rates of
labor demand, real wages, productivity, and physical capital:
(B.4) l˙ = 1
1 − α (a˙ + αk˙ − w˙) .
This approach allows calculating the growth rate of labor demand con-
sistent with given assumptions on the behavior of productivity, capital,
and real wages. The difference between the growth rate of labor demand
and the growth rate of the labor force represents the growth rate of
employment.
Approach C
In order to avoid setting an exogenous dynamic for capital accumulation,
it is possible to assume that the ratio of capital per laborer remains
constant during the projection horizon. Therefore, since k˙ = l˙ , real
wages adjust to changes in productivity (w˙ = a˙ ), and the following rela-
tionship holds:
(B.5) l˙ = y˙ − a˙ ,
which delivers the dynamics of labor demand for a given dynamic of eco-
nomic output and productivity.
Coverage Rate Projections
Coverage rates measure the number of employed workers who are
enrolled in the pension system as a share of the labor force. Two
approaches are used here to project coverage rates: an “enrollment”
approach, linking coverage to capacity of the system to enroll new work-
ers, and an “income” approach, linking coverage rates to the level of
GDP per capita. In the enrollment approach, workers can be enrolled or
not enrolled in the national pension system. Once enrolled, workers are
assumed not to quit the system, and uncovered workers are assumed not
to enter the system in their middle or late career. Both enrolled and
uncovered workers can be employed or unemployed. Then projections
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for the coverage rate are generated using projections for modeling the
labor force and the unemployment rate (see chapter 2) as well as for
modeling the enrollment rate for new workers. In the “optimistic”
scenario, a gradually increasing share of new workers is enrolled in the
system, until 100 percent of the labor force is reached. It is assumed that
all the countries take 30 years to obtain a 100 percent rate of enrollment.
In the “pessimistic scenario” there is no improvement in the enrollment
of new workers. The income approach is based on Palacios and Pallarès-
Miralles (2000), who estimate the relationship:
(B.6) c = −0.15y2 + 7.42y + 0.47, 
where c is the coverage rate and y is GDP per capita (purchasing power
parity adjusted). To ensure consistency with the “enrollment” approach,
a 1 percent technology growth rate and a constant labor force demand
growth rate are assumed. Then a series of GDP per capita is generated
using the population projections calculated in chapter 2. The results are
presented in figure B.4 and in figure 3.2 in chapter 3. 
TABLE C.1
Characteristics of the CNR and CASNOS in Algeria
Characteristic CNR CASNOS
Eligibility conditions 
Age 55 years for women; 60 for men 60 years for women; 65 for men
Vesting period 10 years for women; 15 for men 15 years
Rules for early retirement 45 years for women; 50 for men, with 14 years  of —
employment for women and 20 years for men 
or 32 years of contributions without minimum 
age. A 0.5 percent additional contribution is required
from both the employer and the employee. The pension 
is reduced by 1 percent for each year of discrepancy
prior to normal retirement age
Rules for delayed retirement — —
Rules for abandoning the system Retirement settlement is set at age 65 with five years or —
20 quarters of coverage. There is no minimum pension 
Social security contribution rates Total: 34.5 percent of gross salary (employer, 25 percent; Only for pensions, 7.5 percent 
worker, 9.5 percent). For pensions, 16.5 percent; for of gross salary
unemployment insurance, 4 percent of gross salary;
for health insurance, 14 percent of gross salary
Accrual rate 2.5 percent 2.5 percent
Income measure Average five best years of salary (no indexation) Average 10 best years of salary 
(no indexation)
Ceiling on covered wage 15 times the minimum wage Eight times the minimum wage 
Maximum replacement rate or 80 percent replacement rate and maximum 80 percent replacement rate
maximum pension pension of 15 times the minimum wage and maximum pension of 15 times
the minimum wage
Pension indexation Ad hoc annual indexation Ad hoc annual indexation
Minimum pension 75 percent of the minimum wage
Economy-wide minimum wage DA 10,000 a month
Economy-wide average wage DA 23,000 a month
Sources: CNR and CASNOS.
Notes: CNR covers civil servants and the military and administers retirement, survivor, and disability insurance. CASNOS covers the 
self-employed.
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.2
Characteristics of the GOSI and PFC in Bahrain
Characteristic GOSI PFC (civil servants) PFC (military)
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the
system
Social security contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement rate or 
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
55 years for women; 60 for men
10 years for women, 15 for men (at
retirement, workers get five
extra years to a maximum of 30)
15 years of contributions for
women, 20 for men; early-
retirement pensions are 
reduced by 20 percent if the
worker is younger than 45 years,
by 15 percent if the worker is
45–50, and by 10 percent if the
worker is 50–55
—
If individual leaves the system
before accruing pension rights,
he or she receives a lump sum
at age 55 (women) or 60 (men)
equal to 15 percent of the last
wage times years of
contributions
12 percent of gross wage for old-
age and survivor pensions (em-
ployer,7 percent;worker,5 percent)
2.2 percent
Average wage for last two years
with no indexation
No
80 percent
Ad hoc
BD 1,800 a year
—
BD 4,285 a year
60 years for men and women
10 years; at ages 55–59,
workers are credited by law
with five additional years of
contributions provided that
the total is less than 60 years
20 years of contributions or
15 if the position is can-
celed; employees can pur-
chase up to five additional
years of service if the total is
less than 40; the pension is
not adjusted
—
Same as GOSI,however,if termi-
nation is due to resignation,
the lump sum is reduced as fol-
lows:by 25 percent with less
than five years of contributions;
20 percent with 5–10 years of
contributions;15 percent for
10–15 years of contributions;if
termination is due to cancella-
tion of the position,the lump
sum is multiplied by 1.5
For Bahrainis,15 percent of gross
wage (state government,
10 percent;worker,5 percent)
2 percent
Last month wage
No
80 percent
Ad hoc
BD 45 a month (plus BD 9 for
each dependent)
Source: World Bank 2003b.
Note: — = Not available or not offered.
60 years for men and women;
five years can be added, as
in the case of the military
15 years
10 years of contributions if the
position is canceled;other-
wise,25 years of contribu-
tions for women and men,
with no age restriction,or
15 years of contributions
with age 50; the pension is
reduced by 5 percent if the
worker is younger than 45
years and by 2.5 percent if
the worker is 45–50. If service
is terminated due to health
conditions, the pension is
computed as fully paid
—
Same as military
15 percent of gross wage (for
state government, 10 per-
cent; for worker, 5 percent)
2 percent
Last month wage
No
80 percent
Ad hoc
BD 45 a month (plus BD 9 for
each dependent)
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TABLE C.3
Characteristics of the OPS and CMR in Djibouti
Characteristic OPS (after reform, Law 154/AN/02/4L) CMR (military)
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the system
Social security contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximun replacement rate or
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
55 years for women and men
For those born after 1951, 25 years; for those born in
1950, 1949, 1948, 1947, 1946, and before, 23, 21, 19,
17, and 15 years, respectively
Workers can retire at age 55 or after, without having
completed the vesting period, but the pension is ad-
justed downward (government has not issued the
regulations yet). Beginning at age 50, workers can
also apply for early retirement, but only for medical
reasons, and they need to have a vesting period
equal to 25 minus the number of years missing to
reach the normal retirement age; for ages 50, 51, 52,
53, and 54, the pension is reduced by 50, 60, 70, 80,
and 90 percent, respectively
—
—
19.7 percent (employer,50 percent;worker,50 per-
cent); for old-age pension,8 percent; family allowance,
5.5 percent;health and work accidents,6.2 percent
2 percent for years contributed until December 2001;
1.8 percent between 2002 and 2006; afterward,
1.5 percent
Average wage of last 10 years. Article 109 of the law
indicates that wages need to be indexed and that
the cabinet defines the index (no regulations have
been issued to date)
No
81 percent
Ad hoc
DF 170,000 a year
There is no minimum wage
DF 800,000 a year
None
15 years
—
—
—
20 percent of gross wage (employer,
13 percent; worker, 7 percent)
3 percent
Last month wage
No
Unknown
Ad hoc
Unknown
Sources: OPS and CMR.
Notes: OPS covers private sector workers; CMR covers the military forces.
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.4
Characteristics of CNR in Djibouti after Implementation of Reform Law 155/AN/02/4L
Characteristic Civil servants Police Parliamentarians
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the
system
Social security contribution
rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement rate or 
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
55 years for those born after 1955
(for those born between 1947
and 1954, retirement age is re-
duced by half a year for each
calendar year)
25 years
Early retirement is possible if for
physical or institutional reasons
the employee cannot continue
to work
—
—
20 percent of basic wage 
(employer, 14 percent; worker,
6 percent); covers old-age and
survivor benefits
Until December 2001, 3 percent
for first 15 years; 2 percent
thereafter; between January
2002 and January 2007, 1.8 per-
cent; between January 2007
and January 2010, 1.5 percent;
after January 2010, 1.3 percent
Last month wage
No
81 percent
—
DF 170,000 a year
—
DF 800,000 a year
55 years for women and men
10 years
Same as for civil servants;
pension is equal to two-
thirds of normal pension
—
—
36 percent of gross wage
(employer, 19 percent;
worker, 17 percent)
Until December 2001,
4 percent;afterward,
3 percent
Last month wage
No
75 percent
—
DF 170,000 a year
Source: CNR.
Note: — = Not available or not offered.
Same as for civil servants
26 years
Same as for civil servants;
maximum 37.5 years of con-
tributions can count to this
pension
—
—
22 percent of gross wage 
(employer, 15 percent;
worker, 7 percent)
Until December 2001, 3 per-
cent for first 15 years, then
2 percent; between January
2002 and January 2007,
1.8 percent; between Janu-
ary 2007 and January 2010,
1.5 percent; after January
2010, 1.3 percent
Last month wage
No
81 percent
—
DF 170,000 a year
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TABLE C.5
Characteristics of the Government Pension Fund, Public and Private Enterprises Employee
Pension Fund, and the Scheme for the Self-Employed in Egypt
Government pension fund and public and private Scheme for the self-
Characteristic enterprises employee pension fund employed
Sources: Law 79 of 1975; technical staff from the pension funds.
Notes: The Public and Private Enterprises Employee Pension Scheme is governed by Law No. 79 from 1975. The Scheme for the Self-Employed
is governed by Law No. 108 from 1976.
— = Not available or not offered.
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the 
system
Social security contribution 
rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement  
rate or maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
60 years for women and men
10 years
At any age with 20 years of contributions, subject to penalties: at
less than 45 years of age, basic pension is reduced by 15 percent;
at 45–50, 10 percent; at 50–55, 5 percent; and before age 60, vari-
able pension is reduced by 5 percent for each year of contribu-
tions missing to reach the normal retirement age
Workers who have contributed for more than 36 years or who
have a vesting period greater than that required to attain the
maximum pension (whichever is larger) have the right to a
lump-sum indemnity at the rate of 15 percent of the last annual
wage for each of the years in excess, based on the basic wage
Individuals not meeting retirement conditions receive, for each
year of contributions, a lump sum of 15 percent of the last two-
year average monthly wage on which contributions were paid
Employer, 15 percent of basic wages and 15 percent of variable
wages; worker, 10 percent of basic wages and 10 percent of
variable wages; government, 1 percent
2.2 percent (2.77 percent of those who served in the armed forces
for relevant period). There is also a bonus of 25 percent of the
basic pension; the minimum is LE 20 a month, and the maximum
is LE 35 a month
One part of the benefits is based on the basic wage, in the amount
of LE 8,000 a year; another part is based on variable income
(including all bonuses and allowances) and is the amount in
excess of the basic wage, up to LE 6,000 a year.For the pension
benefit based on the basic wage, the average wage during the last
two years is taken, no indexation is applied.For all but civil servants,
the average monthly wage for the last two years cannot be greater
than the average of five years preceding the averaging period.For
the benefit based on the variable wage, remunerations over the
entire carrier are taken, whereby the non-indexed full-career aver-
age is increased by 2 percent for each year of contributions.The
adjusted average has a ceiling of LE 6,000
Effectively LE 8,100 (basic) + LE 6,000 (variable) = LE 14,100 a year
80 percent,yet if less than LE 70 a month,the pension becomes100 per-
cent of the reference wage;maximum pension is LE 900 a month
Ad hoc
LE 105 a month for civil servants and LE 45 a month for other
groups; for those with more than 20 years of contributions, a
minimum replacement rate of 50 percent is set
60 percent of the average wage
LE 8,000 a year
65 years women and men
10 years 
20 years of contributions
—
Unknown
15 percent of gross wage,
paid by employee
2.22 percent
The base for calculating both
contributions and benefits
is one of 23 different
income classes; all income
counts toward the
pension; revalorization
policies are unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
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TABLE C.6
Characteristics of the Scheme for Egyptians Working Abroad and the Casual
Employment Sector/Comprehensive Scheme in Egypt
Characteristic Scheme for Egyptians Working Abroad Casual Employment Sector/Comprehensive Scheme
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the system
Social security contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement rate or
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Maximum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
60 years for women and men
10 years
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
22.5 percent of gross wage, paid by
employee
2.22 percent
All remunerations, revalorization policy
is unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
60 percent of the average wage
65 years for women and men
10 years
At any age with 35 years of contributions
—
Unknown
Workers contribute a flat rate of LE 3 a month
Flat rate of LE 80 a month
All remunerations
Eight times the average monthly wage
—
Ad hoc
LE 80 a month;“Sadat” pension is LE 65 a month
—
—
Source: Public and Private Enterprises Employee Pension Fund  
Notes: The Scheme for Egyptians Working Abroad is governed by Law No. 50 from 1978. The Casual Employment Sector/Comprehensive
Scheme is governed by Law No.112 from 1980. A secondary act stipulates that the “Sadat” pension is an unfunded benefit provided on a
means-tested basis to all poor elderly above 65 years of age.
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.7
Characteristics of the CSRO and the SSO in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Characteristic CSRO SSO
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the system
Social security contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement rate or
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
Option 1: 60 years for men and women (no
minimum number of years); men can also
choose to retire at age 50
No vesting or 25 years of service
Women with 20 years and men with 30 years
with no minimum age;men can also retire at
50 years of age with 25 years of contributions;
in none of the cases do penalties apply
—
Individuals not meeting retirement condi-
tions receive a lump sum equal to three
months of salary for each year of contribu-
tions (in the case of unskilled workers) or 45
days for each year (in the case of skilled
workers)
Total:22.5 percent of basic salary,which
represents 75 percent of the total (worker,13.5
percent;employer,9 percent).Workers with
more than 30 years of service do not pay con-
tributions.These funds cover old-age,disabil-
ity,and survivor benefits,as well as health in-
surance contributions for retirees
3.3 percent
Pensions are calculated on the basis of the
basic wage, which on average represents 75
percent of total earnings; the average of the
last two years is taken; no revalorization ap-
plies
No
100 percent maximum replacement rate
Ad hoc
Equal to the minimum wage
Rls 850,000 a month (66 percent of average
wage)
Rls 1,287,879 a month
55 for women, 60 for men
10 years for both men and women
Women can retire at age 42 with 20 years of
contributions; men can retire with no mini-
mum age after 30 years of contributions; no
penalties apply
—
Individuals not meeting retirement condi-
tions do not receive pensions or
compensation
Total: 33 percent of gross wage (employer,
23 percent; worker, 7 percent; government, 3
percent). For unemployment insurance,
3 percent of gross wage; for health insur-
ance, 9 percent of gross wage; for all pen-
sions and cash transfers, 21 percent of gross
wage
3.3 percent
Average last two years; no revalorization
applies
Eight times average wage
116 percent of gross wage
Ad hoc indexation
Equal to the minimum wage
Sources: CSRO, SSO, and World Bank 2003d.
Notes: The CSRO covers civil servants only; the SSO covers private sector employees.
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.8
Characteristics of the SEP and SSW in Iraqa
Characteristic SEP SSWa
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the system
Social security contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement rate or
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
Monthly average wage
60 for men and women
15 years
55 for men with 30 years of service; 50 for
women with 25 years of service
Compulsory retirement at 63
Individuals not meeting retirement condi-
tions (age and minimum 15 years of service)
receive a lump-sum payment equaling one
month’s pension for each year of contribu-
tions
The contribution rate varies with the level of
wages. For state-owned enterprises, it
ranges between 3 and 30 percent (1 to
10 percent by employee, matched 200 per-
cent by employer); for civil servants, 1 to
10 percent, also matched 200 percent by
the employer; for the military, not known
12/420 = 1/35 = 2.86 percent
Last month wage
No
75 percent plus 5 percent for each additional
dependent up to a maximum of 90 percent
Ad hoc
The law stipulates a minimum of ID 8 a
month, but is now outdated
No
Unknown
ID 243,400
60 for men; 55 for women
20 years
At any age with 30 years of contributions; no
penalties apply
—
Individuals not meeting retirement condi-
tions receive the average monthly wage of
the last three years times the number of
years of service
Employer, 12 percent; worker, 5 percent; out
of the 17 percent contribution, only 14 per-
cent covers pensions. The equivalent
portions of the contribution for pensions are
employee, 4.1 percent, and employer,
9.9 percent. There are also exceptions: banks,
10 percent of the annual salary; oil compa-
nies, 25 percent of the annual salary
12/480 = 1/40 = 2.5 percent
Average monthly wage last three years
No
There is a maximum pension of ID 80,000 per
month
Ad hoc
Before the war, a minimum pension of ID
6,000 a month was approved, but never
implemented.
ID 45,000
Source: Ministry of Finance and SSW.
Notes: The law does not apply after the war, as flat pensions are being paid. Categories of workers excluded from the system include agricultural
workers, temporary employees, domestic servants, and family labor.
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.9
Characteristics of the SSC, Civil Service System, and Military Pension System in Jordan
Characteristic SSC Civil service system Military pension system
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period 
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the 
system
Social security contribution
rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement rate 
or maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum
wage
Economy-wide average wage
55 for women; 60 for men
15 years
For men, 45 years of age with 18 years of
contributions; for women, 15 years of contri-
butions at any age.There are penalties for
early retirement. Early-retirement reduction
factors by gender and age are for women,
age 45–49, 10 percent; age 50–54, 5 per-
cent; age 55–59, 0 percent; for men age
45–46, 18 percent; age 47, 16 percent; age
48, 14 percent; age 49, 12 percent; age 50, 10
percent; afterward falling by 1 percentage
point a year away from normal retirement
—
Individuals not meeting retirement condi-
tions receive lump-sum payments consti-
tuting 15 percent of final earnings for each
year of contributions of 15–18 years, 12 per-
cent for contributions of 5–15 years, and 10
percent for contributions of 1–5 years
Total: 16 percent of gross wage. For work in-
jury and occupational disease insurance,
2 percent. For old-age, disability, and
survivor pensions, 14.5 percent (employer,
9 percent; worker, 5.5 percent)
2.50 percent
Average of all salaries during last two years.
Final pay (that is, pay at time R) is adjusted
downward or upward to ensure that
1.2*Pay(R-5)  Pay(R)  1.6*Pay(R-5)
No
75 percent of income measure
Discretionary
Equal to minimum wage
JD 960 a year in 2003
JD 230 a month (2,760 a year)
None
15 years for women;
20 for men
Unknown
—
—
8.75 percent of basic
wage, paid by
employee
4.17 percent
Last month wage
No
No
Discretionary
—
None
16 years
Unknown
—
—
8.75 percent of basic 
wage, paid by
employee
4.17 percent
Last month wage
No
No
Discretionary
—
Sources: SSC; World Bank 2003c.
Notes: The SSC covers private sector workers and civil servants. Since 2002 the military pension system has been closed to new entrants, who
are directed to SSC. The same has been applied to the civil service scheme since 1995.
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.10
Characteristics of the Military Scheme, the Civil Service Scheme, and the Private Sector
End-of-Service Indemnity Program in Lebanon
Private sector end-of-service 
Characteristic Military scheme Civil service scheme indemnity program
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed 
retirement
Rules for abandoning the 
system
Social security 
contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement
rate or maximum 
pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum
wage
No age requirement
20 years. Individuals’ years of contri-
butions are multiplied by a factor
ranging between 1.5 and 3, de-
pending on the level of alert
No
A combination of lifetime pension
and end-of-service compensation
is provided to individuals with
more than 40 years of service, with
the end-of-service compensation
being three times 85 percent of the
last monthly salary for each year of
service that exceeds 40 years
For less than 20 years of service, an
end-of-service compensation is
calculated based on 85 percent of
the last monthly wage reference
for each year of service for the first
10 years and two times 85 percent
of last monthly wage per year of
service after that
6 percent paid by employee
2.66 percent
Last month wage
No
85 percent of final salary
Ad hoc
No
LL 310,400
No age requirement
20 years
No
A combination of lifetime pen-
sion and end-of-service com-
pensation is provided to indi-
viduals with more than 40 years
of service,with the end-of-
service compensation being
three times 85 percent of the
last monthly salary for each year
of service that exceeds 40 years
For less than 20 years of service,
an end-of-service compensa-
tion is calculated based on 85
percent of the last monthly
wage reference for each year
of service for the first 10 years
and two times 85 percent of
the last monthly wage per
year of service after that
6 percent paid by employee 
2.13 percent
Last month wage
No
85 percent of final salary
Ad hoc
No
60 years for women and men
20 years
—
—
Workers can withdraw
their balance on leaving
employment, but with
increasing penalties the
shorter the period of
contribution
8.5 percent of gross wage,
paid by employer
The lump-sum benefit is
equal to the capital accu-
mulated on the individual
account with past em-
ployers;plus one month of
salary for each year of con-
tribution during the first
20 years of service spent
with the last employer
and 1.5 months after that
—
No
—
—
(Continues on the following page.)
204 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
Sources: NSSF and Ministry of Finance. See also World Bank 2005a.
Notes: NSSF provides the end-of-service indemnity.
— = Not available or not offered.
TABLE C.10 (continued)
Private sector end-of-service 
Characteristic Military scheme Civil service scheme indemnity program
Economy-wide average
wage
LL 930,000 (contributory wage). The
preliminary number without the
latest update is LL 1,142,417 for
the civil service and LL 721,771 for
the military. Both figures exclude
allowances. Contributors,
LL 307,800 for end-of-service (2000);
LL 39,700 for civil servants (2001);
LL 59,700 for the military (2001)
TABLE C.11
Characteristics of the SSF in Libya
Characteristic SSF (basic regime)
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period 
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed retirement
Rules for abandoning the system
Social security contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement rate or
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum wage
Economy-wide average wage
65 years for men and 60 years for women (non-civil servants); 62 years for men and 60 years for
women (civil servants)
None
62 years for men and 60 years for women (non-civil servants); 20 years of contributions 
(civil servants). In none of the cases do penalties apply
None
Nothing; can continue to contribute when rejoining
15 percent of gross wage for civil servants and wage earners (employer, 70 percent; worker,
25 percent; government, 5 percent) or for foreigners (employer, 75 percent; worker, 25 percent).
The contribution rate covers pension, 10.5 percent; basic health care, 2.5 percent; work accidents,
1 percent; and a basic pension, 1 percent 
For the self-employed, the contribution rate is 16.5 percent of gross wage (employer, 95 percent;
government, 5 percent); the extra 1.5 percentage point goes to cash transfers, which in the other
cases are paid directly by the employer
2.5 percent for the first 20 years or less; 2 percent for more than 20 years of service
Average of last three years; no revalorization applies
No
80 percent
Ad hoc
80 percent of the minimum wage
LD 85 a month
LD 233 a month
Source: SSF.
Note: — = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.12
Characteristics of the CMR and the CNSS in Morocco
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period 
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed 
retirement
Rules for abandoning the
system
Social security 
contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement
rate or maximum 
pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum
wage
Economy-wide average
wage
60 years for men and women
None
15 for women; 21 for men; the
accrual rate is reduced by
0.5 percentage point
—
Employee receives his or her
contributions (not employer’s)
without interest
14 percent of gross wage
(employer,7 percent;worker,
7 percent); for old-age pension,
14 percent;for other benefits,
noncontributory.Contribution is
increasing to 20 percent at a rate
of two percentage points a year;
other benefits are financed di-
rectly by the government
2.5 percent
Last salary
No
Maximum pension is 
100 percent of net wage
Ad hoc
DH 500 a month
DH 2,009 a month
DH 2,750 a month
45 or 50, depending on grade
None
Same as for civil servants
—
Same as for civil servants
21 percent of gross wage 
(employer, 14 percent; worker,
7 percent) to finance old-age
pension; other benefits are
financed directly by the
government
2.5 percent
Last salary
No
Maximum pension is 100 per-
cent of net wage
Ad hoc
DH 500 a month
60 years for women and men
15 years
55 years for women and men;
no penalties apply, but the
employer pays the pension
between ages 55 and 60
—
Individuals can only receive
benefits if they meet eligibil-
ity conditions
20.39 percent (employer, 16.09
percent; worker, 4.29 per-
cent). Old-age, disability, and
survivor pensions, 11.89 per-
cent; family allowance,
7.5 percent; short-term
benefits , 1 percent
3.3 percent first 15 years;
1 percent afterward (law in-
dicates 50 percent of the in-
come measure for the first
3,240 days, then 1 percent for
each block of 216 days; sim-
plification assumes that one
year is 216 days of work)
Last eight years (no 
revalorization applies)
DH 6,000
70 percent of gross wage
Ad hoc
DH 500 a month
Source: CMR and CNSS.
Note: — = Not available or not offered.
CMR
Characteristic Civil servants Military CNSS
206 Pensions in the Middle East and North Africa:Time for Change
TABLE C.13
Characteristics of the CMR and the RCAR in Morocco
Characteristic RCAR (basic regime)
Eligibility conditions
Age 60 years for women and men 
Vesting period 21 years
Rules for early retirement 55 years for both women and men with 21 years of contributions.The pension is
reduced by 4.8 percent for each year missing to reach the normal retirement age (60)
Rules for delayed retirement If individual retires after age 60, the pension increases by 4.8 percent for each year
above the age of 60 
Rules for abandoning the system Receives capital accumulated in the individual accounts
Social security contribution rates 18 percent of gross wage (employer, 12 percent; worker, 6 percent). Of  these,
individual accounts, 12 percent; family allowances, 0.65 percent; disability and survivor
pensions, 1 percent; general fund covering future unfunded obligations of the
scheme, 4.35 percent
Accrual rate 2 percent
Income measure All remunerations (revalorized by the growth rate of the average covered wage)
Ceiling on covered wage Four times the average salary (DH 11,000 in 2003)
Maximum replacement rate or maximum 90 percent
pension
Pension indexation Automatic indexation to consumer price index
Minimum pension No
Economy-wide minimum wage —
Economy-wide average wage DH 2,750 a month
Source: RCAR.
Notes: RCAR covers contractual workers in the public sector.
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.14
Characteristics of the CNRPS and CNSS in Tunisia
60 years
15 years
At age 50 or 55, no
penalty is applied
—
Unknown 
15.7 percent of gross
wage (employer,
8.95 percent, worker,
6.75 percent)
2 percent for the first
10 years; 3 percent for
the next 10 years;
2 percent after that
Highest of last wage or
last two years average
revalorized with the
growth rate of cov-
ered wages
No
90 percent
Growth rate of covered
wages
Two-thirds of industrial
minimum wage
Industrial minimum
wage, DT 2,206 a year;
agricultural minimum
wage, 6.509 a day
DT 5,138 a year
60 years
10 years
55 or 50 years;
involves 2 percent
reduction for each
year short of nor-
mal retirement age
—
Unknown 
12.5percentofgross
wage(employer,
9.75percent;worker,
2.75percent)
4 percent for the
first 10 years;
2 percent after
that
Average of last 10
years; past wages
are revalorized by
prices
No
Maximum pension
of 80 percent of
earnings up to six
times industrial 
minimum wage
Industrial minimum
wage
Two-thirds of 
industrial mini-
mum wage
65 years
10 years
60 years with no
penalty
—
Unknown 
7 percent of gross
income for self-
employed
4 percent for the
first 10 years;
2 percent after
that
Average of last 
three or five
years; no reval-
orization of past
wages
No
80 percent
Industrial or 
agricultural 
minimum wage
30 percent of 
industrial 
minimum wage
60 years
10 years
No
—
Unknown 
5.25 percent of gross
wage (employer,
3.5 percent; worker,
1.75 percent)
4 percent for the 
first 10 years;
2 percent after
that
Average of last three
or five years; no
revalorization of
past wages
No
80 percent
Agricultural 
minimum wage
40 percent of 
agricultural 
minimum wage
60 years
10 years
No
—
Unknown
7.5 percent of gross
wage (employer,
5 percent; worker,
2.5 percent)
4 percent for the
first 10 years;
2 percent after
that
Average of last three
or five years; no
revalorization of
past wages
No
80 percent
Agricultural 
minimum wage
Two-thirds of 
industrial mini-
mum wage
Source: Centre de Recherche en Securité Sociale.
Notes: CNRPS covers civil servants, military, security forces, contractual workers, and local authorities. See Law 85-12; 1985. RSNA covers nona-
gricultural workers in the formal sector. RSAA covers agricultural workers in cooperatives. RSA covers agricultural wage earners employed at
least 45 days a quarter by the same employer. RNS covers the self-employed. The industrial minimum wage, as of July 1, 2003, is DT 211.120 a
month (48 hours a week) or DT 183.906 a month (40 hours a week). The agricultural minimum wage, as of June 30, 2003, is DT 6.509 a day.
— = Not available or not offered.
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early 
retirement
Rules for delayed
retirement
Rules for abandoning
the system
Social security 
contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered
wage
Maximum replace-
ment rate or 
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide 
minimum wage
Economy-wide 
average wage
CNSS
Characteristic CNRPS RSNA RSAA RSA RNS
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TABLE C.15
Characteristics of the West Bank Scheme, the Gaza Scheme, and the Security Forces
Scheme in the West Bank and Gaza Prior to the Reform
Characteristic West Bank scheme Gaza scheme Security forces scheme
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early retirement
Rules for delayed 
retirement
Rules for abandoning 
the system
Social security 
contribution rates
Accrual rate
Income measure
Ceiling on covered wage
Maximum replacement
rate or maximum 
pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide minimum
wage
Economy-wide average
wage
60 years
40 years
At any age with 15 years of 
service, with approval; for
more than 30 years of service,
approval is automatic
Personal allowance (NIS 10+)
plus family (wife and child)
allowances
—
Worker, 2 percent nominal con-
tribution on wages; employer,
0 percent, but pays all benefits
when due
2 percent
Basic salary (years before 1987),
last basic salary  allowances
(years after 1987)
No
70 percent
Ad hoc periodic adjustment
equivalent to that given to 
active employees with same
rank as when retired
No
No
NIS 17,924 a year (Palestinian
territories)
60 years
15 years
At any age with 20 years of ser-
vice with the following reduc-
tions for age: less than or equal to
45 years of age, 20 percent; 46–50
years, 15 percent; 51–55 years, 10
percent; 56–57 years, 5 percent.
With involuntary resignation
workers receive full benefits if
they have 15 years of service
Personal allowance (NIS 300)
plus family (wife and child)
allowances
With more than or equal to three
years of service,workers receive a
lump sum equaling 15 percent
times annual final average salary
times years of service
22.5 percent (government,
12.5 percent; worker,
10 percent)
2.5 percent
Last wage
No
70 percent
Ad hoc periodic adjustment
equivalent to that given to 
active employees with same
rank as when retired
No
60 years
15 years
Minimum 15 years of contri-
butions, varying by rank;
early retirees do not receive
a 70 percent add-on (from
the general benefit formula,
70 percent*basic wage  70
percent*80 percent*basic
salary)
Modest social allowance for
wife and sons
—
22.5 percent (employer,
12.5 percent; worker,
10 percent)
For less than 15 years of 
service, 5.33 percent; for
more than 15 years of ser-
vice, higher accrual rate
Basic wage
No
No
Ad hoc adjustments requiring
approval of the president
No
Sources: World Bank 2002c.
Notes: West Bank and Gaza schemes cover civil servants and local authorities. Newly hired civil servants after June 2001 participate in the Gaza
scheme regardless of their location.The schemes for workers in Israel and Israeli settlements operate under the Histaadrut union agreements,
according to which these workers have been contributing to occupational pension schemes in Israel, while others have contributed to the
Solidarity Fund in Israel. Under Article III of the Gaza-Jericho Economic Accord between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, these funds should
be transferred to the Palestinian Authority once certain conditions have been met, such as the creation of relevant “pension institutions.”
— = Not available or not offered.
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TABLE C.16
Characteristics of the GCSS, GASS, Police Pension Fund, and the Army Pension Fund
in the Republic of Yemen
Private pension Civil service pension Police pension Army pension 
Characteristic fund (GCSS) fund (GASS) fund fund
Eligibility conditions
Age
Vesting period
Rules for early 
retirement
Rules for delayed 
retirement
Rules for abandoning
the system
Social security 
contribution rates
Accrual rate
55 years for women;
60 for men
15 years for men; 10 years 
for women
At any age with 30 years
(men) and 25 years
(women) and no adjust-
ments; 25 years of contri-
butions in case of resigna-
tion. Men at age 50 with 25
years or at age 55 with 20
years; women at age 46
with 20 years. In none of
these cases do reductions
apply. Men and women
can also retire at age 45
with 20 years of service,
and the pension is reduced
by 10 percent. Men can
also retire at age 50 with
20 years of service, and the
pension is reduced by 
5 percent
—
Unknown
For pensions, employer con-
tributes 6 percent times
(total basic pay  total
amount of allowances
received  6 percent of
basic pay). Employee
matches contributions; for
disability, employer con-
tributes 4 percent; for work
injury, government con-
tributes 1 percent
2.5 percent
55 years for women;
60 for men
15 years for men; 10 years for
women
At any age with 30 years
(men) and 25 years
(women) and no adjust-
ments; 25 years of contri-
butions in case of resigna-
tion. Men at age 50 with
25 years or at age 55 with
20 years; women at age 46
with 20 years. In none of
these cases do reductions
apply. Men and women
can also retire at age 45
with 20 years of service,
and the pension is re-
duced by 10 percent. Men
can also retire at age 50
with 20 years of service,
and the pension is
reduced by 5 percent
—
Unknown
For pensions, employer con-
tributes 6 percent times
(total basic pay  total
amount of allowances
received  6 percent of
basic pay). Employee
matches contributions; for
disability, employer con-
tributes 4 percent; for work
injury, government con-
tributes 1 percent
2.86 percent
—
—
Unknown
—
—
Unknown
12 percent of gross
wage (employer,
6 percent; worker,
6 percent)
—
—
Unknown
—
—
Unknown
12 percent of
gross wage
(employer, 6
percent; worker,
6 percent)
(Continues on the following page.)
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TABLE C.16 (continued)
Private pension Civil service pension Police pension Army pension 
Characteristic fund (GCSS) fund (GASS) fund fund
Income measure
Ceiling on covered
wage
Maximum 
replacement rate or
maximum pension
Pension indexation
Minimum pension
Economy-wide 
minimum wage
Economy-wide 
average wage
Average monthly wage for
last two years (not to
exceed 150 percent of
the average of the last
five years)
No
100 percent
Ad hoc
No
Yrls 8,750 a month
Yrls 10,770 a month
Last monthly salary
No
100 percent
Benefits are adjusted by
50 percent of the value of
any salary increases granted
to active civil servants
Yrls 7,000 a month; there is
also a minimum replace-
ment rate of 50 percent
Unknown
—
100 percent
100 percent
—
Unknown
—
100 percent
100 percent
—
Sources: GCSS and GASS 
Notes: Part-time workers, agricultural workers, domestics, seamen, and fishermen are excluded from the pension system.
— = Not available or not offered.
Tax Treatment of 
Pension Systems
APPENDIX D
The tax treatment of pension contributions and benefits has important
implications for fiscal policy, individual decisions regarding savings and
consumption, and equity. A generous tax system could encourage private
saving, but it would do so at the cost of forgone tax revenue (reduction
in public sector saving). Adverse redistribution may also result if high-
income individuals benefit more from tax exemptions than low-income
individuals. Three issues require attention: (a) What tax base should
be used: income or consumption? (b) If the latter, should the taxation be
front-loaded or back-loaded? (c) What role do subsidies (for example,
preferential tax treatment) have in voluntary saving for retirement?
Most countries tax income under the personal income tax scheme
(for a review of practices in the tax treatment of retirement savings, see
Whitehouse 2001). Under such an approach, savings are undertaken out
of taxed income, and interest income on these savings is taxed again. For
mandated retirement income, however, most countries have a different
type of treatment. In unfunded systems, contributions are typically tax
exempt, while benefits are fully taxed. The same approach is used for
funded schemes, where most of the interest earned is not taxed. For
retirement income, the consumption-type tax approach is thus applied,
which eliminates distortions on intertemporal consumption and saving
decisions. This is the appropriate treatment of retirement income.
However, not having taxes is not a good idea either. In some countries,
retirement savings remain totally untaxed, leading to distortions in the
other direction and questionable distributive outcomes, since essentially
the higher-income groups profit from this treatment.
A consumption-type tax treatment can, in principle, be achieved by
front-loading and back-loading taxation, while being neutral for the
intertemporal budget constraint of government. Under the latter,
contributions as well as interest earned remain untaxed, while benefits
are taxed (hence an exempt-exempt-tax, EET, treatment). Under the
former, contributions are taxed, while interest rates earned and benefits
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remain untaxed (hence a tax-exempt-exempt, TEE, treatment). In a
model-type setting (including constant marginal tax rate), both treat-
ments are equivalent. In a real-world setting, differences do emerge.
From a political point of view, an EET treatment may be preferred,
since a TEE approach may not be credible (because further taxation can
be introduced in the future). For budgetary reasons, however, a TEE
treatment may be preferred, because the government might not be
able to finance the extended tax credit under the EET approach. When
the tax system is progressive, TEE is likely to provide more tax revenues,
but EET provides more incentives for individuals to participate. Also, if
one stands by the notion that public investments have a lower marginal
product than private investments, EET treatment has the advantage of
freeing resources to be invested by the private sector. This will only hold
if the government reduces expenditure to balance the budget effect
while freeing resources to be used by the private sector. But it will not
hold if the government issues debt to finance the budget problem.
Hence, in a dynamic sense, EET treatment may provide, at least in
theory and ceteris paribus, higher overall tax revenues than TEE treat-
ment. Nonetheless, either EET or TEE is acceptable. The option a
country chooses will depend on its politics and the outlook of its fiscal
accounts. Any difference in the economic impacts of either option will
be of a second order of magnitude.
While there is strong consensus about the tax treatment of mandated
schemes (unfunded or funded) in the pension community, there is no
consensus about the tax treatment of voluntary schemes. For some
economists, preferential tax treatment (that is, consumption-type taxa-
tion) should also be applied, within limits, to voluntary schemes in
order to encourage the take-up of these schemes and to allow govern-
ments to play a more active role in regulation and supervision. For
other economists, such tax treatment does little to increase overall indi-
vidual saving, and an increase in take-up reflects simply a substitution
for other forms of saving. Even worse, the income effect of the prefer-
ential tax treatment may even reduce individual and government saving.
Still, even though consumption-type taxation may not increase saving
and may not deepen financial markets, it does change the composition
of financial intermediation favoring long-term funds. This, in turn,
reduces the refinancing risks of governments, banks, and enterprises
and reduces the leverage of enterprises, making them more resilient to
shocks.
A problem with consumption-type taxation under a progressive tax
system is that the well-off benefit the most, since low-income workers
with insufficient income to pay taxes do not benefit at all. Hence, an
alternative approach is for the government to grant matching subsidies
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to contributions to voluntary retirement plans. Moreover, using match-
ing subsidies instead of tax preferences permits the design of a well-
targeted, equitable, and transparent program. Such a program would be
available to nontax payers, which could increase coverage rates by
attracting the self-employed and informal sector workers to voluntary
pension plans.
In the Middle East and North Africa region, there is large variation
in the treatment of pension products (see table D.1). The tax treatment
differs according to whether the pension plan is mandatory or voluntary
and across providers—that is, pension funds or life insurance companies.
Some countries in the gulf—for instance, Bahrain—do not have an
income tax system.
Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the West Bank and Gaza tax
the mandatory pension plans twice. The same is true in Morocco, but at
reduced rates. Tunisia taxes these plans three times, although investment
income is taxed at a reduced rate. At the other extreme, Egypt provides
a generous tax treatment to pension plans.
Some countries heavily tax voluntary pension plans. In particular,
Lebanon taxes the contributions to the plans twice, while it taxes invest-
ment income and benefits once. In general, the tax system discourages
TABLE D.1
Tax Treatment of Pensions in Select Middle East and North African Countries
Country or territory Mandatory Voluntary Life insurance
Algeria ETT — —
Bahraina EEE EEE EEE
Djibouti EET — —
Egypt, Arab Rep. of EEE EEE —
Jordan EtE EEE TTT
Iran, Islamic Rep. of TTE — —
Lebanon EtE T2 TT TtE, Ttt
Morocco Ett EEt EtT, TtE, tEE, EEt
Tunisia TtT — —
West Bank and Gaza TETb EET —
Yemen, Republic of E-T — —
Source: Authors’ calculations based on several tax laws.
Notes: ETT means that contributions are exempted from income tax, while investment income of reserves and benefits are taxed. EEE means
that contributions, investment income of reserves, and benefits are exempted from income tax. EET (exempted, exempted, taxed) means that
contributions and investment income of reserves are exempted from income tax, while benefits are taxed. ETE means that contributions and
benefits are exempted from income tax, while investment income is taxed TTE-tax, tax, exempted. TTT means that contributions, investment
income, and benefits are subject to income tax. T2 TT means that contributions are subject to income tax twice, while investment income and
benefits are taxed once. TEE means that contributions are subject to income tax, while investment income of reserves and benefits are
exempted. E-T means that there is no information on the tax treatment of investment income. Finally, t stands for a tax rate lower than the
statutory tax rates, either because it is an implicit tax due to financial repression or because only part of the tax base is taxed.
— = Not available.
a. The country does not have income tax.
b. Proposed law adopts EET treatment.
voluntary long-term savings plans through life insurance. Some volun-
tary plans benefit from tax incentives without imposing limits on the
level of contributions, while other plans impose limits. 
Implicit taxation of investment income in the region results from
restrictions on the investment of pension reserves, forcing these funds to
purchase government or agency debt that is illiquid and bears below-
market yields. In addition, in some cases public pension fund managers
do not credit the full return into members’ accounts.
The governments should adopt best tax practice for mandatory plans,
either EET or TEE treatment. For voluntary plans, there should be a
limit on the contributions to tax-preferred schemes. In addition, it
would be advisable to consider implementing a pilot program based on
matching contributions to voluntary plans, also with a limit. Finally, the
governments should eliminate implicit taxation on investment income
by liberalizing investment rules, while strengthening the governance,
accountability, and investment policy of public pension funds.
Personal Income Tax Regulations in the Region
The following paragraphs summarize the personal income tax regula-
tions in a sampling of Middle East and North African countries.
In Algeria, employees’ social security contributions are deductible
against the personal income tax. Pension benefits are taxable. The
income tax schedule is as follows:
Band lower limit (thousands of dinars)
0 10,000 15,000 30,000 70,000 100,000
Tax rate (percent) 0 5 10 15 20 25
In Bahrain, there is no personal income tax. 
In Djibouti, pension contributions are deductible against the personal
income tax. Pensions in payment are taxable. For incomes between
DF 25,000 and DF 30,000 a year, the tax liability is DF 500. Thereafter,
the schedule is as follows:
Band lower limit 
(thousands of francs)
30 50 150 600
Tax rate (percent) 15 18 20 30
In Egypt, pensions are not subject to personal income tax. There is a
general deduction of LL 2,000 a year for single taxpayers plus LL 2,000
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a year additional allowance for earnings. The schedule applied after
these allowances is as follows:
Band lower limit (pounds)
0 2,500 7,000 16,000
Tax rate (percent) 20 27 35 40
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, there is a general income tax allowance
of Rls 19.2 million. Income above this level is taxed at a rate of 10 per-
cent. Social security contributions are not deductible for income tax
purposes. Pensions in payment are not subject to tax. 
In Jordan, employee social security contributions are deductible
against the personal income tax. Pensions in payment are not subject to
tax. There is no general allowance or basic relief, and the income tax
schedule is as follows:
Band lower limit (dinars)
0 2,000 6,000 12,000
Tax rate (percent) 5 10 20 25
In Lebanon, pensions in payment are subject to income tax. There is a
general allowance of LL 7.5 million a year for a single person. The tax
schedule, using 1999 numbers, is as follows:
Band lower limit (millions of pounds)
0 6 15 30 60 120
Tax rate (percent) 2 4 7 11 15 20
In Libya, there is a general personal allowance in the income tax, which
is LD 480 for a single person (higher for individuals who are married or
have children). The rate schedule after this allowance is as follows:
Band lower limit (dinars)
0 1,800 3,000 4,800 6,600 8,400
Tax rate (percent) 8 10 15 20 25 35
In Morocco, social security contributions are deductible against the
personal income tax. There is a general relief against earned income,
meaning that only 83 percent of wages is subject to the income tax.
Similarly, only 60 percent of pension income is taxable. The personal
income tax schedule is as follows: 
Band lower limit (dirhams)
0 20,000 24,000 30,000 60,000
Tax rate (percent) 0 13 21 25 44
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In Tunisia, pension benefits are subject to tax, but there is an abate-
ment of 25 percent. Social security contributions are deductible under
the personal income tax. Furthermore, 10 percent of earnings are
exempted from tax. The income tax schedule is as follows:
Band lower limit (dinars)
0 1,500 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000
Tax rate (percent) 0 15 20 25 30 35
In the West Bank and Gaza, employee contributions to the civil service
scheme are deductible against the income tax. Although practice has
varied in the past, pension benefits are not currently subject to income
tax. The income tax schedule is as follows:
Band lower limit (shekels)
0 7,200 12,000
Tax rate (percent) 0 8 16
In the Republic of Yemen, pension benefits are subject to tax. Social
security contributions are deductible against the personal income tax.
The income tax schedule is as follows: 
Band lower limit (rial)
0 3,000 7,000 22,000
Tax rate (percent) 0 10 15 20
APPENDIX E
Basic Formulas 
and Mathematical Results 
Used in the Analysis
Equivalence of the Standard Defined-Benefit Pension
Formula and the Formula Used in a Points System
In a points system, the pension is calculated as follows:
(E.1) BR =
(
R∑
t=1
βwt
pt
)
vR ,
where β is the contribution rate, wt is the wage at time t, pt is the
purchase value of the point at time t, vR is the liquidation value of the
point at time R, and R is the time of retirement. Hence, the expression
in parentheses gives the total number of points that an individual has
accumulated between dates 1 and R. By multiplying the total number
of points by the liquidation value of the point, we obtain the pension.
Equation E.1 can be rewritten as:
(E.2)
BR =
R∑
t=1
βwtv0 (1 + l) R
p0 (1 + r)t
=
R∑
t=1
βwtv0 (1 + l)t (1 + l) R−t
p0 (1 + r)t
= α
R∑
t=1
wtλt (1 + l) R−t ,
where α = βv0/p0 and λt = (1 + l)t/(1 + r)t .
Equation E.2 is exactly the standard defined-benefit formula when
all wages are included in the calculation of the pension. If r = 1, wages
are indexed by (1 + l) R−t . Hence, a points system is like a standard
defined-benefit system with an accrual rate equal to the contribution
rate times the ratio of liquidation and the purchase value of the point.
If both the purchase value and the liquidation value of the point are
indexed by the same factor (that is, 1 = r ), then the points system is
equivalent to a defined-benefit system like the RCAR in Morocco,
where all salaries are included in the calculation of the pension and
indexed by a factor of 1 (in the case of the RCAR, 1 is equal to the
growth rate of the average wage).
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Applying formula E.2 to the CIMR in Jordan, where v0 = 11.64 and
p0 = (1/0.1667)∗14.25, we find that the accrual rate offered by the sys-
tem today is equal to 0.82 percent (α = 0.0082). This accrual rate is
40 percent of the accrual rate offered by the RCAR (2 percent), but the
contribution rate is 33 percent of that of the RCAR.
Rates of Return in Earning-Related Schemes
In this section we investigate the equivalence between the virtual
account formula and the standard defined-benefit formula and the
implications for the expected internal rate of return on contributions.
Case of the Virtual Account Formula
We start by defining the formula to compute a pension in the notional
defined-contribution system. It is given by:
(E.3) p NDC =
β
R∑
t=1
wt (1 + g) R−t
L∑
k=R
sk (1 + r) R−k
,
where β is the contribution rate, g is the index for past salaries, r is the
rate used to discount future pensions, sk is the survival probability until
time (that is, age) k, R is the retirement age, and L is the maximum age
humans live (see figure E.1 for the survival probabilities used in
Morocco). The denominator in equation E.3 is known as the G factor.
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Let us call r∗ the expected rate of return on contributions that an
individual who enters the system at time 1 and retires at time R would
receive from this system. This rate guarantees that the present value of
contributions is equal to the present value of future pensions. Formally,
(E.4) β
R∑
t=1
wt(1 + r∗)−t −
L∑
k=R
sk p NDC (1 + r∗)−k = 0.
By substituting equation E.3 in equation E.4, we obtain:
(E.5)
β
R∑
t=1
wt(1 + r∗)−t − (1 + r)−R β
R∑
t=1
wt (1 + g) R−t
×
L∑
k=R
sk (1 + r∗)−k
L∑
k=R
sk (1 + r)−k
= 0.
Or, after simplification, assuming that r = r∗, we obtain:
(E.6)
R∑
t=1
wt(1 + r∗)−t −
R∑
t=1
wt (1 + g)−t = 0.
From equation E.6 it is easy to see that if an arbitrary number r∗ > 0
is chosen, and if we set g = r∗ and r = r∗, then r∗ verifies equation E.6,
and therefore r∗ is the expected implicit rate of return paid by the
system. In other words, the policy maker can choose the rate of return
that an individual gets in a virtual account by choosing the rate at which
salaries are indexed and using this rate to discount future pensions (that
is, to calculate the G factor).
The rate of return, r∗, is independent of the wage history, wt , and
the retirement age. This is a very important feature of the virtual ac-
count formula. If pensions are discounted by the same factor by which
wages are indexed, then all individuals, regardless of their wage history,
when they enroll, or when they retire, receive the same rate of return.
Redistribution can still take place, but through more transparent mech-
anisms such as the introduction of a minimum pension.
Case of the Traditional Defined-Benefit Formula
It is easy to see that the traditional defined-benefit formula, if all the
salaries are included in the calculation of the pension indexed by the
rate g , can be expressed as a virtual account formula. Indeed, we can
write:
(E.7)
p DB = α · R ·


R∑
t=1
wt (1 + g) R−t
R

 = α
R∑
t=1
wt (1 + g) R−t = ε · p NDC
= ε
β
R∑
t=1
wt (1 + g) R−t
L∑
k=R
sk (1 + r) R−k
,
where α is the accrual rate, the first expression in parentheses is the
average of all past wages and ε =
α
L∑
k=R
s t (1 + r) R−k
β
. If α = βL∑
k=R
s t (1 + r) R−k
, 
that is if α is equal to the contribution rate divided by the so-called G
factor, then ε is equal to 1 and therefore the traditional defined-benefit
formula gives exactly the virtual account formula (or notional defined-
contribution formula).
However, if α is higher than the contribution rate divided by the
G factor, the most frequent case across the world, then ε > 1. In this
case, the rate of return, r , needs to verify the following:
(E.8)
R∑
t=1
wt (1 + r)−t − ε
R∑
t=1
wt (1 + g)−t = 0.
Clearly, r∗ = r = g is not a solution to equation F.8. Indeed, with ε > 1,
we would have:
(E.9)
R∑
t=1
wt(1 + r∗)−t − ε
R∑
t=1
wt(1 + r∗)−t < 0.
The new rate of return, r∗∗, would need to be higher than r∗ for equa-
tion E.8 to hold. Indeed, by increasing r, each of the terms in equation E.8
becomes smaller, but the second term (which has ε) becomes smaller
“faster.” Thus the difference between the two terms, eventually, becomes
equal to 0. This is intuitive: the higher the accrual rate α, the higher ε and
therefore the higher the rate of return that the individual receives.
Let us assume that r∗∗ is the solution to equation E.8. Then we have:
(E.10)
R∑
t=1
wt(1 + r∗∗)−t − ε
R∑
t=1
wt(1 + r∗∗)−t = 0.
Since ε is greater than 1, a change in the wage history, wt , the
enrollment age, or the retirement age will have a greater effect on the
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second component of the equation, which is multiplied by ε. This
implies that the solution to equation E.10 will have to change, as the
two components of the equation are no longer equal. Hence, even if all
wages are included in the calculation of the pension in a standard
defined-benefit formula, as long as ε > 1, rates of return will be sensi-
tive to changes in individual socioeconomic characteristics. Redistribu-
tion will be a pervasive feature of the system, but it will be difficult to
understand “who is getting what.”
The solution to equation E.9 will also change if the contribution
rate changes. Indeed, an increase in the contribution rate implies an
increase in ε. Thus another important implication: the smaller the
contribution rate (or the higher the accrual rate), the higher ε and
therefore the higher the variation in rates of return resulting from
changes in the wage histories and enrollment-retirement strategies.
Formulas for Individuals Transferring from One Fund to Another 
In a well-designed defined-benefit scheme, the transfer of one em-
ployee from fund A to fund B will operate in the following way: the
total contributions to fund A up to date T of the transfer, indexed by its
sustainable rate of return, g , are calculated:
(E.11) CA = βA
T∑
t=1
wt (1 + gA) R−t .
The sum C is then transferred to fund B, where the contribution
rate, the sustainable rate of return, and the accrual rates can be differ-
ent from those in A, but set according to equation E.7. In fund B, the
transferred C continues to be indexed, but this time at the new rate.
The individual continues to contribute, at the new contribution rate,
until retirement at time R. The pension will then have two compo-
nents: one resulting from the new contributions in fund B and a second
resulting from the initial capital transferred from fund A. We have:
pB = αB · ( R − T ) ·


R∑
t=T
wt (1 + gB) R−t
R − T

+ αBβB CA (1 + gB) R−T.
(E.12)
In equation E.12, the capital C is divided by the contribution, because
C already represents contributions, whereas the accrual rate has to
apply to a sum of wages.
Some Clarifications Regarding the Calculations of Implicit Rates
of Return in this Study
Formally, the implicit rate of return is the discount rate that makes the
present value of pension payments equal to the present value of contri-
butions. A technical difficulty with the calculation of IRR is that pension
funds often do not separate the contributions allocated to various types
of benefits. For instance, separate contribution rates for old-age, disabil-
ity, and survivor pensions seldom exist. Even when the separation is
made, cross-subsidies between branches exist. In some cases, the same
contribution rate also finances short-term benefits such as maternity
leave. The approach taken here is to consider the total contribution to
old-age, disability, and survivor pensions. In those few cases where the
contribution rate also finances short-term benefits, which are small
relative to long-term benefits, the contribution rate is prorated. For
simplicity, however, the implicit rate of return is only computed from
the perspective of individuals who retire without benefiting from
disability benefits and considering only a survivor pension for the spouse
(if the individual is married). The resulting rate of return is a lower
bound for the average rate of return paid by the system, which includes
the payment of disability benefits and the presence of survivors other
than the spouse.
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This is the first comprehensive assessment of pension systems in the Middle East and NorthAfrica. The authors have compiled a wealth of information regarding the institutional,
demographic, and financial situation of more than 30 pension schemes in the region, which 
are benchmarked against those in other countries in the world.
T ime for Change shows that pensions systems in Middle East and North African countries face serious problems in terms of limited coverage, fragmented administration, and system 
design that harm economic efficiency and equity. In addition, and despite still favorable 
demographics, the financial equilibrium of the schemes is under threat. All schemes are 
accumulating large and unsustainable implicit pension debts. The inescapable future aging 
of the population will aggravate this problem.
The authors argue that countries in the region have a window of opportunity today to initiate reforms. They provide a framework for guiding discussions and for making objective
policy choices. Novel mechanisms to expand coverage to vulnerable population groups are 
discussed. The authors emphasize that there is no single paradigm to be followed when 
reforming a pension system and that choices need to reflect local cultural, social, and 
economic conditions.
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